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Few theories of politics in Soviet Uzbekistan have received greater attention, 
affirmation, and debate than the importance of regionalism, often depicted as manifested 
in elite “clans” or solidarity groups. Concentrated primarily in Tashkent, Samarkand, 
Ferghana, and to a lesser degree Khorezm, these groups are asserted to have been vying 
and scheming for power throughout the Soviet era. Three path-breaking works have been 
authored on the topic: Kathleen Collins’ Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central 
Asia, Pauline Jones Luong’s Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet 
Central Asia, and Olivier Roy’s The New Central Asia.  
Two circumstances compel a reappraisal of this hypothesis. First and foremost, 
neither these contributions nor any of the dozens of scholarly articles published on the 
topic build on primary archival sources. This dissertation fills this lacunae. Second, 
conflicting claims regarding this proposition give room for doubt. Luong, for example, 
averred in the early 2000s that cadre recruitment on the basis of region of origin in Soviet 
Uzbekistan was “overt” and well-known. What is puzzling is that Irwin Selnick’s 500-
page doctoral dissertation on elite recruitment in Uzbekistan, defended in 1984, did not 
even mention the possibility of such local favoritism, let alone using the concepts of 





Politburo was filled with figures from Rashidov’s Samarkand why did Selnick not 
recognize it?  
The reason, this dissertation contends, is because the notion of “clans” and 
strong regionalism in Uzbekistan is largely a myth. The origins of this myth trace to the 
dubious, populistic, and demonstrably false information on Uzbekistan presented by 
Soviet authorities in the mid-1980s. Older readers may remember the “cotton scandal” 
during these years, in which hundreds of Uzbek officials were purged following 
revelations of widespread corruption, embezzlement of cotton, and “mafia-rule”. This 
was also the catalyst of the clan/region hypothesis, pioneered by Donald Carlisle in 1985. 
This theory of extensive nepotism and subnational loyalties corresponded seamlessly 
with the picture portrayed by the Prosecutor General’s anti-corruption investigators, 
Telman Gdlyan and Nikolai Ivanov, as well as that of Rashidov’s successor Inamzhon 
Usmankhodzhaev, all of whom had a political agenda and, as will be detailed below, used 
biased or falsified information to support it.   
To back up these claims, this dissertation builds primarily on a close 
examination of primary sources in Moscow’s RGASPI and RGANI archives, 
biographical information gleaned from official Soviet Central Asian encyclopedias, 
Soviet newspapers, and party plenum reports. The main archival material used has been 
drawn from the Party Control Commission, which monitored party violations in the 
Soviet Union, including the presence of nepotism, localism (zemlyachestvo or 





1924 to independence in 1991, although plenty of material has been drawn also from 
other Soviet republics. Needless to say, whether locally based loyalties were more or less 
present in Uzbekistan than elsewhere in the Soviet Union can only be assessed 
comparatively.  
The main findings are: First, the archival record contains scant evidence that 
subnational loyalties were a major problem in Soviet Uzbekistan. While there were rifts 
to be sure, these were mostly limited to antagonisms between Uzbeks and Russian/Slavs 
in the Central Committee, “groupism” in the agricultural sector on the specific 
technologies to be used, and oligarchic decision-making in obkom and republican bodies. 
Locally based loyalties were noted elsewhere in the Soviet Union, especially in 
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and several Russian oblasts but only rarely 
in Uzbekistan.  
Second, it is true that figures hailing from Tashkent, Ferghana, and Samarkand 
dominated politics throughout the Soviet period. This could in part be explained by 
demographic factors: in 1976 Tashkent, Samarkand, and Ferghana oblast made up 29.7%, 
27.5%, and 26.5% of the population respectively, i.e., more than 80% of Uzbekistan’s 
total population. The supremacy of any one or two of these regions at any point in time 
could also be explained by Moscow’s intricate “hierarchy of regions” in which cadre 
were drawn from the most important oblasts, the ranking of which varied over the Soviet 
period; Minsk and Vitebsk filled analogous roles in Belarus, just as Vilnius and Kaunas 





Notably, however, when power over cadre appointment was extensively 
decentralized, principally during the Brezhnev era, this hegemony dissolved. At no point 
in Soviet Uzbekistan’s history did members of the Politburo hail from more varied 
regions than during the zenith of Rashidov’s powers, who served as First Secretary 
throughout the Brezhnev era. That Selnick did not detect any regionalism with this set up 
is not surprising since no such clear-cut pattern existed but is an erroneous construction 
of the post-Soviet era.  
Third, at the very moment when the clan/region hypothesis gained traction 
among Western scholars, in 1989, the Politburo and Supreme Soviet in Moscow, 
paradoxically, discussed a set of important classified and hitherto unexamined documents 
which questioned the revelations of the “cotton scandal”. One established that the 
corruption investigations in Uzbekistan had not only implicated a great number of 
innocent Uzbek officials but also fed the media with false information. Another made 
similar claims, calling on the Prosecutor General’s office to reassess the cotton scandal 
due to the slender or inexistent evidence on which many had been convicted. However, 
Uzbekistan was never “rehabilitated” from this morass since the Soviet Union collapsed 
two years thereafter. If it ever would have been revealed is doubtful since these findings 
were hushed while the USSR still existed.  
Why, then, does all of this matter? Beyond the obvious reasons that scholars 
may have been wrong, that the claims of tightly organized regional clans or “solidarity 





officials may have been wrongly convicted -- several of whom committed suicide -- the 
findings of this dissertation matter because they offer alternative hypotheses about Soviet 
Uzbekistan’s politics.  
Here, as elsewhere in the USSR, coalitions of protégés formed at the oblast and 
republican-levels primarily among former co-workers and associates. Region of origin 
played a marginal role at most in this calculus, as a careful tracing of the origins of 
members in protection pacts attests to. That the Uzbek elite typically served on average in 
three or more oblasts during their careers, as established in this dissertation, and were 
generally less “rooted” than the Soviet average diversified loyalties beyond home 
regions. Coalitions formed among figures of diverse origin, resulting in essentially non-
territorialized factions.   
In stark contrast stood neighboring Tajikistan whose Leninabad oblast supplied 
all of Tajikistan’s First Secretaries from 1946 to 1991 and all Chairmen of the Council of 
Ministers but one -- none of whom ever served outside of Leninabad or the capital oblast 
Stalinabad. Whereas heads of party and state came from heterogenous origins in 
Uzbekistan and a majority, as a rule, had traversed several oblasts during their careers, in 
Tajikistan political power was concentrated to a single region. This lopsided arrangement 
contributed to unleashing and sustaining a devastating civil war in Tajikistan after 
independence when power was transferred to officials hailing from Kulyab. Stability in 
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Note on Transliteration 
This dissertation employs the American Library Association – Library of 
Congress (ALA-LC) system in the romanization of the Russian Cyrillic alphabet. 
Diacritical marks have been omitted for the reader’s convenience. For Uzbek sources 
written in Cyrillic I adhere to the ALA-LC system but with the addition of the letters ў 
(transliterated “u”), қ (transliterated “q”), ғ (transliterated “gh”), and ҳ (transliterated 
“h”). For consistency, names, place-names, etc. during the Soviet period have been 
transliterated using the ALA-LC system (e.g. Khodzhaev) from archival sources rather 
than using the post-Soviet spellings in either the national Central Asian languages (e.g. 
Hojaev) or the common English variant (e.g. Khodjaev). For a few very common words, 
e.g. mahalla, the typical spelling in the English language has been used and not the ALA-
LC transliteration from Russian (i.e., makhalla).  Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, which 
during the Soviet period were known as “Kirgizia” and “Turkmenia”, are throughout the 
dissertation referred to as Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.  Tajikistan is also referred to as 
“Tajikistan” and not the transliteration from Russian Cyrillic “Tadzhikistan” or Tajik 
Cyrillic “Tojikistan”. Needless to say, the choice of transliterations used does not 
represent any political statement but is solely to facilitate the reader’s use and verification 






The Soviet Union, no less so than any other political system, was defined by a 
degree of regionalism. Regional networks developed in the state and party apparatuses 
when leading officials brought in their former co-workers from lower administrative-
territorial levels of government. National-level officials incorporated clients from the 
oblasts (provinces), oblast-level officials smoothed the way for former colleagues in the 
rayons (districts), and so on.   Since a position at the national level, with few exceptions, 
came through long service in the rayons and oblasts, place-based networks resulted from 
the Soviet pattern of upward mobility.1 The USSR’s intricate “hierarchy of regions” 
added impetus to this regionalism since a few prominent oblasts tended to be privileged 
sources of cadre recruitment.2 
While this source of regionalism has been recognized by most scholars of Soviet 
politics as valid in the Western parts of the empire, it has not been considered applicable 
                                                 
 
1 See e.g. John B. Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992).   
2 See Geoffrey Hosking, “Patronage and the Russian State,” The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 





to regionalism in Soviet Uzbekistan. Instead, contemporary Central Asia analysts 
maintain that Uzbekistan’s politics was defined by indigenous “clans” or a Central Asian 
regionalism fuelled by its “clan-based” history as opposed to “career-based” 
regionalism.3 The belief in these cultural singularities is so firm that the alternative theory 
of Soviet career-based regionalism has larely passed unnoticed in this literature’s 
explanation of Central Asian regionalism.  
Whether expressed as “clans”, regional factions, or “solidarity networks”,4  each 
of these theses on Central Asian regionalism share the assumption that politics in Soviet 
Uzbekistan was distinct and contested between groups bound by identity and territory 
representing specific cities or provinces. Of these, Tashkent, Samarkand, and Ferghana 
                                                 
 
3 Kathleen Collins, Clans, Pacts, and Politics: Understanding Regime Transition in Central Asia, PhD 
Dissertation, Stanford University, 1999, p. 105; Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political 
Continuity in post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002).  
4 The most thorough-going works are: Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central 
Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and 
Political Continuity in post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); Kathleen Bailey Carlisle, Clan and Politics in Uzbekistan, Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Boston College, September 2000; and Olivier Roy, Det Nya Centralasien (Stockholm: Alhambra, 2002). 
For similar accounts in Russian, see, e.g., D.A. Trofimov, “Klanovost kak element politicheskoj kultury 
Tsentralnoj Azii (na primere Kazakhstana, Uzbekistana i Kyrgyzstana),” in Politicheskaia Kultura Stran 
Azii i Afriki (Moscow, 1996); and S.N. Abashin, Natsionalizmy v Srednej Azii: v Poiskakh Identichnosti (St. 





have generally been regarded as the most powerful contestants even if other lesser ones 
e.g. Khorezm/Karakalpakstan and Kashkadarya also made their presence felt. An 
assumption of such region-based groups is that, if given a chance, they pursue a “winner 
takes all” policy and smooth the way for their rodstvenniki (relatives or people from the 
same place of birth) into governing positions.5 Conversely, Moscow had to engage in a 
constant balancing act to prevent any one of the regional groups from shoring up too 
much powers, lest they challenge its authority.6  
Thus, politics in Soviet Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia, in this 
interpretation, took on a fundamentally different character than elsewhere in the Soviet 
Union. In Central Asia regionalism concerned “identity” and “territory”; in other parts of 
the USSR, regionalism did not involve identity and territory per se. Place-based networks 
were merely epiphenomena of the Soviet career pattern, structures of trust in Soviet 
politics, and the hierarchy of regions. National solidarities, it follows, were all but 
inexistent in Central Asia since strong regional identities among the elite transcended 
                                                 
 
5 For an assessment and critique, see S. Frederick Starr, “Political Power in Uzbekistan,” Unpublished 
manuscript, p. 2.  
6 See e.g. Kathleen Collins, Clans, Pacts, and Politics: Understanding Regime Transition in Central Asia, 
PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, 1999, p. 168; Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in 





loyalties to the nation. Clan and region as sources of identity are rather presumed to have 
been activated in response to the Bolsheviks’ imposition of national republics.  
A number of factors speak in favor of the clan/region hypothesis: Uzbek family 
bonds are traditionally strong, analysts have provided a wealth of information on the 
workings of these groups even if often abstract, and the Bolsheviks adopted a tribal 
policy for the neighboring republic of Turkmenistan to balance the tribes.7 Besides, this is 
not only a Western finding or construct. The same view prevails among many local 
analysts. A group of Central Asian specialists wrote in 2011, for instance, that 
competition among Uzbekistan’s regionally organized “clans” presents “one of the most 
serious challenges to the Uzbek system”.8  That strong regional identities among the 
Uzbek populace derive from late state formation, as has been postulated, is also sound.9 
                                                 
 
7 Adrienne L. Edgar, ”Genealogy, Class, and Tribal Policy in Soviet Turkmenistan, 1924-34” Slavic 
Review, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Summer 2001), p. 266-67. 
8 Baktybek Beshimov, Pulat Shozimov, and Murat Bakhadyrov, “A New Phase in the History of the 
Ferghana Valley, 1992-2008,” in S.F. Starr (Ed.), Ferghana Valley: The Heart of Central Asia (New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2011), p. 220. For another influential account see Demian Vaisman, “Regionalism and Clan 
Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan,” in Yaacov Ro’i (Ed.) Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies 
(Portland: Frank Cass, 1995).  
9 Diora Ziyaeva, “Changing Identities Among Uzbek Youth: Transition from Regional to Socio-Economic 
identities,”  Paper prepared for the NBR conference “Generational Change and Leadership Succession in 
Uzbekistan,” Washington D.C., March 2, 2006; Alisher Ilkhamov, “The Limits of Centralization: Regional 
Challenges in Uzbekistan,” in Pauline Jones Luong (Ed.), The Transformation of Central Asia: States and 





Not formed until 1924, Uzbekistan was an agglomeration of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Karakalpaks 
and peoples from the three khanates that comprised Central Asia prior to the Russian 
conquest, and rural-urban migration that could inculcate in citizens a spirit of national 
identity was low throughout the Soviet period.  
On the other hand, a retrospective tracing of the evolution of this hypothesis and 
sources employed suggests that it must be treated as tentative. The clan/region hypothesis 
emerged after the unfolding of the “cotton affair”, which from 1984 and onwards 
condemned Uzbekistan as the most corrupt and nepotistic Soviet republic. Thus in 1984 
Rashidov’s successor First Secretary I. Usmankhodzhaev, at the 16th Plenum of the 
Uzbek Central Committee, accused his predecessor’s regime of staffing positions on the 
basis of “kinship, local favoritism, or personal devotion” among other unseemly habits.10 
Such accusations were novel. Uzbekistan had rarely been associated with the specific 
charge of kinship- or region-based promotions since its formation in 1924, as this 
dissertation will show. The notion of Uzbek regionalism, emerging two years thereafter 
in a pioneering article by Donald Carlisle, in all likelihood emanated from Moscow’s 
                                                 
 
Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006); Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in post-Soviet Central Asia: 
Power, Perceptions, and Pacts (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).    





portrayal of events.11  In 1989 scholars reconceptualized this “regionalism” into Uzbek 
elite “clans”.12 The timing is noteworthy since Soviet press a year earlier, from mid-1988 
and on, had begun proposing the existence of elite “clans” (klany) in Uzbekistan.13    In 
other words, there are grounds to believe that the scholarly conception of regionalism and 
“clans”, its subsequent elaboration, and projection far back into Soviet history stems 
consciously or unconsciously from Usmankhodzhaev’s unflattering judgments (or other 
related ones at the time) and Soviet central media.  
If this is a correct interpretation of events, is this a problem? It is since 
propaganda was part of the job descriptions of Soviet leaders and central media. 
Everything that was said should not necessarily be believed since propaganda was a 
weapon of policy. When push comes to shove, Uzbek officials may have acted no 
differently from other Soviet politicians who at times incorporated individuals from their 
native regions.  For example, when coming to power in 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev 
                                                 
 
11 The pioneering article was Donald Carlisle, “The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938–
83),” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No. 3-4, (1986).  
12 The Western studies on Uzbek “clans” emerged almost simultaneously in 1989-1990. One of the first to 
speak of Uzbek elite “clans” was: Boris Rumer, Soviet Central Asia: A Tragic Experiment (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, May 1989), p. 149 and p. 158. 
13 Trud, June 18 1988 in FBIS-SOV-88-125; Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 20, 1988 in FBIS-SOV-88-145; 
Literaturnaya Gazeta, August 17, 1988 FBIS-SOV-88-165. See also the untitled article by G. Ovcharenko 





immediately elevated his protégé Murakhovskii, the former Party Secretary of 
Gorbachev’s native Stavropol, to Chairman of Gosagroprom.14 And Leonid Brezhnev 
stood in a class of his own in his favoritism of former associates from his native 
Dnepropetrovsk, as will be detailed later in the dissertation.  
Which of these hypotheses, clan/region or “normal” Soviet regionalism, that 
most accurately describe politics in Soviet Uzbekistan is yet to be resolved. As noted by 
Frederick Starr,” the analytical and scholarly literature [on clans and regions in 
Uzbekistan] is almost entirely based on unproven assumptions.”15 One reason for the 
“unproven” nature of these assumptions is the scholarly neglect of Soviet archival 
sources among both proponents and critics of the clan/region hypothesis. Soviet 
Communist Party organs closely monitored and kept tabs on nepotism, localism, and 
corruption in its ranks and its confidential documents are thus clearly a rich source on this 
question. Adrienne Edgar’s thorough-going account on Soviet Turkmenistan noted above 
points the way. Even if limited to the formative 1920s and early 1930s, her archival 
research shows how Soviet authorities perceived tribal loyalties among the nomadic 
                                                 
 
14 Gordon Smith, “Gorbachev and the Council of Ministers: Leadership Consolidation and Its Policy 
Implications,” Soviet Union, Vol. 14, No. 3 (1987), p. 353.  





Turkmen “elite” to be a problem and that they responded to it.16 Whether such strong 
place- or kinship-based loyalties could be observed also in the settled Uzbekistan and 
among its elite is for this dissertation to determine.  
Unlike existing works on patronage in Soviet Uzbekistan, my research is based 
on archival sources, which were closed to scholars during the Soviet period but which 
have been made available since. It takes note of the theories on informal politics outlined 
above just as it acknowledges the workings of the Soviet Union’s formal system of 
appointments, the nomenklatura.17 But it defers judgment on the accuracy of both, asking 
instead: To what degree was patronage in Soviet Uzbekistan, to use Merle Fainsod’s 
phrase, “a mirror of Soviet reality”? Or, alternatively, how and how much did it deviate 
from Soviet patronage politics exercised elsewhere?  
The Stakes of These Hypotheses 
Proponents of the clan/region hypothesis argue that Soviet Uzbekistan and 
independent Uzbekistan was and is profoundly split along regional lines. This holds for 
                                                 
 
16 Adrienne L. Edgar,”Genealogy, Class, and Tribal Policy in Soviet Turkmenistan, 1924-34,” Slavic 
Review, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), pp. 266-67. 
17 I am indebted to Frederick Starr’s similar way of formulating the problem, though his account concerns 





both the general citizenry and elite groups. This implies that the regional groups have 
both identity, territory, and resources under their control, i.e., all those attributes that 
typically are associated with the risk of civil war.18 Some recent observers have even 
argued that Moscow during the Soviet period manipulated Uzbekistan’s seven “clans” 
(Samarkand, Tashkent, Ferghana, Jizak, Kashkadarya, Khorezm, and Karakalpak) to 
preempt the formation of a united Uzbek people.  Exploiting these clan divisions was, in 
this interpretation, a delicate task since “Moscow had to ensure that the rivalries did not 
erupt into outright war between the clans because Moscow was not certain that it could 
contain such hostilities.”19 A number of publications in the past two years have made 
similar claims on the importance of Uzbekistan’s regional “clans” and their potentially 
destructive impact.20  
                                                 
 
18 See, for example, David Laitin, “Ethnic Unmixing and Civil War,” Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4 
(2004), pp. 350-65; and Monica Duffy Toft,  The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the 
Indivisibility of Territory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).   
19 See, “A History of the Uzbeks: From the Silk Road to the Soviet Union,” Stratfor, December 30, 2013. 
Part one of the three part series “The Clans of Uzbekistan”.   
20 See e.g. Alexey Malashenko, The Fight for Influence: Russia in Central Asia (Moscow: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2013), p. 196; Alisher Ilkhamov, “Stalled at the Doorstep of Modern 
Statehood: The Neopatrimonial Regime in Uzbekistan,” in Emilian Kavalski (Ed.), Stable Outside, Fragile 
Inside? (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 206-210; David Lewis, “Understanding the Authoritarian State: 






Most prominent among them, Kathleen Collins argues that had Uzbekistan’s 
regional “clans” not hammered out a pact prior to independence the republic would likely 
have spiraled down into a similar civil war that ripped neighboring Tajikistan apart in the 
1990s.21 The assumption is that regionalism was equally pronounced in both cases and 
that the absence or presence of pacts among the regional elites were the critical factor 
shaping their post-Soviet trajectories. However, if the extent of regionalism in Soviet 
Uzbekistan has been exaggerated and if the politics related more to “normal” career-
based Soviet patronage politics, this explanation may be spurious. Hypothetically, 
differences in the extent and nature of regionalism in these two cases may to some degree 
have accounted for the absence or presence of civil conflict and its sustenance.  
Purpose and Definitions 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the extent of “localism” and 
regionalism in Uzbekistan during the Soviet period. This topic has never been explored 
using primary archival sources.  Yet far-reaching claims have been made about 
regionalism and “clans” in Soviet Uzbekistan’s politics and its implications for post-
                                                 
 
21 Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (New York: Cambridge 





Soviet politics.22 The Soviet period is crucial since no contemporary analyst asserts that 
the Uzbek “clans” were created ex nihilo; they were products of pre-Soviet and Soviet 
government and society. In other words, if their presence during the Soviet period has 
been overstated, or perhaps even significantly exaggerated, then it is reasonable to 
question their existence also in the post-Soviet period.  
My original contribution is to address this topic by using hitherto unexamined 
primary archival sources from the RGANI and RGASPI archives in Moscow. The study 
is primarily limited to Uzbekistan, even if some evidence and implications have been 
gleaned from archival and other material relating to the rest of Central Asia and other 
Soviet republics.  
For reasons that were expounded upon above, several circumstances render the 
evolution of the clan/region hypothesis and proof for it suspect. This dissertation aspires 
to bring an objective approach to this puzzle without preconceptions. All material 
relevant to the theme has been included regardless of whether it supports or contradicts 
the clan/region hypothesis. Biographical source references have also been specified for 
each individual to provide verifiable data on backgrounds.  
                                                 
 
22 Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet 





I should define the analytical terms employed here, regionalism and localism, 
more precisely. Regionalism implies that the primary socio-political identities of citizens 
and the elite are oriented regionally rather than nationally and consequently that loyalties 
are directed towards regions (oblast in Russian) rather than the Uzbek nation.23 While 
regionalism may or may not be a relevant “category of analysis”, it was not a Soviet 
“category of practice”. The concept used for sub-national loyalties in Soviet documents 
was the related concept of zemlyachestvo (people from the same city, county or province) 
who associate to generate mestnichestvo (the promotion or acquisition of privileges on 
the basis of place of origin and family status, not merit).24  In the English language, a 
better cognate than “regionalism” to these two Russian words is “localism”, which is less 
geographically precise.25 “Localism”, in a political sense, should here be understood as a 
                                                 
 
23 It should be noted that the notion of “regionalism” in the Soviet polity differs depending on level of 
analysis. At least three levels existed in the Soviet period: federation, republic, and oblast. The second and 
third might both be called “regionalism” depending on the analyst’s point of view.  
24 See entry ”Mestnichestvo” in Istoriya Otechestva, Bol’shaya Rossijskaya Entsiklopediya (Moscow, 
1997) and “Zemlyachestvo” in A. Kryukovskikh, Slovar’ Istoricheskikh Terminov  (Moscow: 1998). 
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Uzbekskij Slovar’ (Tashkent: Qomuslar Bosh Taririiati, 1993). The concepts of “clans” and “tribe” are 
blurred in the Uzbek language. Thus, the Uzbek Academy of Sciences’ Russian-Uzbek dictionary translates 
“klan” as both urug (tribe) and qawm (“village solidarity group”). See Ruscha-Uzbekcha Lughat (Moscow: 





preference for personnel from one’s home-town or region of origin and the extension of 
certain privileges to it.  This dissertation will employ this concept, not “regionalism”, as 
the English translation of zemlyachestvo and mestnichestvo, even if the original terms are 
provided whenever possible. “Clan”, it should be said, is not used when analyzing 
archival material in this dissertation for the sole reason that the Russian loan word “klan” 
was rarely, if ever, used in correspondence and primary sources.  
The overarching purpose of this dissertation is to portray and analyze politics as 
understood and interpreted by contemporaries in primary sources. The critic may object 
that some nuances of the modern concepts of “clan” or regionalism may have eluded 
contemporaneous observations. In simple terms, the Russian concepts of localism and 
nepotism may not test “clans” or regionalism precisely since these are modern categories 
of analysis rather than Soviet era categories of practice. If one is intent on using primary 
sources there is no conceivable way of bridging this conceptual gap perfectly. But the 
benefits with using primary sources and categories of practice, I trust, is greater than 
projecting modern concepts on the past without primary sources that could test the 





Sources and Method  
Archival Material 
This dissertation relies primarily on material gathered at the Russian State 
Archive for Social and Political History (RGASPI) and the Russian State Archive of 
Modern History (RGANI). RGASPI’s holdings include primary documents up to the 
death of Stalin and RGANI’s stretches from the early 1940s to the collapse of the USSR.  
Parts of the RGASPI archive have been digitized and is since 2013 available online at the 
website “Dokumenty Sovetskoj Epokhi” (DSE).26 This forms the backbone of sources 
used for the formative years 1917-1953 explored in this dissertation. The coverage in 
DSE is uneven with the majority of documents dating to the 1920s and 1930s. Even so, 
several relevant documents relating to Uzbekistan from the 1940s and early 1950s have 
been found, examined, and complemented with material from RGANI.   
The RGANI archives are only available on site and I therefore undertook a 
month-long research trip to Moscow. Their holdings are divided into 9 Fonds.27 Of these, 
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Union Central Committee and Otdel 1939-1966; Fond 9 includes Central Committee material (all-Union) 
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Fond. 6, which contains material of the Party Control Commission (Komitet Partiinogo 
Kontrolia) 1939-1966, was used most extensively. The Party Control Commission was an 
organ of the Central Committee tasked with ensuring that official rules and norms of 
party life were observed and that nomenklatura rules were adhered to.28 As such, no 
material of any other individual agency in the Soviet Union is arguably as valuable for 
establishing the extent of patronage, localism, and other violations of party members as 
the evaluations of the Party Control Commission. My focus was on files relating to 
Uzbekistan but documents for other republics have also been examined since the absence 
or presence of localism, nepotism, or any other transgression of party rules must be 
viewed comparatively. Needless to say, whether a specific violation was more or less 
present than elsewhere can only be determined through comparison. Regrettably, the vast 
majority of documents from the Brezhnev-period remains classified for all Soviet 
republics, including those of the Party Control Commission. This inevitably creates a gap 
of archival sources in this dissertation for the years 1961 to the early 1980s. The key 
material for the 1980s was obtained in Fond 89, a “special collection” of classified 
documents, which contained a number of valuable documents on the “cotton affair”.    
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Beyond RGANI and RGASPI, other archival sources used include: the Dmitri 
Volkogonov papers at the Library of Congress, containing some other declassified 
material on the “cotton affair” in the 1980s; the Alexander Yakovlev archives whose 
holdings include a few relevant primary sources (http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org); 
and George Washington University’s collection of Soviet documents 
(http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/rus/Collections.html). Primary sources and 
contemporaneous Russian writings used for the pre-Soviet background in Chapter 2 have 
been gathered principally at the Russian State Library in Moscow and at the Library of 
Congress.  
In parallel to examining archival material, I have employed the Uzbek Central 
Committee’s official resolutions and plenum reports published in Pravda and Pravda 
Vostoka. These provide a useful check to the classified material and an opportunity to 
examine the extent to which public reports correspond or deviate from it. Additional 
information has been gleaned from some of the Party Control Commission’s published 





violations in each Soviet republic.29 These informative publications previously belonged 
to the library of the USSR Central Committee but are now accessible at RGANI.  
When evaluating archival documents the strategy was in part to search for 
references to localism (mestnichestvo or zemlyachestvo), nepotism (kumovstvo) and 
promotion of rodstvenniki (relatives or “kinsmen”). The language used in Soviet party 
documents is Russian which make these Russian terms the categories of analysis here 
rather than their Uzbek or English equivalents (e.g. mahalgaroi, clan). The contemporary 
English word used, “clan”, or its Russian loanword “klan” was never encountered during 
this author’s archival research on either Uzbekistan or elsewhere, even if Siberian, 
Caucasian, Kazakh, and Turkmen tribes (plemya) are occasionally referred to. The use or 
non-use of these concepts for Uzbekistan’s politics were compared also with their use or 
non-use in other Central Asian and non-Central Asian republics to gain an appreciation of 
the incidence of these phenomena comparatively. The employment of these terms formed 
the main benchmarks for comparison.  
However, archival documents were not only assessed on these criteria but also 
what they reveal about Soviet politics in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in general. For 
                                                 
 
29 The volumes consulted are: V.M. Lyukov et. al., Partijnyj Kontrol’: Printsipy, Praktika, Zadachi 
(Moskva: Polizdat, 1983); Spravochnik Partijnogo Rabotnika (Moskva, 1983); and Organizatsionnaya 





example, what were the main sources of conflict in the Uzbek Central Committee and 
between what types of groups? What were the respective powers of the native First 
Secretary and non-native Second Secretary in cadre policy and appointments, the powers 
of which formally belonged to latter? And what were the main forms of party violations 
in Uzbekistan and in what ways, if any, did they differ from other republics? Answers to 
these questions and other related ones have been sought persistently, though the nature of 
archival material and their often uneven temporal coverage inevitably renders some data 
and analysis more exhaustive on these questions than others.  
Biographical Data 
By far the most difficult, though not insurmountable, obstacle on this topic is the 
sparsity of biographical data. Reliable biographical data are essential since career patterns 
and birth places cannot be established without it. Yet there is no single comprehensive 
source of biographical information on leading Uzbek province- and republic-level 
officials in either the English and Russian languages. General sources such as the Great 
Soviet Encyclopedia (in Russian and English) only provides data on Uzbek heads of state 
and party, not officials at lower levels or even members of the Central Committee 
Bureau. Instead, this information must be pieced together from other more obscure 





Encyclopedia, which was published only in the Uzbek language.30 This 14-volume 
encyclopedia was published sequentially from 1971 to 1980, starting with the first 
volume A-B in 1971 and ending with “Kh”, the last letter in the Uzbek Cyrillic alphabet, 
in 1980. The Uzbek Soviet Encyclopedia includes biographical information, including 
birthplace, for most though not all leading Uzbek officials at the province- and republic-
level. Some of those omitted, however, appear in the equivalent encyclopedias for the 
other Soviet Central Asian republics, especially the Tajik Soviet Encyclopedia,31 the 
Kyrgyz Soviet Encyclopedia,32 and the Kazakh Soviet Encyclopedia.33 These have also 
been employed for establishing career patterns and origins of some Tajik officials. The 
importance of this primary source of official biographical data on Uzbek and Central 
Asian officials cannot be understated since there exists no other comparable source, 
except for the obituaries and other tidbits of biographical material published in Pravda 
Vostoka and other local newspapers. Less comprehensive but still informative is the 
Sovetskij Enstiklopedicheskij Slovar’, published in the Kyrgyz Soviet republic, which 
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1972-1980). This encyclopedia is available for consultation at Russia State Library’s Oriental Institute in 
Moscow.  
31 Entsiklopediyai Sovetii Todzhik, Vol. 1-8 (Dushanbe: Akademiyai Fankhon RSS Todzhikistan, 1986-
1988).  
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contains thumbnail sketches of a few leading Central Asian officials.34 Another source 
used is the 2010 edition of the O’zbekistan Milliy Entsiklopediyasi, which is less 
exhaustive than its Soviet predecessor, more arbitrary in its selection of Uzbek officials, 
but a valuable complement since it contains biographical information of several since 
rehabilitated Soviet Uzbek officials excluded in the 1970s version.35   
Biographical data have been employed, in part, to test the assertion that figures 
from particular Uzbek regions clustered in specific state institutions during the Soviet 
period. Because of the dearth of biographical material on Soviet Uzbek officials, this 
inquiry must be limited in scope and focus mainly on the top executive body of Soviet 
Uzbekistan – the Central Committee and its Bureau. This alone is a challenge since a few 
disgraced officials have vanished from the pages of encyclopedias, but it is nevertheless 
an indicator to the prevalence of regionalism and localism, and a test of the accuracy of 
existing data on the subject. Biographical data also shed light on elite mobility between 
oblasts and the extent of “rootedness” among officials, potentially intersecting careers 
among patrons and clients, the amount of native/non-native oblast first secretaries, and 
the degree to which republican-level officials rose through the provinces. The latter has 
proven to be a catalyst of “regionalism” elsewhere in the USSR and deserves to be tested 
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in Uzbekistan as well. No comprehensive study of politics in Soviet Uzbekistan can do 
without reliable biographical sources. They are thin evidence alone, however, since they 
do not reveal motives, sources of conflict, Moscow’s perceptions of the absence or 
presence of localism, in whose hands political power over appointments were, and what 
happened behind the curtains of publicly available data in general. This lacunae must be 
filled with archival sources – policy directives, party control documents, letters, 
evaluations, and other assessments.  
The Evolution of the Clan/Region Hypothesis  
The Neglect of Primary Sources 
A primary source is typically defined as a document written or created during 
the time under study by someone present and with “inside experiences” and a secondary 
source the interpretation of primary sources.36 In this definition, the present literature on 
clans and regions in Soviet Uzbekistan has been based on neither primary nor secondary 
sources unless Soviet media is treated as a “primary source”. Evidence has appeared in 
five main forms: biographical data on birth places and regions of origin of officials 
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whereby officials from particular places are declared to have dominated the state 
apparatus at various points in time;37 circumstantial “cultural” evidence regarding Central 
Asia’s traditionally tribal and patriarchal society;38 material on Soviet administrative-
territorial policy and “stability of cadres” in regions;39 interviews with officials pertaining 
to the post-Soviet period;40 news media; as well as references to other published books 
and articles.   
This absence of primary sources, rarely reflected upon by adherents of the 
clan/region hypothesis, generates a risk of unintended abstraction, reification and a 
cumulative chain of reinterpretations and misinterpretations. Hypotheses may be 
amplified and reformulated yet without the addition of new real evidence based on 
primary sources. Even if several scholars have brought considerable insight to bear on 
Uzbekistan’s opaque politics, it is necessary to insert a “reality check” by tracing how the 
clan/region hypothesis evolved in the absence of primary or secondary sources. This, in 
turn, may offer initial clues to the robustness of this premise.   
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38 See e.g. Olivier Roy, Det Nya Centralasien (Stockholm: Alhambra, 2002). 
39 See e.g. Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in post-Soviet Central Asia: 
Power, Perceptions, and Pacts (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
40 See e.g. Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (New York: Cambridge 





The Pre-1986 Literature  
The role of personal linkages bypassing or interfering with the nomenklatura 
system and formal channels became an intensely studied area of Soviet politics in the 
1960s and 1970s. But these analyses were generally confined to the politics of the center 
or the national republics in the Western part of the empire -- in particular Ukraine, 
Belarus, Russia, and Lithuania -- and did not extend to Central Asia.41 Only a handful of 
publications hinted to the presence of recruition on a “local” or kinship-basis in 
Uzbekistan. Of these, the Handbook of Central Asia in 1956 noted the “special problem” 
of “bribes, nepotism, and friendship ties in choosing personnel for remunerative posts in 
Central Asia”.42 Likewise, Alexandre Bennigsen remarked in 1979 that the kolkhozes [in 
Turkmenistan and in particular in Kazakhstan] were “often based on clan kinship” and in 
some places even cadres “were selected for certain positions in local party and 
government organs according to clan/tribal structure”.43 Citing both the Handbook of 
Central Asia and Bennigsen’s article, Nancy Lubin similarly postulated in 1984 that 
                                                 
 
41 See, e.g., Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957-1964 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1966); Sidney Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of 
Agricultural Policy, 1953-1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965); and Merle Fainsod, 
Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958).   
42 Handbook of Central Asia, Vol. 3 (New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files, Inc., 1956), p. 776. 
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kinship was of “importance” in Central Asian cadre selection and that “blood ties or 
ancestry” had simply been “transferred to modern day-hiring practices in Uzbekistan”.44 
Except for these observations, none of which provided any specific examples, 
regionalism or localism were still peripheral concerns and undeveloped hypotheses at this 
point.  
It is true that some Russian and French experts spoke about a social basis of 
“clans” in Central Asia from the late 1950s.45 But there were no suggestions in this 
literature that these “clan” impulses had penetrated politics.46   Bennigsen, cited above, 
even criticized Soviet ethnographers at the time for “exaggerating” the problem of 
surviving clans for political purposes. Bennigsen did recognize the presence of intact 
“clans” in a kolkhoz in Uzbekistan’s rural Khorezm oblast, parts of Kazakhstan, and a 
                                                 
 
44 Nancy Lubin, Labor and Nationality in Central Asia (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1984), 
p. 164.  
45 Alexander Bennigsen, “La Famille Musulmane en Union Soviétique” Cahiers du Monde Russe et 
Soviétique, Vol. 1, No.1 (May, 1959); Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, “Les Survivances pré-Islamiques chez 
les Musulmans de l'U.R.S.S.” Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April - June, 1961), 
pp. 212-227 ; A. Zdanko, “Karakalpaki Khorezmskogo Oazisa”, in Arkheologicheskie i Etnograficheskie 
raboty Khorezmskoj Ekspeditsii I945-1948 (Moskva, 1952), p. 514; See also the conference proceedings of 
Materialy Ob'edinennoj Nauchnoj Sessii Posvjalcennoj Istorii Srednej Azii i Kazahstana v do-Oktjabrskij 
period (Tashkent: Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, 1955).    
46 S. Gadzieva, “K Voprosu o Tuhume i Bolshoj Sem'e u Kajakentskih Kumykov” K.S.I.E., Vol. 14, 





few other places but viewed these as “isolated cases”.47  Extended families were still an 
important part of Central Asian society but these were “clans” in name only, and the 
shape and strength of these varied enormously and among the sedentary Bashkir, Tatar, 
Azeris, Uzbeks and Tajiks they “had practically disappeared.”48  
Even in the nomadic areas, S.M. Abramzon in the 1950s distinguished an 
evolution of kinship bonds from one of “totem clans” or rodovaya obshchina in the first 
centuries of the first millennium, to aul’naja obschina (village society) towards the end 
of the millennium, patriarchal extended families thereafter, conjugal smaller extended 
families in the 15th and 16th centuries, and unions of these families by the time of the 
Bolshevik revolution. Economic development broke up the traditional “totem clan”, 
diversified loyalties from territory, introduced a class element to the extended families, 
and bound families together on an economic basis. Thus, in the early 20th century family 
units in the nomadic areas had undergone quite a transformation. Even if the “unions of 
families” often shared the belief in a mythical common ancestor, the “clans” at this point 
in time were quite different from their predecessors in history.49 The Kyrgyz and 
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48 Ibid., p.88.   
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Kazakhs, Alexander Park remarks, were “in a transitional stage between nomadism and 
agriculture [where] tribal ties, though still important were slowly disintegrating”.50 Only 
the Turkmen retained the old tribal political organization almost intact.   
Conceivably, the general scholarly neglect of “localism” in Central Asia 
stemmed from the assumption that politics in Central Asia followed general Soviet norms 
and was not distinct from other Soviet republics. Thus, Irwin Selnick’s dissertation on 
elite recruitment in Uzbekistan from 1984 inferred that nationality was the main 
determinant of power distribution whereby Central Asians and non-Central Asians were 
allocated institutionalized quotas in placement of cadre.51 As such, the share of 
natives/non-natives was not determined by either the lack of qualified Central Asian 
cadre or Moscow’s preference for central appointees. Offices were distributed by a 
carefully elaborated formula whereby some offices were reserved for natives and others 
for non-natives. Thus, “the mechanism of political recruitment [in Uzbekistan],” he 
concluded, “is based more on central determinations than personal decisions”.52 Selnick 
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speaks about “localism” in Uzbekistan at a few points in the dissertation. However, by 
localism he means not the power of regions and cities but Uzbek “localism” vis-à-vis 
Moscow, i.e., the protection of Uzbek interests against Russia.  If someone demonstrated 
tendencies of “localism”, this implied the favoring of Uzbek interests over Soviet ones. 
Region of origin, birth place, and the like were not mentioned, let alone considered to be 
of importance.  
Likewise, Gregory Gleason’s dissertation on the politics of Uzbekistan’s cotton 
complex during the Brezhnev era (also completed in 1984) did not perceive these 
factors.53 Other first-rate scholars -- Richard Pipes, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, and others 
– did not take note of these phenomena either at the time.54 If anything, what defined the 
literature of the 1960s and 1970s was the emphasis on the uniting force of nationalism 
among the Uzbek and Central Asian elite, not divisive forces of regionalism.55  
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By the time of Gorbachev’s launch of glasnost and perestroika in 1986, this 
literature underwent a profound transformation. While nationalism and ethnicity 
remained in focus several years thereafter the analysis of political power in Central Asia 
was incrementally overtaken by the emphasis on regionalism and “clans”. Perhaps the 
reorientation towards regionalism was to be expected since similar observations had been 
made elsewhere in the USSR.56 However, the regionalism in Central Asia was disjointed 
and asserted to be of a different quality than in other Soviet republics. Here, it was 
attributed to pre-Soviet history and Central Asia’s clan-based society and not primarily to 
Soviet policies and structures of trust in Soviet society.  
The Pioneering Contribution: Carlisle’s 1986 Article 
The first contribution on regionalized power was Donald Carlisle’s pioneering 
article on the Uzbek “power elite” published in 1986.57  Identifying a number of 
regionally based power groups in Uzbekistan (Tashkent, Ferghana Valley, 
Samarkand/Bukhara, Khorezm/Karakalpaks, and Kashkadarya/Surkhandarya), this article 
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was the embryo from which the post-Soviet literature on clans and region would 
develop.58 Carlisle’s argument was that the geographical subdivisions in the Moscow-
published book “Uzbekistan” of Uzbekistan’s “Salient Regions” could also be translated 
into a political map with the regional loyalties and geographic power bases of Uzbek 
politicians corresponding neatly with these regions.59  
Hence, (1) and (2) in Map 1 below matched with the salient regions/political 
factions of Tashkent and Ferghana Valley, (3) to Samarkand/Bukhara, (4) to 
Kashkandarya and Surkhandarya, and 5) to Karakalpakstan and Khorezm.   Carlisle did 
not define these factions as “clans” but as a “type of regional ‘group politics’” founded 
upon a politician’s “local loyalties and regional roots”, which ostensibly were unique to 
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Map 1: Uzbekistan’s “Salient Regions” 
 
 
1) Northeastern, 2) Eastern, 3) Central, 4) Southern, and 5) Northwestern.   
Source: L.N. Babushkin (Ed.), Uzbekistan (Moscow: Mysl’, 1967). Donald 
Carlisle, “The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938–83),” Central 
Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No. 3-4, (1986), p. 94.  
 
Carlisle’s main body of evidence in support of this regionalization was 
biographical/career data of Uzbek officials and a compilation of the “regional roots” of 





analysis formed the foundation for the “regionalism” framework which Pauline Jones 
Luong and other prominent authors nearly two decades thereafter would further refine.61  
While pathbreaking, at least two problems could be identified with this regional 
theory: First, the “Salient Regions” conflicted with the regional political identities spoken 
of. For example, the Tashkent region (1) on this map includes the entire Jizak oblast 
(which surrounds the placement of the number “1” on this map). Politically, however, 
Jizak has been associated by Carlisle and others with the Samarkand faction and as the 
primary antagonist of the Tashkent-based group.  Second, the “Salient Regions” coincide 
neatly with Uzbekistan’s six original oblasts at the time of delimitation in 1925 – 
Zaravshan, Kashkadaria, Samarkand, Tashkent, Khorezm, and Ferghana. But these were 
broken up into smaller units and constantly readjusted. As soon as a year thereafter, in 
1926, they had nearly doubled to 10 oblasts and these were also the main building blocks 
that were to define Uzbekistan’s oblasts ever since.62 If the hypothesis that 
administrative-territorial borders served to reinforce loyalties is correct, then the 
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Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 84.  
62 The 1926 oblasts (then called okrugs) were Bukhara, Urta-Zaravshan, Kashkadarya, Surkhandarya, 
Samarkand, Tashkent, Khodjent, Khorezm, Andijan, and Kokand. See S. K. Abdurazakov, 





proliferation of oblasts should rather have broken up than fostered the regionalism 
associated with the “Salient Regions” and the original six oblasts.  
Nonetheless, this was a novel framework and it competed with several other 
interpretations of elite recruitment in the same volume of the journal, ranging from ethnic 
determinants of politics to the force of nationalism.63 Of these, however, the clan/region 
hypothesis would eventually emerge as the “paradigm”. Uzbek nationalism was generally 
confined to citizen nationalism in the literature and not a property of a united nationalistic 
Uzbek elite.64  The dissolution of the Soviet Union also partially dislodged the “ethnic” 
aspect of politics since Russians were gradually purged from the state apparatus in the 
first decade of independence.65 
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The Post-1986 Literature 
Putting the past in a new light, Carlisle’s pioneering article inspired a new post-
1986 literature whose common denominator was the emphasis on clans, regionalism, and 
solidarity groups. Several dozen articles and book chapters were subsequently published, 
most of which were concentrated in the 1990s and 2000s.66 Carlisle only superficially 
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elaborated on the causes behind the Uzbek regional power groups but this lacuna was 
filled by subsequent scholars. Henceforth, the roots of factionalism were generally 
understood to be three: Uzbekistan’s traditionally “clan-based” social organization, the 
Soviet Union’s empowerment of particular regions, and/or the paternalism of Central 
Asian Islamic society. Some stressed the synergy of all of them, others only one or two. 
Novel in this new literature, however, was the turn to society as a determinant of politics 
in Soviet and post-Soviet Uzbekistan.   
A key contribution was Olivier Roy’s The New Central Asia, first published in 
French in 1997. This book devotes several chapters to Uzbekistan’s and Central Asia’s 
“solidarity groups”, the “core unit” of social organization in pre-Soviet Central Asia. 
These groups were often but not always place-based in the qawm, mahalla, or avlod -- all 
terms relating to extended families and communal forms of living -- and tribally 
organized only among the Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, and Turkmens. In Roy’s interpretation, 
Soviet rule breathed new life into these networks whose manifestations in politics became 
region-based elite power groupings (e.g. Khodkent or Kulabi in Tajikistan and Tashkent 
or Samarkand in Uzbekistan).67  To acquire and retain power, the leaders in the Soviet 
Central Asian republics built power bases which “always were regional”. Power holders 
rose to the top with the assistance of figures from their native regions and once there they 
                                                 
 





reciprocated by promoting their rodstvenniki into positions of power. This gave solidarity 
groups a social territorial anchoring that “their Russian counterparts were lacking”.68  
Soviet government territorialized these groups with its administrative divisions into 
oblast, rayon etc., and at lower levels collectivization in kolkhozes and sovkhozes 
produced the same effect. The result was regionalized “political webs” competing for 
state resources. In Soviet Uzbekistan these were manifested in tightly organized 
“solidarity groups” from Tashkent, Ferghana Valley, and Samarkand/Jizak.69 Roy cites 
few biographical data but builds his case on an intimate knowledge of Central Asian 
“solidarity groups” historically.   
Roy’s argument subsequently branched out in two separate interpretations: 
Kathleen Collins’ “clans” and Pauline Jones Luong’s “regionalism”. Collins’ Clan 
Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) is the most extensive published study on “clans” in Central Asia to date and builds 
on her doctoral dissertation. Collins defines “clans” in Central Asia as informal 
organizations comprising a network of individuals linked by “kin and fictive kin 
identities”.70 Bound together by “tight-knit, pre-national collective identities”, clans 
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should be distinguished from ethnicity since “clan identity is associated with a particular 
geographical region”.71 Further, unlike clientilism, which is transitory, dyadic, non-kin-
based and “without group or identity content”, clan relations have both “an organization 
and an identity.”72 The operational core consists of a kin unit at the center, which radiates 
outwards in multiple levels incorporating “extended kin relations, including kin by 
marriage, and the relations of marital kin.”73 Thus, the “dominant principle of 
appointments” in Uzbekistan and Central Asia was zemlyachestvo, defined as the 
“appointment of one’s family, kin, and friends from the place of one’s birth.”74 Collins’ 
work is undoubtedly strong theoretically but like the other contributions discussed here it 
is not based on primary sources. It is therefore unclear, for instance, how she can state 
with such certainty that zemlyachestvo was the “dominant principle of appointment” in 
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Soviet Uzbekistan since the only record containing such information is in party 
documents.  
Luong’s approach differs from Collins in her emphasis on formal politics and 
“strong regions”. Regionalism is defined in terms of the predominance of regional 
political identities and should be distinguished from both “clan” and “solidarity groups”. 
In this interpretation, “Soviet policies and institutions in Central Asia created, 
transformed, and institutionalized regional political identities, while at the same time 
eliminating tribal, religious, and national identities.”75 This does not negate the earlier 
presence of “clans” and tribes in Central Asia’s pre-Soviet history, Luong argues, but 
Soviet rule repackaged these in Soviet administrative institutions. Tribal powers were 
usurped by the vast authority vested in the Soviet obkom (oblast committee) First 
Secretaries, which eliminated informal “clan” politics. The First Secretary had access to 
scarce resources, something which was reinforced by the Soviet command system based 
on shortages. This redefined existing clan and tribal-based patronage networks to the 
regional level while disempowering the tribal structures of pre-Soviet Central Asia since 
these lacked any official recognition or institutional resources.76 Moreover, Central Asian 
officials throughout the Soviet period tended to be much more “rooted” in single oblasts 
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than elsewhere in the USSR, which fuelled these strong regional identities.77 The creation 
of strong regional identities, at the expense of tribal or “clan” networks, was the 
rudimentary factor which preserved stability and continuity with the Soviet system after 
independence. The end result, however, is highly similar since these strong “identities” 
have led Uzbekistan’s leaders to promote figures from their home regions.78  The main 
evidence furnished in support of strong regional identities is a compilation of tenures of 
obkom First Secretaries and the extent to which they served their careers in single 
oblasts.  
The contributions of Collins, Luong, and Roy are variants of Carlisle’s initial 
framework and all cite it in their works. Where they diverge is in the emphasis placed on 
kinship.  Collins asserts that kinship is the cement of these alliances. Roy’s interpretation 
is slightly different since solidarity groups could but need not be focused on kinship. 
Luong, finally, proposes that the Soviet legacy privileged political affiliations based on 
region over those based on “kinship, religion, or nationality”.79 Her emphasis is on 
regional affiliation as an indicator of loyalty rather than birth place or primordial 
                                                 
 
77 Ibid., p. 52.  
78 Ibid., p. 88.  
79 Pauline Jones Luong, ”Sources of Institutional Continuity: The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia,” Paper 
prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, 





attachments. Whatever the differences between these approaches, they all seek to explain 
the same outcome of officials from particular oblasts that cluster together and favor each 
other and that this was, essentially, exceptional for Central Asia. In other words, all have 
derived different explanations for an outcome which they all identify as undisputed. 
Thus, Pauline Jones Luong notes that Sharaf Rashidov, who ruled the republic from 1959 
to 1982, surrounded himself “with leaders from his own region [and] accomplished this 
in a very overt manner”.80 Regional identities were and are the main cleavages in politics, 
and this leitmotiv represents a significant departure from pre-1986 interpretations when 
no such politicking had been uncovered. Other than this, all also view regional and 
national identity as dichotomous: strong regional identities by definition imply a weak 
national identity.  
It should be noted, however, that this shift in thinking is not primarily a 
consequence of the surfacing of new evidence, data, and sources. While some new 
evidence on “clans” have been introduced on Uzbekistan’s post-Soviet politics published 
in the post-Soviet period, typically based on interviews,81 no existing study of “clans” or 
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region during the Soviet era is based on archival sources.  That the shift in emphasis 
towards “clans” and regions coincided with Moscow’s determined anti-corruption 
campaign during perestroika to portray Uzbekistan in this light is also ground for high 
suspicion. Thus, it is worth asking if the assumed powers of “clans” and regional 
identities in Uzbekistan were more a function of Moscow’s discourse and the gradual 
amplification of these claims than conclusions based on primary sources and real 
evidence.    
Patron-Client Relationships Elsewhere in the USSR 
An alternative hypothesis to “clans” and regionalism in Uzbekistan is the form 
of patronage politics elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Even if “clan” and region were not 
factors in analyses of Uzbek and Central Asian politics up until the Gorbachev era, what 
did fill the pages of Soviet Studies, Slavic Review, and other journals throughout the 
Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras was the pervasive favoritism and protégé networks in the 
Kremlin. The early Bolsheviks staffed government agencies with spouses,82 Brezhnev 
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drew cadres from his native Dnepropetrovsk,83 Khrushchev smoothed the way for former 
colleagues in Moscow oblast and the Ukraine,84 and Zhdanov did similarly with figures 
from Leningrad.85 Rarely were these portrayed as forming “clans” or “regional groups”. 
They just worked within the informal rules of the Soviet system, and those who were 
good at it were also the ones who reached the top.  
Diverse as their aims were, the practitioners of Soviet politics had one thing in 
common, namely that career success was determined by building “networks of reciprocal 
favor”.86 Such networks may have been created from friendships and understandings 
formed from intersecting past careers, shared values, similar personalities, or early 
political associations with a particular province.87 Because upward mobility was the goal 
of most aspiring officials, informal patron-client linkages were built vertically through 
the state from district up to the all-Union level.88 Beginning with Stalin’s control of the 
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Orgburo in the 1920s, few slots in the state machinery were more potent than controlling 
the nomenklatura and the ability to place one’s protégés in leading state and party 
positions.89 It had the added benefit of cultivating loyalties among those who were 
appointed, creating links of mutual dependence.   
Thus, V. Kruzhkov and Yu. Zhdanov wrote in a confidential party report in 1950 
how “cadres [in the Soviet system] are selected not on the basis of political qualities but 
on the basis of friendly relations…linked by mutual responsibility (svyazannykh krugovoj 
porukoj)”.90 Soviet patron-client relations could but needed not involve kinship. Nor was 
there any general concern for the well-being of the coalition of protégés per se, by 
contrast to the group solidarities of “clans”. Rather networks formed on the basis of 
rapport established between specific individuals who sustained each other to advance in 
their careers.91  The roots of such career-based loyalties are deep. In imperial Russia they 
reach back to the 18th and 19th centuries when “kinship” and “monarchical proximity” as 
sources of career advancement gave way for, first, “geographical location” which drew in 
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those who had served in the same province and, second, “institutional position”, 
assembling figures who had worked in the same office or functional organ.92 Stalin’s 
speech to the February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee perhaps captured 
this most authoritatively, lamenting that some party leaders had “dragged along large 
numbers of their protégés to serve under them in their new posts” when “transferred from 
region to region”.93 Similar networks pervaded all areas of the state and party, not least 
academia. In the Soviet Academy of Sciences, for example, researchers sometimes 
clustered in institutions on the basis of nationality since they brought in former 
colleagues from the republics. Once in Moscow they returned the support given by 
former colleagues by promoting them.94  
Work place, not region of origin per se, bound these officials to each other and 
served as the source of patron-client relations.  Thus, the formative years of Khrushchev 
and Brezhnev in the Ukraine would be consequential for their promotions two decades 
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later. By the time of the 20th Party Congress in 1956 Khrushchev had replaced the party 
secretaries in seven of 14 republics and 41 of 69 regions within Russia. Among these, 
three of the republic secretaries and six of the regional secretaries were his former 
subordinates from the Ukraine.95 In 1951, no Ukrainian served on the Politburo; two 
decades later, in 1971, four of the fourteen voting members on this board were 
Ukrainians.96 When a regional leader obtained a position higher up, “he or she promoted 
members of the regional family circle to prominent positions.”97    
The changing patterns of upward mobility in the Soviet system gave further 
impetus to the “localism” of these coalitions of protégés.  The career path from province 
to republic or all-Union level became straighter with Stalin’s demise.98 Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev presided over a system which became increasingly oriented towards recruiting 
Politburo personnel beyond the central organs of government, and this was reflected in 
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regionalization of politics as members and candidates in the Politburo brought in friends 
and colleagues from the provinces.99 The consequence was a “territorialization” of elite 
factions. In the Brezhnev Politburo and Secretariat at least five such factions can be 
distinguished: Brezhnev’s group from his native Dnepropetrovsk in Ukraine, the Suslov-
Pelshe Ponomarev clique, a Kharkov faction headed by Nikolai Podgorny, a Belarussian 
group presided over by Piotr Masherov, and a Moscow group led by Ivan Kapitonov.100  
A parallel development occurred in the republics, where oblast secretaryship 
became a spring board to the highest offices at the republic level. Because the First 
Secretaries of the republics, as a rule, had previously served in provincial organs, their 
former colleagues and clients in these provincial apparatuses were favored. The cliques 
that formed in each republic therefore often took on the character of place-based 
networks, skewed towards appointees who had previously served in the same province or 
republics as their patron.  Lithuania is a case in point. Having served as First Secretary of 
Vilnius prior to being named Lithuania’s First Secretary, Grishkiavichus soon named 
former colleagues from the Vilnius party organization to key party and state positions at 
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the republic level.101 Such networks could be pinpointed in Belarus as well where cadres 
from Minsk and Vitebsk oblasts dominated republic-level leadership in the two decades 
from 1966 to 1986, the clusters of which formed under the patronage of First Secretary 
N.N. Sliunkov (Minsk, 1983-1987) and Second Secretary A.N. Aksenov (Vitebsk, 1971-
78) among others.102  
That provincially rooted officials in the Soviet Union brought in their friends 
and former co-workers to the national level created something which resembled “clans” 
but which was in essence a function of Soviet cadre policy and the nature of trust in 
Soviet society. The difference being that in Uzbekistan this favoritism became known as 
“clans”; in Russia and the Slavic republics they were just normal Soviet politics. In 
Uzbekistan this phenomenon was linked with “identity”; in Russia, Belarus, and 
elsewhere it concerned career advancement and self-interest.  Regional patronage 
networks in the Western republics did not preclude national solidarities; in the Eastern 
they did. These distinctions are important since they strike at the core of national 
consolidation and the degree of regional cleavages.   
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The nodes in this Soviet patronage system were the First Secretaries at each 
level of the party apparatus. Organized on the principle of edinonachalie (one-man 
management), the obkom First Secretaries and the First Secretaries of the republics 
possessed enormous powers in the Soviet command economy, especially during the 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods when powers were transferred from the “state” to the 
party. They were in control of the supplies and scarce resources to the local and oblast 
level, factory managers, and kolkhoz chairmen, and became the center of politicking 
from the local level and up as well as the arbiters of resources distributed from the 
center.103 Thus positioned as the middlemen for production and investment, the First 
Secretaries became a source of some of the most destructive patron-client relationships in 
the Soviet system.  
If First Secretaries were the primary actors, blat was their main currency. 
Banned in official Soviet discourse but present in confidential telegrams and documents, 
blat referred to the size of one’s informal network and ability to command loyalty and 
favors from others. In a confidential Soviet document, blat is described as the marriage of 
“nepotism and protection” (kumovstvo and protektsiya) whereby “cronies [are] appointed 
to positions exempt from hard work…in short through connections made involving all 
                                                 
 





sorts of privileges and covered in crime.”104 Not only an elite term, blat or “connections” 
was used extensively among Soviet citizens as a measurement of one’s capability to 
acquire consumer goods, favors from others, repairs on one’s apartment, and virtually 
any service or good that were in short supply.105 Blat, in turn, gave rise to the tolkach (the 
“five percenter”) who knew “who had what and how to make the proper 
arrangements.”106 All things being equal, an official with extensive blat was bound to 
move upward significantly faster in the food chain of Soviet politics than one with lesser. 
Because blat was acquired through interactions with others, it was primarily centered on 
the primary locales where officials interacted, i.e., in party and state organs at all levels, 
creating geographical or functional stove-pipes of political power according to the 
particular career mobility patterns.  
All of this culminated in “family groups” whose members collaborated in the 
attainment of production goals and other shared interests. With supplies being scarce and 
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production goals often set exceedingly high, family groups covered up for and protected 
each other. This acted as a safety valve when production goals could not be met: they 
could conceal failures but only through collaboration with others. As such, “family 
groups” were a defense mechanism against the controls of the omnipresent state and its 
often unrealistic and contradictory demands.107  
Curiously the literature cited above on “family groups” and regionalism in the 
rest of the USSR has eluded the attention of Central Asia analysts who tend to assert the 
uniqueness of Central Asia’s “clan-based” history or a peculiar “Central Asian 
regionalism”.108 Consequently, the debate has centered on “Central Asian factionalism” 
as if it were wholly separate from that elsewhere in the USSR.109 If such entities as 
“clans” from Ferghana, Tashkent, and Samarkand exist the question is how these can be 
meaningfully distinguished from the dozens of other regionally based factions and 
“family groups” in Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Russia and other places cited above. 
Deferring this issue until later, it is worth noting at this point that patron-client relations 
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elsewhere in the Soviet Union, even if different from those of Central Asia, may have had 
similar or nearly identical manifestations.   
Scope and Limitations 
The temporal scope of this dissertation is the Soviet period, 1917 to 1991, but it 
also touches on pre-Soviet and post-Soviet government and society. Emphasis is on the 
post-Stalin period but archival research has been conducted also for the Stalin years down 
to 1953. The time period covered is extensive but justified on several grounds. First, the 
focus on localism is quite narrow in itself. The archival material available on the topic as 
regards Soviet Uzbekistan in the RGANI and RGASPI archives is not extensive and 
manageable within the time and resources of this project. There was thus no compelling 
reason to leave parts of this material aside. This, of course, precludes a thorough 
elaboration of other aspects of the politics and economy in Soviet Uzbekistan, e.g. 
collectivization, labor, and nationalities policy, which have been the focus of other 
insightful studies.110  
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That archival sources for much of the Brezhnev period remain classified is one 
obvious limitation of this dissertation. When these archives are opened, other 
documentary sources may surface that challenge the conclusions reached herein. As such, 
this dissertation does not aspire to provide “final answers” to the questions asked even if 
it goes beyond existing works by building on primary sources.      
A further limitation is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to resolve in each and 
every individual case whether the appointment of a particular official was primarily 
centrally or locally determined. The documentary evidence in the RGASPI and RGANI 
archives contain such information for only a handful of senior-level appointments. 
Whether a state official was selected for a particular position from the nomenklatura on 
the basis of central or local influences is, of course, highly important for the questions 
asked. Formally, the Second Secretary, who almost invariably was a central appointee, 
was in charge of cadre policy. If this rule had always been followed, it would be 
meaningless to speak of appointments of key officials in the obkom and republican-level 
on the basis of “clan” ties since the locals were not empowered to make such decisions. 
But as this dissertation shows, this rule was often circumvented. Not infrequently, the 
First Secretaries, who uniformly were Uzbeks since 1929 in Uzbekistan, took over the 
Second Secretary’s powers of cadre appointment and oftentimes with Moscow’s tacit 
approval. This was particularly pronounced during the post-World War II Stalin and 





The inability to determine with precision if political powers rested primarily 
centrally or locally and how it varied from case to case strikes a discordant note to any 
scholarly research on the topic. No available source exists to judge the power of cadre 
appointment precisely for each case. Until such archival material appears, if it exists, one 
must be content with acknowledging this lacunae, state every instance in which 
appointment power is revealed in archival documents, cautiously draw some general 
trends on this basis, and be cognizant of the limits to this inquiry.   
Outline of Dissertation 
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 begins with a brief review of 
pre-Soviet state and society. This is followed by an assessment of Soviet nationality 
policies and the Soviet national delimitation in 1924, which created modern Uzbekistan 
and the Central Asian republics.  The main finding is that the national delimitation, 
contrary to what has been assumed, counteracted subnational loyalties since the 
privileges and power of the native elite were embedded in the formation of the new 
republic. It was a vehicle to careers and power and a prize to which the Uzbek elite 
attached their allegiances.  
Chapter 3 compares forms of party violations in Stalin era Uzbekistan with 
patterns elsewhere in the Soviet Union and analyzes sources of internal conflict in the 





considered an era of extensive centralization. This was true down to the early to mid-
1940s but thereafter the local First Secretaries in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan wielded 
significant powers, especially on cadre appointments.  Second, the main split in 
Uzbekistan’s Central Committee during this era was not within the Uzbek elite, as has 
been assumed, but between Uzbeks and Russians. Third, in contrast to his Tajik 
counterpart Gafurov, the Uzbek First Secretary Yusupov’s promotions had only a weak, 
if any, territorial basis. Most were rather acquaintances he had encountered during his 
career in Tashkent as several independent sources attest to, including biographical data, 
archival material, and Yusupov’s biographers.  
Chapter 4 appraises party violations and loyalties in Uzbekistan under 
Khrushchev. Determined to eradicate the nepotism that flourished in the post-World War 
II period, Khrushchev launched a union-wide campaign on the ills of zemlyachestvo. Yet 
Uzbekistan never became a part of this even if the Party Control Commission identified 
other party violations in Uzbekistan.  Khrushchev’s dizzying reforms and the creation of 
winners and losers nonetheless infused the political system with “groupism”, i.e. 
sectional groups that pursued distinct policy-related interests, which became particularly 
salient in Uzbekistan’s Cotton Production Complex. This development served to further 
reinforce career-based as opposed to place-based loyalties.  
Chapter 5 examines the Brezhnev period, focusing in particular on Uzbekistan’s 
long-standing First Secretary Sharaf Rashidov. There is scant evidence that Rashidov 





contrary, Rashidov’s “coalition of protégés” came from more diverse origins than at any 
time in Soviet Uzbekistan’s history, which was reflected in the Central Committee 
Bureau. Reports of the Party Control Commission did neither single out zemlyachestvo as 
a particular concern in Uzbekistan. However, a transcript of the Tashkent obkom party 
congress in 1964 attests to the prevalence of career-based loyalties among the individuals 
who spoke up. This period, which typically has been viewed as the most clear-cut 
example of region-based politics, is probably the one in which empirical support for it is 
the weakest.   
Chapter 6, covering the Andropov and Gorbachev periods, examines the 
ubiquitous nepotism in the USSR as a whole, the evolution of Uzbekistan’s “cotton 
affair”, and reasons for skepticism towards the data presented. Evidence on “clans” has 
been drawn from this period but later in the 1980s it was revealed that many of the claims 
by Soviet authorities surrounding the affair had been fabricated.  
Chapter 7 analyzes Gorbachev’s determination to uproot the Uzbek power elite, 
Uzbekistan’s “silent rehabilitation” from the “cotton affair” in 1989, and the construction 
of “clans” in Soviet media and scholarship during the 1980s. Paradoxically, at the same 
moment that scholars began speaking of “clans”, in 1989, the Soviet Politburo (behind 
closed doors) addressed the flaws of this discourse and how the anti-corruption 
investigators, Gdlyan and Ivanov, had manipulated media to portray Uzbekistan in an 
unfavorable light. The chapter concludes by touching on President Karimov’s strategy in 





Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the findings, distinguishes the myths from the 
realities of Soviet Uzbekistan’s politics, and notes implications for the understanding of 
post-Soviet conflict in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The main finding of this dissertation, 
that Uzbekistan’s coalitions of protégés were fundamentally non-territorial, has 
implications not only for our understanding of the Soviet political system. It also has 
implications for the republic’s prospects of building a viable nation-state and chances of 






2. A New National Elite: Politics and Loyalties in Early 
Soviet Uzbekistan, 1917-1937 
Introduction 
The literature on “clans” and regions has typically treated Soviet Central Asia as 
a homogenous whole. Or, at least, that similarities in its common history, culture, and 
social organization were more pronounced than the differences.111 But there were and are 
important distinctions and these crystallized in the early Soviet period. Just as Tsarist 
Russia emphasized the distinct social bases of politics and life in the settled versus the 
nomadic areas of Central Asia, the Bolsheviks adopted separate policies for the nomadic 
territories surrounding Uzbekistan’s settled core. Whereas policies in Turkmenistan were 
oriented to manage and subdue the tribes, no such initiatives were considered necessary 
for the settled population in Uzbekistan.  
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National loyalties were undoubtedly weak or inexistent throughout Central Asia 
prior to the national delimitation in 1924. Solidarities were not directed to ethnic nations 
but rather to villages, cities, Islam, in some areas tribes, and in the early 20th century pan-
Turkism. However, the creation of national republics and the Soviet “affirmative action” 
policy accelerated the process of national consciousness. The Bolshevik challenge was to 
break down traditional loyalties among the indigenous “elite” and replace them with new 
loyalties directed to Moscow and its aims. Lenin and Stalin were successful in this 
endeavor. The new national elite in Soviet Uzbekistan derived significant benefits from 
the national delimitation and rallied to the Bolsheviks’ cause. Stalin’s shrewd policy of 
empowering the native elite while disempowering the Russian and Slavic prefects posted 
in the region gave the former vested interests in collaborating for their own ends.   
When the Soviet Union had consolidated its rule in the region by the early 
1930s, the cadres associated with those areas in Soviet Uzbekistan perceived as disloyal 
were purged, as were the Russian/Ukrainian prefects in Moscow’s regional organ (the 
Sredazbyuro). Particularly pronounced was the marginalization of officials linked to the 
party apparatus in Bukhara but their counterparts in Kokand had been thoroughly 
destroyed earlier. Thus, Soviet Uzbekistan came to be dominated by individuals from 
Tashkent and later, after the bloodletting of 1937-38, Ferghana. In Uzbekistan, at least, 
Moscow’s calculus had little to do with managing indigenous “clans” but was an 





Pre-Soviet Central Asia 
Settled versus Nomadic Society in Pre-Soviet Central Asia  
Prior to Soviet rule there had existed no state, nation, or province named 
Uzbekistan and no other state had historically inhabited its borders. When Tsarist Russia 
annexed Central Asia in the 19th century, these territories were ruled by three khanates – 
Khiva, Kokand, and Bukhara. By most definitions they could be considered “states” but 
there were no “nations” attached to them. The concept of nation and its corollary, 
nationality (Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Kazakh etc.), was only marginally present in these territories 
up until Soviet rule. However, a majority of the peoples of these three khanates would 
eventually become Uzbeks since Khiva, Kokand, and Bukhara all fell entirely or partially 
within Uzbekistan’s borders.  
Nearly two centuries of Russian encroachments into the region had preceded the 
Bolshevik conquest: The Kazakh territories were swallowed between 1731 and the mid-
19th century and the Kokand khanate was fully incorporated in the 1860s. Russia’s new 
administrative entity Turkestan was formed between 1863 and 1885 and comprised 





degree of independence and were not to be entirely submerged under Russian influence 
until Soviet rule in the 1920s.112    
Moscow’s early settlers encountered settled forms of life in Central Asia’s oasis-
areas, comprising contemporary Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and predominantly tribal 
territories surrounding them, in what are today Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Turkmenistan.113 The less Islamicized, nomadic, Turkic-speaking, and tribal steppe-
culture, it was quickly recognized, had shaped a civilization which was quite distinct 
from the settled, Islamicized, Persianized, city-culture of the oases annexed later. The 
dependency on irrigation as well as collection of taxes and tariffs had compelled strongly 
centralized forms of government in the settled parts in contrast to the decentralized 
authority structures of the nomads. In the desert and steppes life was a constant struggle 
against nature. In the densely populated areas of the oases, by contrast, man’s primarily 
struggle was with other men, requiring government to settle differences between them.114 
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Thus, St. Petersburg categorized the Central Asian population by both ethnicity 
(Kyrgyz, Uzbek etc.) and habitat (urban vs. nomadic or semi-nomadic). Sarts denoted the 
Turkic-Persian town-dwelling population that existed alongside “pure” ethnicities 
(Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Karakalpak, the Persian Tajik, as well as Russians and 
Chinese), and was consequently a fusion of habitat and ethnicity.115 Habitat was a 
dichotomy of progress whereby the urban or settled were considered more advanced than 
the nomadic, in effect making Sarts the most “advanced” population of Central Asia.116 
These categories were not invented but built on local self-ascriptive identities. The term 
Sart, for instance, was a relabeling of the indigenous Turki (the settled Turks who did not 
claim tribal affiliation) and Uzbek referred to a common tribal heritage which traced back 
to the confederation which three centuries earlier had brought the Shaybanids to 
power.117  
Several more specific distinctions between the nomadic and settled areas could 
be observed.  First and foremost, political power was contested among a more 
heterogenous set of actors in the Sart sedentary core – e.g. the ruling dynasty, the ulama 
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(religious authority), and the merchantry – in contrast to the power struggle between 
more “horizontal” tribal groups in the nomadic areas. Second, in contrast to nomads who 
typically held property in common, city dwellers were owners of private property (mulk) 
and could accumulate wealth as well as purchase, sell, donate, or transfer property by 
will. Third, in contrast to the Turkmen obas or Kazakh auls (villages), there was no 
recognition of solidarity or political affiliation with outside tribal groups among residents 
of mahallas (neighborhood organizations) in towns and non-tribal qishloks (villages). 
Nomadic tribal groups who settled along the river oases also typically surrendered their 
tribal affiliations and submitted themselves to the protection of the state and stronger 
influence of Islam on their lives. The fusion of peoples in cities produced identities which 
were only in part derived from place of origin or tribe; the multiethnic and multi-tribal 
category Sart derived from this intermingling of identities.  And fourth, the sedentary 
population observed Sharia law and was more devoutly Muslim than the Muslims of the 
steppes who practiced customary law.118    
In light of these differences, administration of the hierarchically organized town 
dwellers required Imperial policies which were different from government in the sparsely 
populated nomadic and rural areas. The mix of assimilation and imposition of Russian 
                                                 
 






institutions was determined by this distinction. Just as Western colonial powers 
commissioned reports about the characteristics of tribes in its imperial areas, the Tsarist 
government engendered a field of study on Sarts. In Russian government writings, the 
Sarts were portrayed as obedient to authority, susceptible to state administration, and 
placing order high in the hierarchy of values. Nomads, by contrast, were depicted as more 
malleable, primitive, inclined toward democratic values, and bound to another in tribes or 
clans.119  
A new system of administration was promulgated in 1867 in which locals were 
preserved a marginal political role, especially in the higher echelons of power. Headed by 
Konstantin von Kaufman, the General-Gubernat of Turkestan put the politics of 
Turkestan under almost complete Russian control. Tsarist imperial government divided 
Turkestan into oblasts and okrugs with town centers where Tashkent became the center 
of Syr Darya oblast and Samarkand that of Zerafshan.120  
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These were later reconfigured and redrawn with the adoption in 1886 of a 
general body of law on Turkestan, the Svod Zakonov Rossiskoi Imperii when three new 
oblasts were formed: Syr Darya, Ferghana, and Samarkand (see Map 2 above).121 The 
Soviet government did not redraw these borders noticeably, and the core areas of 
Uzbekistan’s Soviet Republic would be built from these administrative blocks.  
It might be an exaggeration to say that “a native middle class and intelligentsia” 
had been formed at this time.122 It is true, however, that a small but not insignificant 
group of Muslim reformers emerged. The Tatar usul-i jadid movement, propagating 
Western ideas of Muslim reform, self-government, reason over dogma, and nation (millet 
or vatan) gained foothold in Turkestan during the late 19th Century. Building on 
discontent with Russian rule, the Jadids were to play a minor but not insignificant role 
when the Russian revolution of 1917 opened a temporary vacuum of authority in Central 
Asia. The Jadids seized the opportunity and organized the 4th Extraordinary Conference 
of Central Asian Muslims in the Ferghana Valley. The Conference called for the election 
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of a constituent assembly, autonomy in a federated Russian republic, and the setting up of 
a provisional government. This agenda was realized in part in 1917 with the 
establishment of the Kokand Republic, headed by Mustafa Chokayev. Squeezed between 
the feuding Tashkent Soviet and the Tsarist officials of the ancien régime, the Kokand 
Republic managed to remain afloat in the unfolding chaos for a year before it was 
crushed by the former in January 1918. Two months later, in March, the “Young 
Bukharans” headed by Faizullah Khodzhaev set up the Bukharan Republic, which was 
inspired by the same principles as the Kokand republic, but enjoyed support from the 
Bolsheviks.  
The transitional period from Tsarism to Bolshevik rule had implications for the 
distribution of power in the future Soviet republic of Uzbekistan, depending in part on the 
nature and extent of opposition to Bolshevik rule in Turkestan’s territories. The elite 
associated with the anti-Bolshevik Kokand autonomy fell by the wayside and were 
decimated by the Bolsheviks, in part because Kokand had become a symbol of the anti-
Bolshevik resistance.123 The restiveness of Ferghana initially precluded the remaining 
parts of its elite from an influential role under Bolshevik rule. Bukhara, by contrast, had 
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succumbed to the realities of Bolshevik predominance, was effectively bought off, and its 
new leadership headed by F. Khodzhaev declared its loyalty to Soviet rule. This ensured 
the elite associated with Bukhara prominent positions in the Turkestan ASSR and later 
Soviet Uzbekistan. Bukhara, too, however were subsequently to be marginalized when 
the USSR had consolidated its rule in the region.  
Nation Versus Tribe: Early Soviet Uzbekistan  
Soviet Nationality Policy and the National Delimitation 
In 1924 the Soviet Union divided the Turkestan ASSR (the successor of Tsarist 
Russia’s Turkestan krai) into four republics and autonomous oblasts -- the Turkmen SSR, 
Uzbek SSR with the Tajik ASSR (now Tajikistan), Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast 
(now Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), and the Karakalpak Autonomous Oblast (now part of 
Uzbekistan). Uzbekistan’s present nation-hood date back to this delimitation, whose 
borders only have been modified by the detachment of Tajikistan in 1930.124 The 
delimitation in Central Asia was anything but simple since national self-consciousness 
was weak throughout the region by the time of the Soviet conquest. Needless to say, how 
                                                 
 





to draw borders on the basis of national ethnicity when many people did not conceive of 
themselves as having any or were unsure was an arduous task.125   
The national delimitation in Central Asia formed part of Soviet nationality 
policy for the empire as a whole. The Russian revolution of 1917 coincided with a rising 
tide of nationalism and Soviet nationality policy was adopted to disarm it by allowing 
“forms” of nationhood. Nationality policy aspired to buttress Soviet rule by granting 
rights and privileges to the USSR’s diverse nationalities, actively promoting national 
consciousness among them, and giving them the institutional forms of the nation-state. 
Hence, a dozen large national republics were formed throughout Soviet territories 
alongside tens of thousands of national territories.126 Three more specific premises 
undergirded the convictions in this policy: First, nationalism was considered dangerous 
since it had the potential to form “an above class alliance in pursuit of national goals”. 
Second, national consciousness was portrayed as an inevitable stage in the modernization 
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process that all peoples had to go through prior to the Marxist-Leninist ideal of 
“internationalism”. Third, Lenin and Stalin viewed the non-Russian nationalities in the 
Soviet Union as having justifiable distrust towards the Great Russians, resulting from the 
“Great Russian chauvinism” under Tsarist rule.127 By granting the non-Russian 
nationalities equal status with the Russians, the Bolsheviks could gain the support among 
the formerly suppressed non-Russian nationalities.128 “Nativization” (korenizatsiia), a 
crucial corollary of Soviet nationality policy, was to ensure that indigenous nationalities 
occupied prominent leadership positions in the party, government, industry, and schools 
in each national territory. Extensive training programs were implemented to this end, 
especially in the underdeveloped Eastern territories of the empire.129 
In practice, then, Soviet nationality policy in Central Asia amounted to a de-
Russification of the Russified Turkestan state apparatus the Bolsheviks inherited from 
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Tsarist rule. Hence, already in November 1921 the Turkestan Central Committee 
declared its ambition to absorb more loyal natives and to purge disloyal elements, 
Russian and natives alike. Inclusion of committed native communists, particularly 
peasants, and prevent those with “nationalist convictions” from entering were the new 
declared goals, even if it was acknowledged that the Turkestan population “was behind 
the times” and uneducated. Oblast committees, for example, were to ensure that they had 
at least one voting member of the indigenous population and similar quotas were 
established elsewhere in the governing apparatus.130 Thus, in December 1921, 
Asfendiarova (Turkestan), Sultan-Galiev (Tatar Republic) and Rysukulov (Kyrgyzstan), 
were put on the board of the Narkomnats, splitting the influence in this heretofore 
Russified body between locals and Russians/Slavs.131 Nativization in Moscow’s regional 
organ of government could also be observed: In the Sredazbyuro of 1922 – only two of 
eight were natives, Rakhimbaev (Khodjent) and Khodzhaev (Bukhara);132 Twelve years 
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later 14 out of 30 were Central Asians.133 Furthermore, Stalin was demonstrably keen 
from the outset to include natives in decisions taken. In 1923, for instance, he reproached 
Lyubimov and Svetlov of the Sredazbyuro for sending a cable to the Central Committee 
in Moscow without all members of the body as signatories, noting the absence of 
Malyabaeva and other locals.134       
The content of Soviet nationality policies and its “affirmative action” program 
was formally passed in the resolutions of the 12th Party Congress in April 1923 and at a 
separate conference of the Central Committee in June 1923.  Encompassing the entire 
Soviet Union, Soviet nationality policy and its delimitations was obviously a central 
policy. Even so, Stalin initially portrayed the initiative to divide Turkestan as locally, not 
centrally determined, and left some room for local input on the process. Thus, Stalin 
ordered on June 1, 1924: 1) To adopt in principle the proposal of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of Turkestan, Central Committee of Bukhara, and Central 
Committee of Khorezm to divide these territories into the republics of Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan; 2) That Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan should enter into the USSR 
independently and not through Russia; 3) That economic questions arising in this matter 
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should be left at the discretion of the three Communist Parties of Central Asia; and 4) that 
the detailed aspects of this question should be left to the commission constituent of 
representatives from the three republics and the USSR ispolkom.135 The regional organs 
of Moscow’s control were sidelined in this process, the powers of which were usurped by 
representatives of the new nations.  Far from being passive recipients of the imposition of 
borders, the native elite took an active part in the delimitation.136 Yet whatever the initial 
input and initiative of locals in the process, Stalin telegraphed Central Asian authorities in 
October 1924 resolving that the issue had been “removed from the agenda of the 
assemblies” and was to be settled conclusively in the center’s Politburo.137  
Uzbekistan was apportioned territories from all of the three post-17th century 
historical state-entities – the Khanates of Khiva and Kokand as well as the Emirate of 
Bukhara – and all of their capitals fell under Uzbekistan’s suzerainty. As can be 
discerned in Map 3 below, the new republic centered on the Bukharan Emirate whose 
borders were preserved more or less intact, including Uzbekistan’s present provinces of 
Samarkand, Bukhara, Kashkadarya, Surkhandarya, Syrdarya, and Navoi up to the Aral 
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Sea. In recognition of national divisions, the delimitation commission declared that the 
“Uzbek parts of Bukhara” would belong to the Uzbeks, and the rest to Turkmenistan. The 
other parts of Uzbekistan comprised Fergana, Andijan, Namangan and Tashkent, which 
had been part of the Khanate of Kokand, as well as Khorezm oblast and the Karakalpak 
Autonomous Republic, remnants of the Khivan Khanate. Tajikistan was made an 
autonomous republic within Uzbekistan and Tashkent was declared to belong to 
Uzbekistan “because it was populated principally by Uzbeks”.138  The commission left 
the issue of naming the new republic to the “Bukharans and Uzbeks” to be determined in 
a session between them, testifying to the Bukharans leading role in the new republic as 
well as the distinctions made between these two groups.139 The Tsarist category of Sarts 
was decreed out of existence and replaced by “Uzbeks”, comprising the Turkic-speaking 
population of Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bukhara, and the more remote Pamir 
communities became “Tajiks”.140 On May 13, 1925, at the Third Congress of Soviets of 
the USSR, Uzbekistan was officially incorporated into the Soviet Union.  
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Conflicts and Solidarities in the New National Elite  
Contemporary analysts have singled out zemlyachestvo as a predominantly 
Central Asian phenomenon. Yet it was a present concern throughout the USSR at this 
formative stage. For example, when the Orgburo of the Central Committee met in 1924 to 
evaluate secretaries for the country’s gubkoms (predecessor to obkoms) they considered 
not only the level of crime in the province in question, corruption in the provincial organ, 
but also the state of “localism” among the secretaries.141 A letter from Felix 
Dzherzhinsky to V.V. Kuibyshev likewise singled out “localism” (zemlyachestvo) and 
“speculation” (spekulyatsiya) as the paramount management problems in the Union next 
to “labor discipline” and “cooperation”.142 Another document dated five years later from 
the Secretary of the Ivanov obkom in Russia noted the widespread “patronage” 
(pokrovitel’stv) and localism in his oblast, other regions of Russia, as well as Kazakhstan 
but no mention is made of the other territories in Central Asia.143 Similarly, Moscow 
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lambasted the party leadership in Siberia for grupovshchiny (“groupism”) and 
nepotism144 and Kazakh authorities were called upon to speed up a “management 
plan…designed for a settled way of life…and the transition to a sedentary lifestyle”, a 
hint of existing “localism” among the tribally organized Kazakhs.145 Yet no comparable 
requests were issued to Uzbeks whose “settled” cadres were depicted as capable 
professionals.146 This is also why Uzbeks were sent to staff government agencies in 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.  
The only factionalism and indigenous conflict documented in earlier confidential 
correspondence, relating to the territories of Uzbekistan, was infighting among the 
hegemonic Bukharan elite. Even though Bukhara natives administered the Turkfronta 
(fighting the Basmachi insurrection against Soviet rule in Central Asia),147 the 
Upolnarkomvoe (the main internal troops), and were best represented in the Sredazbyuro, 
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Bukharans had trouble uniting among themselves.148 Strains were seen with the most 
overt competition for leadership occurring between Khodzhaev, the head of Bukhara’s 
communist party, and Mukhitdinov another communist whose loyalties were questioned 
in Moscow.149  In April, 1922, Moscow’s prefect in Bukhara relayed that this “crisis in 
the Bukhara government had reached its climax” and that the brief absence of Khodzhaev 
had thrust the government into “complete confusion”, with the “left communist” 
unwilling to take part in the struggle with the Basmachi revolt, the local Islamic uprising. 
Instead, what they had spent their time doing was to collect a dossier of the “criminal 
activities” of Khodzhaev’s government, forcing Stalin to recommend a thorough 
Sovietization of the Bukhara government, support of Khodzhaev, and a complete 
turnover of personnel.150 In December 1924, on the Sredazbyuro’s proposal, the Politburo 
in Moscow withdrew Islamov from Uzbekistan and sent him to Moscow as a 
consequence of “internal squabbles” among the local elite. The Politburo also warned 
that unless terminated, Abdulla Rakhimbaev, Fayzullah Khodzhaev, and Ishan 
Khodzhaev (all Bukharans or in the case of Rakhimbaev, Khodjent, adjacent to the city of 
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Bukhara) would be “immediately withdrawn”.151 Stalin’s foremost concern in Uzbekistan 
was not localism but Bukhara’s feuding elite, which would leave a permanent mark of 
disloyalty and untrustworthiness.152  In Moscow at least this conflict was interpreted and 
portrayed as one between “leftist” and “rightist” communists and did not concern power 
disputes between cities, regions, or the Bukharan tribes.153   
The contrast with the nomadic areas is illuminating. Soviet writings of the 1920s 
considered genealogy key to grasp the nomadic cultures of the Turkmen, Kazakhs, and 
Kyrgyz and the Bolsheviks also incorporated this element into policy.154 Thus, by 1928 
the republics and areas of the USSR defined by nomadism -- principally the Kara-Kirgiz, 
Siberia, northern Caucasus, and the Turkmen – were endowed with native executive 
committees (tuzriki), native soviets (tuzemnye sovety), aul (aul'nye) soviets, clan 
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(rodovye) soviets, and nomadic (kochevye) soviets.155 However, with the exception of the 
mahalla’s new role as an appendage to the soviets and the creation of mahalla 
committees, the fusion of soviets with kinship-based structures such as those above were 
not seen in Uzbekistan.156  
Beyond the soviets, the Bolsheviks sought equitable representation of the 
rivalling Turkmen tribal groups in the future Turkmen republic. Hence, in 1924, a deputy 
head of the Sredazbyuro, stated: "If we promote someone from one tribe into an 
administrative post, we have to make sure that we give a similar promotion to the others. 
If we give an award to someone from one tribe, we have to do the same for the others as 
well. If we form a police force, then it must be with the calculation that we will take an 
equal number of people from each tribe, and that they all will have equivalent positions, 
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and the same for those who work in the military, in the secret police, and so on."157 This 
“tribal parity” proposal even went beyond balancing the major Turkmen tribes and 
prescribed equal representation for rivalling segments within each tribe. The Sredazbyuro 
protocols in which this issue was discussed contain no similar provisions for the 
sedentary Uzbek areas, which testify to the important differences between the settled and 
nomadic cultures.158   
If this balancing served to acknowledge tribal rights, a second component of this 
policy aimed at defeating them. Collective land tenure was a primary factor undergirding 
descent group affiliation in Turkmenistan, and the Bolsheviks therefore proceeded to 
undermine this economic basis, principally with the 1925 Land-Water Reform 
program.159 The land reform in Turkmenistan followed closely that of Uzbekistan, “apart 
from a number of distinctive features resulting from special forms of land tenure peculiar 
to Turkoman tribes”.160 Similar deliberations of defeating descent groups were not 
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present in the implementation of the program in Uzbekistan. The Bolsheviks did not 
anticipate similar dangers with the land reform in Uzbekistan since the landowners of 
Uzbekistan were less entrenched than the tribal leaders of Turkmenistan, who had “a 
stronger grip on the loyalties of the people”.161 Thus, confiscation of land could proceed 
more easily in Uzbekistan than in the tribally organized Turkmenistan. This key 
distinction between the settled and the nomadic was mirrored in the form loyalties were 
expressed.  
For example, when rumors were swirling that the capital of Turkestan would 
shift from Tashkent to Samarkand in 1921, the Chairman of the TurkTsIka, Abdullo 
Rakhimbaev – himself a native of Khodjent in Tajikistan, a Chairman of the Samarkand 
obkom in 1919, and later in 1923 secretary of the Central Committee of the  Bukhara 
Communist Party – wrote at a state of “urgency” and inquired why this decision had not 
been coordinated with the TurkTsIka, noting that this decision (if correctly reported) 
would “stir up a lot of trouble”.162 In other words, his loyalties do not seem to have been 
with this particular city, region, or with the Tajiks since the transfer of the capital 
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potentially would have been a feather in the hat of this region and, hence, something 
which he should have welcomed. Instead, he resolutely questioned the transfer of the 
capital. This should be compared with the intense inter-tribal struggles between Tekes 
and non-Tekes that surrounded the discussions over the transferring of the capital in 
Ashgabat to Chärjev in the 1920s. Unlike Rakhimbaev’s national orientation, the non-
Teke party official K.A. Böriev accused the Tekes of striving for “Teke hegemony” with 
the placement of the capital in Ashgabat.163 In this abortive attempt to transfer the capital 
and others, sub-national loyalties among the settled population appear to have been 
subdued.164 
The absence of a tribal policy in Uzbekistan suggests that the Bolsheviks viewed 
kinship- and other sub-national loyalties a lesser problem than in the nomadic areas. The 
policy did not exist in Uzbekistan not only because of the difference in social structure 
between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan but also because of differences in Soviet 
perceptions about the social structures of these two republics. Similar to their Tsarist 
predecessors, they rather simplistically considered the Turkmen and Kazakhs as nomadic 
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and tribal and the Uzbeks and Tajiks as sedentary and non-tribal.165 But perhaps this was 
not all that surprising in view of the mélange of identities present in the settled areas. 
Even in the partially tribal territories of Bukhara and Khorezm, adjacent to Turkmenistan, 
individuals had difficulties comprehending their identity, at least in categories used by 
Europeans. This point came across an expedition of Soviet ethnographers when they, in 
1924, departed for this remote region to bring clarity to the matter. When asked “to what 
tribe or clan do you belong”, respondents in these areas reportedly were puzzled and “did 
not understand the question”.166    
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 “Empowering” the New Nationally and Career-Oriented Elite 
Uzbekistan’s first entirely native leadership constellation was formed in 1929, 
before which the heads of the Uzbek Communist Party had been non-natives. Akmal 
Ikramov was named First Secretary of the republic in 1929 by the local Sredazbyuro167, 
holding this office until 1937 when he was executed in Stalin’s purges. Though a 
Tashkent native, Ikramov rose to power through party work in Namangan, Ferghana, and 
then Tashkent, serving first as deputy head of the Namangan revkom and Secretary of the 
Ferghana and Syr Darya obkoms. In 1925 at the age of 27 he was nominated member of 
Uzbekistan’s Central Committee.168 Slightly older was Faizullah Khodzhaev, the native 
leader of the People’s Republic of Bukhara before it acceded to the USSR. He was 
instated chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars in 1924 at the age of 26 and 
occupied this position until he too was shot in the purges of 1938.169 The head of the 
central ispolkom (the “legislative” organ and predecessor of the Supreme Soviet) was a 
Ferghana native from Margelan, Yuldash Ahunbabaev. Ahunbabaev had previously 
served as Chairman of the Margilan (Ferghana) soviet and was its representative at the 
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founding Congress of the Uzbek SSR in 1925, at the time of which he also was elected to 
the Central Committee.170 Seven years younger than Stalin, Ahunbabaev was part of the 
older generation of Bolsheviks who had reached adulthood by the time of the 1905 
revolution. Stalin had no intention of promoting his generation to power, however, but 
aimed to leapfrog it in favor of the younger one.171 The seniority principle was also 
offset. Khodzhaev was the most powerful of the three since political power initially 
rested with the head (predsovnarkom) of the Council of People’s Commissars 
(sovnarkom) and not the First Secretary of the Communist Party.   
Though Stalin had been perturbed by the infighting among the Bukhara elite, he 
sought to shield Khodzhaev from the party apparatchiks in Tashkent. In April 1926 Stalin 
telegraphed Ikramov, Zelensky, and Ivanov instructing them not to “depersonalize the 
sovnarkom [Council of People’s Commissariat], isolate the predsovnarkom [Khodzhaev], 
and undermine his influence”. “The party in Uzbekistan” he continued “ should consider 
the authority of the sovnarkom…and make this an asset for the party”.172 That the capital 
of Uzbekistan at first was located to Samarkand, part of the Emirate of Bukhara and 
                                                 
 
170 “Yuldash Akhunbabaev,” in Kazak Sovet Entsiklopediyasy, Vol. 1 (Almaty: Kazak SSR Gylym 
Akademiyasy, 1972), p. 618.  
171 RGASPI, f.558, op.11, d.32, doc.36, “Shifrotelegramma Stalina I.V. v Tashkent Karklinu i Varejkisu 
I.M,” April 23, 1924.  





People’s Republic of Bukhara, further enhanced the Bukhara/Samarkand region as the 
predominant center of power in the republic.  
The empowerment of this native elite was paired with the establishment of direct 
links between the new national republics and Moscow, bypassing the regional organ of 
government, the Sredazbyuro. In part because of the Sredazbyuro’s desire to undercut 
Moscow’s authority, transform Central Asia into a federated entity akin to the federated 
organization of the South Caucasus, and the localism and “Ukrainization” of this body, 
Stalin and Molotov in 1931 warned this group of employees and subsequently acted upon 
these warnings.173 Chastised for several unsanctioned activities, the Sredazbyuro 
leadership was accused of “forcing the establishment of a Central Asian federation” 
through the creation of a number of institutions operating effectively “as agencies of a 
federation.”174 Zelensky, Moscow’s proconsul in the region since 1924, was recalled the 
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same year and the Sredazbyuro itself was abolished in 1934.175 The result was a more 
vertical relationship of authority between the center and the Central Asian national 
republics. Consequently, in 1931 control over cotton production was transferred from the 
Sredazhlopok to national cotton boards and the Narkomzem in Moscow was reorganized 
to have direct links with the cotton producing Central Asian republics.176 Ikramov’s 
powers grew correspondingly since he was put in charge of this. “It was decided”, 
minutes of the Politburo reveals, “to defer consideration of the cotton sovkhozes of 
Uzbekistan to Ikramov before the issue is brought to Moscow.”177 A regional organ of 
government, the Sredazbyuro, had been useful as an interim body to maintain Soviet 
control but eventually turned into a source of opposition which had sustained other 
district and province-level pockets of local dissent.178   
Whatever ulterior motives Stalin may have had national delimitation did catapult 
a local indigenous elite to power and degrade the influence of Russians and other Slavs in 
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the Sredazbyuro. The native elite were the tertius gaudens, the third-party beneficiaries, 
of the revolution. The new nations became the vehicle to party careers for the native elite 
and thus something which was embraced by many however frail the Uzbek national 
identity was per se.  Korenizatsiia allowed both qualified and unqualified Uzbeks 
unprecedented career opportunities and was, if not an ideological awakening, a bread-
and-butter affair. The newly established Lenin University in Tashkent, to which the 
native party members were sent for training, acted as a melting pot and cement for new 
loyalties directed to the Communist Party.179 Even if not entirely foolproof, the procedure 
of selection of non-Russian personnel into governing positions also tended to favor those 
individuals who were most committed and loyal to the revolution and Stalin’s national 
program.180  
The rapid upward mobility of the Uzbek elite is likely to have presented them 
with a dilemma: To play by the new rules and stay loyal to the Bolshevik national idea or 
revert to old loyalties in their home regions. Archival evidence suggests that the former 
often took precedence, even if not always.  Thus, a Soviet document remarked: “It is 
characteristic that groups which were in conflict within a given nationality before 
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national division (razmechevanie) have not been united by general national interests.”181  
This held particularly true for Uzbekistan since it emerged as a regional leader following 
the delimitation. More than half of the region’s population found themselves within 
Uzbekistan’s borders. The republic also contained 60% of Central Asia’s agricultural 
lands and generated 70% of the region’s total economic profits. This endowment 
prescribed that the republic’s elite became “model leaders for Soviet Central Asian 
policies.”182 The most egregious forms of nepotism that Khodzhaev among others had 
engaged in could no longer be sustained under Stalin’s watchful eye.  “With the sudden 
creation of the Uzbek nation,” Roger Kangas writes, “the indigenous elite began to 
coalesce around this concept”.183 
The proposed transfer of ethnically Tajik territories to Tajikistan in 1930 is a 
case in point. That year Ikramov had an opportunity to dismember Khodzhaev’s Tajik 
“power base” but did not do so. When the all-Union Presidium of the ispolkom adopted a 
decision in 1930 to transfer Surkhandarya okrug (oblast) to Tajikistan, Ikramov filed a 
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complaint and the ispolkom “decided to propose to temporarily reverse its decision”. This 
temporary reversal was later made permanent. 184 Surkhandarya remained in Uzbekistan 
and this is noteworthy since it was Ikramov and not Khodzhaev who objected, even 
though Surkhandarya was former Bukhara territory. If Ikramov wanted to reduce 
Khodzhaev’s clout he could have detached Surkhandarya. But he did not, which points to 
that national concerns trumped narrow local ones.  
Such nationally oriented concerns were paralleled with career-based loyalties 
among the elite. An example is Abdulla Karimov’s replacement as Chairman of the 
Council of People’s Commissars (the predecessor of the Council of Ministers) in 1937.185 
Expressing their dissatisfaction with Karimov (“a member of the anti-Soviet group led by 
Khodzhaev”), Stalin and Molotov solicited the Uzbek First Secretary Ikramov to propose 
alternative candidates for this position.186 Under pressure from the center Ikramov put 
forward two candidates, S. Baltabaev from Ferghana Valley and D. Tyuerabekov from 
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Khodkent (Tajikistan),187 both of whom were acquaintances from Tashkent. Baltabaev 
had been the First Secretary of Tashkent gorkom since three years back and Tyuerabekov 
had “recently returned to Tashkent from Moscow”.188 Stalin penciled Comrade Yezhov in 
a hand-written note, “to check both immediately and report to the Central Committee”.189  
Ikramov’s choice was Baltabaev with Tyuerabekov as deputy, but Stalin opted 
for Tyuerabekov, who would only serve two months, however, before he was executed in 
the purges.190   Regionalism does not appear to have been part of Ikramov’s calculation 
since none of the figures recommended hailed from Ikramov’s native Tashkent but were 
associates whom he had encountered in the capital. Stalin’s primary concern was not that 
sub-national loyalties would split the republic apart but that “anti-Soviet” elements from 
different parts of the republic would unite and conspire against Stalin’s rule. Jotting down 
a note on a cable Stalin accordingly warned the local leadership not to place “Karimov, 
Baltabaev, and Tyurabekov together”.191 The intention was to isolate those perceived as 
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anti-Moscow and eventually remove them, lest they challenge central control over the 
region. 
Locals did evidently have some input into the nomenklatura process and they 
were often empowered to “recommend” figures for top state and party positions that were 
scrutinized and vetted in Moscow, as testified to by the appointment of Baltabaev. 
Proposing candidates, Ikramov discussed both their merits and party history, their 
intellectual abilities, their “reliability” (solidnost’), prior government work, and their 
devotion to the party and the Central Committee in Moscow.192 When portrayed in Soviet 
media, however, responsibility for appointments rested exclusively with the local 
scapegoats. Thus, Ikramov was subsequently snared for filling positions with “protégés” 
such as Baltabaev, on the grounds that that these often were of the bourgeois-nationalist 
character, and that figures excluded from the party had miraculously been pardoned and 
reinstated. Tyurabekov was singled out as one who had “very cleverly bypassed all sharp 
corners” with the help of Ikramov.193  If this indeed was a “pact” it was composed of 
individuals from all three power centers of the republic, which speaks against strong 
subnational loyalties.  
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End of the “Honeymoon”: The Power Transfer from Bukhara to Tashkent/Ferghana 
Uzbekistan’s first generation of leaders may have coalesced around the nation 
but Stalin forcefully imposed a regionalization of political power upon them. Not soon 
after the establishment of Uzbekistan it became evident that the power awarded to figures 
from the Bukharan half of the republic was a Trojan horse. Early signs that their 
influence was being eclipsed were expressed already in 1925 when the composition of 
the Sredazbyuro shifted away from Bukhara and the Tajik areas with the removal of 
Islamov and Rakhimbaev (Khodkent) and towards Tashkent-Ferghana with the 
incorporation of Ahunbabaev (Ferghana) and Tashmukhamedova, the Secretary of 
Tashkent city.194 Capping this trend was the transfer of the capital itself from Samarkand 
to the bustling Tashkent in 1930.  
Stalin had empowered Khodzhaev to ensure Bukhara’s loyalty only to clip his 
wings when Moscow had consolidated its rule in the region. This conformed to Stalin’s 
overall tactic to divide and rule among the Central Asian leadership, often defending the 
natives against the Slavic appointees.195 In 1928, for instance, First Secretary I. Zelensky 
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telegraphed Stalin demanding an investigation of Khodzhaev, Abdulla Karimov, 
Burnashev, and others. Without pressing the point, Stalin considered such an 
investigation “certainly inappropriate” but offered Zelensky to refer the cases to “other 
higher non-judicial bodies…which you find most comfortable”.196 Stalin’s tacit support 
of Ikramov was manifested in early 1929 when Zelensky and his predecessor Nikolaj 
Gikalo also sought the then 31-year old Ikramov’s retirement. However, Stalin retorted 
that “retirement of Ikramov is unacceptable and politically and practically harmful. You 
cannot create the illusion that the Central Committee supports elements like Faizullah 
[Khodzhaev] against Bolshevik workers like Ikramov. The Central Committee considers 
it compulsory to support Ikramov and keeping him as secretary.” The futile attempt to 
“isolate” Ikramov, as had been proposed, was also deemed “wrong.”197  
Seven months later Ikramov would cut into Zelenski’s powers as Ikramov was 
appointed in his place, ostensibly at Zelenski’s own initiative, making Ikramov First 
Secretary of the republic.198 As the 1930s wore on, Ikramov would also figure as the most 
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prominent source of policy initiative while many of Khodzhaev’s proposals increasingly 
fell on deaf ears.199 Steadily accumulating power, Ikramov was selected Third Secretary 
of the Sredazbyuro in 1931, the highest position of any native nationality in this organ.   
Similar to his shifting support of Zelensky, Stalin pitted Ikramov and Khodzhaev against 
each other. By constantly reallocating the powers between them Stalin could play the role 
of arbiter all the while, in a piecemeal fashion, bolstering his own powers and 
centralization of policy making. In principle, this was little different from how Stalin 
maneuvered his way to power in the center by flip-flopping between the “leftists” 
(Preobrazhensky, Trotskij) and “rightists” (Bukharin, Rykov) during the 1920s.200  
The “honeymoon” of Uzbekistan’s first generation of leaders ended with Stalin’s 
degradation of Bukhara. Consequently, five of the six native members of Uzbekistan’s 
Central Committee Bureau in 1937 hailed from Ferghana and Tashkent (see Appendix, 
Table 4).  Thus, political forces associated with Tashkent and Ferghana Valley were 
increasingly privileged at the expense of their counterparts in Bukhara, which since the 
early 1920s had dominated politics in the Sredazbyuro and later Uzbekistan itself. And 
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second, political power tilted from the state to the party, empowering the First Secretary 
(head of the Communist Party) and disempowering the Chairman of the Council of 
People’s Commissariat (head of government).   
Contemporary analysts have interpreted the gulf between Ikramov and 
Khodzhaev in terms of severe regional strife in Uzbekistan. Thus, Bailey Carlisle 
distinguishes the “clan/regional” power struggle between Khodzhaev and Ikramov as 
“monumental”, providing “us with the single most important model for comprehending 
factional politics”.201 The struggle over the Land/Water reform of 1925-1926, in which 
Khodzhaev championed a go-slow approach and Ikramov more radical and fast-paced 
reform, is one of the examples cited.202 The extent to which this conflict was regional in 
nature as opposed to personal or institutional is impossible to gauge with precision.  
What is clear is that earlier analysts in the “pre-regionalism era” did not identify 
a regional dimension of this conflict, at least not the same one as Bailey Carlisle. Roger 
Kangas thorough biographical work on Khodzhaev identifies the bones of contention 
between him and Ikramov to have concerned mainly Khodzhaev’s nationalist beliefs, his 
support of the Jadids, opposition to the Bolshevik’s cotton monocrop policy, and various 
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disputes surrounding economic and social reforms.203 If Khodzhaev had a power base in 
Uzbekistan, it was “among the intelligentsia”, he notes.204 Likewise, Ishanov’s biography 
of Khodzhaev relates his dispute with Khodzhaev solely to their different opinions on 
cotton production.205 Another analyst emphasizes that this was a “personal rivalry”.206 
The only regional dimension to this conflict noted by Kangas is the reverse of Carlisle’s. 
Thus Kangas remarks, “Presumed to be a member of the Samarkand group that opposed 
the Tashkent organization of Khodzhaev before the 1920 revolution, Ikramov was also a 
devoted communist.”207   In this assessment, Khodzhaev is presumed to have belonged to 
the Tashkent group, Ikramov to Samarkand, and not vice versa as has been conveyed by 
Bailey Carlisle.  
Stalin’s interpretation, in turn, was not one of conflict between them but that 
Ikramov had conspired with Khodzhaev. Thus, in a telegram from Stalin and Molotov of 
Uzbekistan dated September 10, 1937, the Central Committee of Uzbekistan was 
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informed that “in relation to the arrests of Bukharin, F. Khodzhaev, Razumov, Ryzykulov 
[and others]…Ikramov was not only associated with these group of nationalists but also 
patronized them”.208  
Whichever is correct, if any, the functions of the state and party often impinged 
on one another, which inevitably generated frequent clashes of authority between 
Khodzhaev and Ikramov. This tactic of divida et impera served Stalin’s purposes as he 
gradually sought to remove those perceived as disloyal and strengthen the communist 
party in the process. Paralells could surely be drawn to Stalin’s targeting of Zhdanov and 
the purge of the Leningrad-faction in the late 1940s.209 Bukhara had been the most 
autonomy-minded of Uzbekistan’s parts, the most restive ever since the Tsarist era, and 
the site of the most severe internal power struggles. Transferring power from Bukhara to 
the more loyal part, Tashkent, was a means to strengthen Soviet control and halt the 
growth of autonomist sentiments. Ferghana initially lost out among the three because it 
was perceived as a source of opposition and Ferghana was marginalized in Kyrgyzstan 
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for the same reason. Tajik Ferghana, by contrast, thrived because it was Uzbek and 
designated to control the new Tajik republic detached from Uzbekistan in 1930.  
A second reason for this power transfer was the shifting importance of Tashkent 
and Ferghana Valley in the late 1920s and the 1930s. The upgrading of Tashkent in 1925 
to a “first rank” city along with Kharkov (Ukraine),210  the subsequent transfer of the 
capital to Tashkent, and its history as the capital of Central Asia since the mid-19th 
century ensured a prominent role for the elite associated with the capital region. Between 
the years 1926 to 1939 Tashkent’s city population nearly doubled, from 314.000 to 
556.000,211  thereby outstripping Samarkand’s more modest population increase from 
105.000 to 136.000 during the same years.212   
Ferghana’s ranking was similarly raised. By the mid-1930s Uzbekistan’s 
economy had overwhelmingly been oriented to that of a “cotton republic”, the production 
of which centered on the Ferghana Valley.213 Cotton thrust Ferghana Valley up in the 
hierarchy of administrative importance since the two foremost cotton-producing oblast, 
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Ferghana and Andijan, were located in the Valley.  While the historical heart of Central 
Asia and of immense cultural significance, the areas associated with Bukhara and 
Samarkand could not boast equal administrative and economic importance. The transfer 
of political power from Bukhara and Samarkand towards Tashkent and Ferghana 
accorded with this changing economic and administrative significance; the latter two 
regions would also become the main cadre pools for the rest of the Soviet period.  Such 
differential treatment of regions and cities as cadre pools was not unique to Uzbekistan, it 
should be said, but the rule in the Soviet system.214  
Bukhara had been downgraded and Tashkent upgraded but the leaderships of 
both areas were eventually truncated. On March 15, 1938, both Khodzhaev and Ikramov 
faced the death penalty together with several others accused of “nationalistic” and anti-
Soviet activities e.g. Khodzhanov, Atabaev, and Karimov.215 They were succeeded by a 
set of new leaders who also took charge of the execution squad, including Usman 
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Yusupov (Ikramov’s successor), Sultan Segisbaev (Chairman of SNK), B.B. Shejdin who 
survived the first round of purges, D.Z. Aprezyan (the new narkom), and A. 
Abdurakhmanov (Segisbaev’s successor).216 
Conclusion 
The “artificial” creation of Uzbekistan in 1924 portended strong local loyalties 
in the new state, but delimitation also acted as a centripetal force by solidifying the 
indigenous elite whether as a marriage of convenience or not. National loyalties gradually 
transcended pre-national ones, even if not supplanting them completely. Analysts have 
claimed that clan and tribal consciousness in Central Asia not only survived the Soviet 
period but was reinforced by it, because “development of tribalism was a natural, 
spontaneous form of resistance to the assimilationist policies that Moscow pursued in an 
effort to divide national communities”.217 The argument in intuitive since this resistance, 
though at another level, is partly what occurred in the Soviet Union as a whole in the 
1970s and 1980s: rather than drawing the nations together, increased inter-homeland 
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migration and interaction in general among USSR’s nations “served as catalysts 
activating national territoriality”.218 It is conceivable that a similar logic applied to the 
delimitation in the 1920s, i.e., that sub-national loyalties were activated in response to the 
imposition of nations.  
However, my findings suggest the contrary. The Bolshevik revolution created 
fresh opportunities for a national elite with vested interests in the new republic. Thus, a 
new class of beneficiaries was created which, to quote Fainsod, “began to separate 
themselves from their neighbors and align their futures with the communist cause.”219 
Such “national” solidarities had their foundation in the social organization of pre-Soviet 
Central Asia and the distinction between settled and nomadic society, where in the former 
the importance of kinship was much weaker. On the Bolsheviks’ part, this was expressed 
in the adoption of a “tribal policy” for Turkmenistan but not for Uzbekistan. Delimitation 
ensured the indigenes participation in their own affairs, better career prospects, and an 
ebbing influence of the non-Central Asian prefects. While such interests wedded to the 
nation mitigated conflicts among the indigenous elite, it did not reduce them completely, 
as testified to by the disputes among the Bukharans.   
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Zemlyachestvo, mestnichestvo, nepotism, and favoritism of former colleagues 
were pinpointed elsewhere in the Soviet system at the time but archival records contain 
surprisingly scant evidence of this in Uzbekistan. That zemlyachestvo was the “dominant 
principle of recruitment” as has been argued is doubtful since few of the Sredazbyuro 
documents discussed the matter.220 What were discussed, at least as regards Uzbekistan, 
concerned merits, party history, intellectual abilities, reliability, prior government work, 
and loyalty to Moscow.  
Soviet nationality policies may have leapfrogged a new nationally oriented elite 
but the Soviet hierarchy of regions in parallel spurred an artificial form of regionalism. 
That particular regions dominated early Soviet Uzbekistan and others lost out was to be 
expected given the events preceding and coinciding with the Bolshevik takeover. The 
Kokand autonomy and its elite was destroyed, Bukhara was bought off, and the historical 
power center Khwarazm was too backward to be a contestant for political power. Thus 
political power was initially dispersed among figures from Tashkent, Bukhara, and to a 
lesser extent Ferghana – the economically, demographically, and politically most 
important component parts of the republic.  
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During the late 1920s and early 1930s, however, Stalin pulled the carpet from 
underneath officials associated with Bukhara and strengthened Tashkent and later 
Ferghana. It was Stalin who sowed the seeds of dissension amongst the native elite, 
which certainly contributed to the deep-seated animosity between Khodzhaev and 
Ikramov. He duped Khodzhaev and undermined him when the USSR was in firmer 
control. A similar tactic of “empowerment-destruction” guided the creation and 
abolishment of the Sredazbyuro. If the imposition of the Uzbek nation and 
regionalization of politics were the foremost external forces shaping politics in early 
Soviet Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan’s settled society was the primary internal force. This 
social basis enabled elite loyalties to the Uzbek nation but it was fettered by Stalin’s 






3. Sidelining Moscow’s Sentinel: Uzbekistan after 
Stalin’s Great Purges, 1937-1953 
Introduction 
From the formation of the Central Asian republics in 1924 down to the great 
purges of 1937-38, Moscow gradually centralized authority over the region. Little if any 
independent authority remained in the hands of the native leadership by the end of that 
cataclysmic period. The first generation of Uzbek leaders was brutally executed and the 
baton was passed over to a group of successors. These, too, had their origins in Tashkent 
and Ferghana which was surprising since had they been “clans”, they would presumably 
have been thoroughly destroyed. Instead, these two regions emerged with renewed 
prestige in a similarly ordered system. Though from the same regions, the post-purge 
Uzbek leaders differed from their predecessors in one important respect: From the early 





selection of subordinates, though not in contesting central directives.1 Still, the Party 
Control Commission’s documentation does not attest to that “localism” or regionalism 
were major concerns, even if such violations were identified elsewhere in the Soviet 
Union. Other violations were pinpointed, e.g., monopolization of decision-making by the 
secretarial group in the Central Committee Bureau, but this was the rule in the Soviet 
system at the time.   
No different from other Soviet leaders, First Secretary Usman Yusupov and his 
successor Amin Niyazov did engage in favoritism but the individuals experiencing 
upward mobility under them were associates they had met in course of their careers. The 
Party Control Commission did acknowledge severe conflicts in Uzbekistan’s Central 
Committee Bureau but these related solely to the incessant feuding between the 
indigenous elite, on the one hand, and the centrally appointed and locally recruited non-
Central Asians, on the other. Nationality, not region of origin, was the source of frictions.  
Tajikistan, in contrast, was the site of some of the most pronounced practices of 
region-based recruiting in Stalin’s Soviet Union. Similar to Yusupov, Tajikistan’s First 
Secretary Gafurov had been granted wide autonomy and misused his seigniorial 
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prerogatives by favoring figures from his native Leninabad. However, even if the extent 
of “localism” in these two cases differ, the logic behind appointments was similar. 
Gafurov, not unlike Yusupov, promoted associates of his. The only difference was that 
elite mobility between oblasts was less pronounced in Tajikistan, generating a 
phenomenon which approximated “clans”. The wide discrepancy between Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan, both settled and culturally similar societies, indicates that Soviet policy and 
patterns of elite mobility were behind the varying expressions of “localism” in these two 
cases. 
 The topics introduced above will form the main subjects of this chapter. I shall 
begin, however, with a brief review of the party hierarchy and the distribution of power 
between the secretaries as it had crystallized by the 1940s as well as touch upon the 
formal workings of the USSR’s appointment system, the nomenklatura.  
The Party Hierarchy and the Nomenklatura 
The Party Hierarchy  
The structure of the party hierarchy in the republics had assumed a stable and 
institutionalized form by the 1940s and remained essentially the same thereafter. In 
Uzbekistan and the other Soviet republics, the Bureau of the Central Committee stood at 
the apex and served as the highest decision-making body. The Bureau had both functional 





decisions, and mediate between central planners and the social, economic, and political 
requisites of the republic. Its symbolic role and legitimizing function prescribed 
representation of both Uzbekistan’s nationalities as well as European non-Central Asians, 
principally Russians and Ukrainians.2 Full and automatic membership in the Bureau was 
conferred upon the entire Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers and his deputy, the Commander of the Turkestan Military District, 
and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.3 
The party-administrative organs below the Bureau included, in descending order 
of authority: the Central Committee Secretariat and its hierarchically ordered line 
organizations; the obkoms including, in Uzbekistan, Tashkent’s gorkom; other gorkoms; 
and the rural and urban raykoms. At the bottom of the pyramid stood primary party 
organizations. The Central Committee departments included staff offices of the 
Secretariat for political, economic, and socio-cultural checking and control of central 
plans and directives. Each level within the party hierarchy also comprised sub-
departments of functional responsibilities.4    
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The First Secretary was tasked with overall leadership, coordination, and 
supervision of the Uzbek party apparatus. These powers were not only symbolic but 
possessed the aura of a chief of state. Presiding over the Uzbek Bureau, the First 
Secretary served as the republic’s chief policy implementer, acting within the constraints 
set by central directives.5 Unlike the centrally appointed Second Secretaries who 
maintained a low but powerful profile in terms of control, First Secretaries participated to 
some degree in policy debates on economic and other subjects.6 On party-organizational 
matters, however, the powers formally rested with a non-Central Asian central appointee, 
the Second Secretary, who controlled the nomenklatura. Overall, the dominance of non-
Central Asians on questions relating to political-organizational matters, was one of the 
most prominent “ethno-political biases” in recruitment to the Uzbek state and party 
apparatuses, which was a calculated measure of control.7 Beyond controlling 
appointments and dismissals, the Second Secretary was empowered to serve as a 
“mediator” between the non-Central Asian and Central Asians. In carrying out these 
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functions, he was also obligated to keep tabs on the republican leadership and report them 
to central authorities.8 Usurping practically all authority of the other state organs at each 
level of government, the powers wielded by the First Secretary and the Second Secretary 
were substantial, though a Chairman of the Council of Ministers (or oblispolkom at the 
oblast level) could wield significant informal authority.9 The division of labor between 
the First and Second Secretaries outlined above was mirrored at lower levels of 
government (oblast, rayon): the non-Central Asian Second Secretary acted as Moscow’s 
watchdog and formally kept control over the nomenklatura.  
The Nomenklatura: A Skein, Not a Hierarchy 
The appointment powers of the different levels of the party organs outlined 
above were defined in the nomenklatura system. One of the basic elements of the Soviet 
socio-political order, the nomenklatura regulated the appointments of hundreds of 
thousands of officials in the Soviet polity, some of them nominally elective, from the 
central government down to the village soviets. The nomenklatura lists were controlled 
by the Communist Party, directed from the center and at successively lower levels of the 
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Communist Party apparatus.10 Although the system was modified over the Soviet period, 
the fundamentals remained the same. The nomenklatura contained two lists regulating the 
appointment and transfer of senior officials. The first included posts which could only 
change hands by a decision of the Central Committee and its bodies -- the Secretariat, the 
Orgburo, or the Politburo. The second list comprised posts needing approval of one of the 
Central Committee members.11 Republican and provincial party organs were instructed to 
compile their own nomenklatura lists modelled on those of the central government in 
Moscow.12 The hierarchy of authority was similar. Positions on the two nomenklatura 
lists could only change through authorization of the Central Committee and its bodies at 
each level of government (central, republican, obkom), though this did not encompass the 
most senior posts.  The appointment of Central Committee members and candidates and 
other “leading” party functionaries at the republican, obkom, and rayon levels was the 
prerogative of the Central Committee at the level above. Likewise, the job categories 
placed on the nomenklatura list on each level were decided by the level above, which 
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empowered that particular party organ to decide the influence of the party organ at the 
level below.13   
The crux of the matter was two: First, the nomenklatura lists contained several 
instances of overlapping authority between bodies. For example, senior officials at the 
republican level were on the nomenklatura of both the Central Committee in Moscow 
and the Central Committee in the republic. Likewise, senior officials at the obkom level 
were on the nomenklatura of the republic’s Central Committee as well as on the obkom 
Central Committee nomenklatura. Thus, the nomenklatura system set the main 
parameters in which appointments were regulated but the overlapping authority between 
bodies entailed that the prerogatives were fuzzy. For example, the oblast and rayon 
NKVD offices in the 1930s were on the obkom nomenklatura and the obkom leadership 
was thus formally authorized to staff them. In practice, however, it was the NKVD itself 
which proposed appointments or removals and the obkom which accepted them.14 It 
became unclear what bodies that initiated or merely ratified decisions since the system 
was a skein and not a strict hierarchy.15  
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Second, these overlapping authorities combined with inadequate administrative 
resources at all levels to monitor and control adherence to nomenklatura rules led to 
ubiquitous informal politicking over cadre appointments. This occurred both laterally 
between organs at the same level of government (e.g. the Central Committee Secretariat, 
the Central Committee Bureau, and the Orgburo) as well as vertically between levels of 
the party organs. In the case of the latter, each level of the party apparatus sought to 
shield itself from the influence of the one above by exploiting these loopholes and dual 
sources of authority in the system. Thus, First Secretaries of raykoms, obkoms, or 
republics and the Bureaus at each level could use their authority over cadre appointments 
to designate their personnel: they made recommendations, smoothed the way for 
particular candidates by advancing their merits, and sometimes appointed personnel 
without approval from the level above to create a fait accompli. At times, the party organ 
at the level above struck back, recognizing the importance of controlling appointments 
below to “prevent local cliques from consolidating”.16  
As the previous chapter hinted to, control over the nomenklatura was not an 
insignificant power but probably the most potent and instrumental source of authority.17 
The heart of political power in the Soviet system was to maintain a following of loyal 
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supporters. The key to maintaining loyal supporters was to control the nomenklatura. It is 
not surprising therefore that the First Secretary attempted to usurp some of the Second 
Secretary’s powers, lest he would lose control over the placement of loyal supporters and 
thus compromise his ability to govern effectively. The post-purge Stalin period furnishes 
us, perhaps, with the most clear-cut evidence on how the formal distribution of power 
between Uzbekistan’s secretaries was upset by informal politics.  
Yusupov’s Uzbekistan  
The Post-Purge Leadership Constellation: Tashkent and Ferghana Unscathed 
Having decimated the first generation of Uzbek politicians, Stalin installed a 
new Uzbek leadership in 1937 who looked squarely to him.18  Yusupov, a native of 
Ferghana, succeeded Ikramov in 1938 and was thrust into the forefront as First Secretary 
of the Uzbek Communist Party at the age of 38. Though a native of Ferghana Valley, 
Yusupov had previously served as Secretary of the Tashkent okrug and head of the 
Tashkent Writers’ Union and was named secretary of the Central Committee in 1929 and 
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Commissar of Food Industries in 1937.19 If Ikramov was a Tashkent native who had built 
his career in Ferghana, Yusupov was the exact reverse – a native of Ferghana who 
plunged into politics in Tashkent. He owed his position to the patronage of Russia’s new 
prefect, Andreev, appointed to Tashkent in September 1937 who familiarized Yusupov to 
Stalin. Yusupov was portrayed as a figure detached from the Uzbek nationalist 
intelligentsia who had “always opposed Ikramov and Khodzhaev”, which clearly worked 
to his advantage.”20 Declaring that he “was not opposed to the candidacy of Yusupov”, 
Stalin instructed Andreev “to act at your own discretion and according to the situation,” 
suggesting a degree of influence on the process of selecting a First Secretary to the 
Second Secretary. However, this correspondence contains no deliberations that his region 
of origin was of importance.21 Yusupov’s main quality was that he was anti-Ikramov and 
perceived as loyal. Evidence of this could be traced back to 1930 when, shortly after 
Ikramov’s rise, Yusupov was demoted and penned several denunciatory letters on 
Ikramov directly addressed to Stalin.22  
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A Tashkent native, Abdudzhabar Abdurarakhmanov was in 1937 chosen 
Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars (later in 1946 renamed the Council of 
Ministers). Abdurarakhmanov, like much of the rest of the Soviet leadership, rose 
through the province and district apparatuses, having served prior to this appointment as 
the secretary of the Margilan, Ferghana, Kokand gorkoms, the Yangiyul raykom 
(Tashkent), and the Bukhara obkom – i.e. in all the three main power centers of the 
republic.23 In between Khodzhaev and Abdurarakhmanov two figures, Abdulla Karimov 
and Sultan Segizbaev, served but they only lasted for a few months each.24 Being only 
one of a few in the Uzbek ruling elite who survived Stalin’s purges, the Ferghana native 
Yuldash Akhunbabaev remained as the servile head of the “legislative” branch but now 
Chairman of the recently established Supreme Soviet.  
Stalin’s bloodshed cut a deep gouge in Uzbekistan’s elite. Even so, the 
supremacy of figures hailing from Tashkent and Ferghana continued after the great 
purges of 1937-1938. Only N. Ismailov from Samarkand came from elsewhere in the 
Central Committee Bureaus of 1940 and 1949 (see Table 3 and 4 in Appendix). In other 
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words, even if an almost entirely new leadership was installed in power they reflected 
largely the same geographical origins as their disgraced predecessors. This attests to the 
robustness of the cadre hierarchy and that this “regionalism” was something which had 
intruded from without. Moscow also visibly reinforced its control by almost doubling the 
presence of non-Central Asians on the Uzbek Central Committee Bureau from five in 
1937 to nine in 1940 (see Table 2 and 3 in Appendix).25 Korenizatsiia had slowed down 
from the early 1930s, which in part was manifested in the Russification of the Uzbek 
Bureau after the great purges, but this did not imply that the powers of the native 
leadership were more curtailed as Uzbekistan entered the 1940s. Quite the contrary, as 
Moscow stood passive to an increasingly reassertive Uzbek leadership.  
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Nationality Frictions and Power Usurpation in the Central Committee Bureau 
Although Stalin’s Russification and centralization of policy in the post-purge 
period initially stifled local political influence, Yusupov’s clout was growing steadily 
during the 1940s and his policy initiatives often trumped those of powerful figures in the 
center. For example, when in the 1940s Yusupov and Kobulov reported increasing theft 
and embezzlement in the trading network of food, textile, and manufactured goods, 
proposing the establishment of a troika composed of themselves as well the Prosecutor 
Beljaev, this was rejected by the Central Committee secretaries Molotov and Mikoyan 
who wanted this to fall under the all-Union Prosecutor General. But Stalin sided with the 
locals, noting “I am against the proposal of Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan. I favor the 
proposal of Yusupov and Kobulov. Insist on that proposal”.26 A second example of 
Yusupov’s increasing authority was his lead role in the construction of the Great 
Ferghana Canal, a massive project begun in 1939 stretching 250 kilometers and 
employing 500.000 workers. Whereas Molotov in his speech to the 18th party congress 
the same year used the rostrum to criticize the “gigantomaniia” of present construction 
efforts and irrigation projects in the USSR as a whole were being scaled down, Yusupov 
confidently ignored this opposition with Stalin’s backing. Not only Molotov but the 
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Uzbek Second Secretary Alexander Kudriavtchev along with the other non-Central Asian 
members of the Uzbek Central Committee opposed the project.27  Evidently, Stalin ceded 
policy initiative and political power to Yusupov and did so in part, as during the 1920s 
and 1930s, to maintain parity between the Central Asian and non-Central Asian 
secretaries.  
The canal controversy and Yusupov’s transgressions of authority frayed 
relations between the indigenous and non-Central Asian centrally appointed members and 
candidates of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee Bureau.28 Thus, the deputy Chairman of 
the Party Control Commission, Nikolaj Lomakin, reported in 1941 that he had “a more or 
less clear picture” of the situation in the Bureau. “Yusupov”, he noted, “distrusts Second 
Secretary Kudriavtchev and vice versa”. There is an “unhealthy climate in the Bureau” he 
continued, mainly fought out “between Russians and Uzbeks”. Accusing Yusupov and 
Abdurakhmanov for ‘anti-party’ activity and for having “adopted or strived for adopting 
the role of Second Secretary”, Kudriavtchev lamented that they had precluded “an active 
role for himself”.29 Comrade Zykov (in charge of the all-Union Central Committee’s 
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cadre policy) corroborated this, writing to Malenkov (Secretary of the all-Union Central 
Committee) that: “On the question of cadres, the opinion of Kudriavtchev is not listened 
to.” Refractory to instruction, Yusupov “went ahead and appointed the Chairman of the 
Workers Reserves, comrade Vostokov, the First Secretary of Lenin raykom, Kotov, and 
comrade Makumbaeva (an NKVD official in Bukhara), against Kudriavtchev’s 
objections”.30   
Appended to Lomakin’s report was a long list of Kudriavtchev’s other 
accusations against the Uzbek leadership, out of which embezzlement, theft, and 
concentration of powers were among the more grave. Noteworthy is that this litany of 
errors contained no allegations of favoritism or nepotism. Lomakin, on the other hand, 
did note “one major shortcoming in Yusupov’s work and that is his cadre policy”. 
However, by this was not meant nepotism or localism but the preferential treatment of 
Uzbeks in army conscription. Underscoring that the main acrimony was between 
Russians and Uzbeks, Lomakin even went as far as saying that these belligerent groups 
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were conspiring against one another.31  That Yusupov was safely under Stalin’s thumb 
cannot be doubted but he apparently exercised significant powers locally, even sidelining 
Moscow’s proconsul.   
Yusupov’s “Family Circle”: The Marginal Importance of Region 
These powers extended also to the delicate sphere of cadre appointment. When 
exercising these powers, “Yusupov was as a man,” B. Reskov and G. Sedov contend, 
“who rarely listened to recommendations…when it came to selecting a person for a 
position”. Rather, Yusupov surrounded himself with those outstanding figures “he had 
met and encountered in his work life.” 32One such “supporter” is described in greater 
detail, R.M. Ghulov, the example of which Reskov and Sedov view as emblematic of 
Yusupov’s governing style. Deaf but ambitious, Ghulov began as a mechanic in Tashkent 
but was assigned to Tajikistan and rose to the position of deputy Commissar for Food 
Industry, and then deputy First Secretary of the Communist Party. He encountered 
Yusupov in the early 1940s during the construction of the Great Ferghana Canal and 
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Yusupov was reportedly so impressed with Ghulov’s labor that he instructed Second 
Secretary Kudriavtchev to appoint him first deputy of the State Control Commission. 
“Yusupov knew one criterion,” Reskov and Sedov write “Intelligence, education, 
independence, organizational skills, determination, and courage […] not national origin.” 
Another appointee, the head of the Great Ferghana Canal project, a Bukhara native, was 
illiterate, but had reportedly the qualities Yusupov sought.33 Yusupov’s men may have 
been lacking in savoir faire but they were apparently both loyal and in possession of the 
requisite talents. 
Even adherents of the regional approach of Uzbekistan’s politics testify to the 
marginal relevance of region and nationality in Yusupov’s calculus. For example, Donald 
Carlisle identified Abdulla Mavlyanov and Mirza-Akhmedov, both Kazakhs and natives 
of southern Kazakhstan, to have been the two key figures in Yusupov’s “family circle”.34 
Born in the Kazakh village Sarar, Mavlyanov was active in Tashkent Unions during the 
1930s, at the time of which he encountered Yusupov. They would also rise together. 
Having served as secretary of the October raykom in Tashkent, then secretary in 
Ferghana and Bukhara, Mavlyanov was elevated to Central Committee secretary in 1941, 
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and from 1942 and 1946 he occupied the prestigious position of First Secretary of the 
Tashkent obkom.35 Similarly, Mirza-Akhmedov was a native of Turkestan City, located 
near the more well-known Kazakh city of Shimkent, but like Yusupov and Mavlyanov he 
spent almost his entire career in Tashkent.36 The common denominator of Yusupov, 
Mavlyanov, and Mirza-Akhmedov was that their careers were confined almost 
exclusively to Tashkent; all had served in the Tashkent obkom or gorkom at various 
points, but it bears noting that none of them came from this area.   
Conversely, the two eminent Tashkent natives during Yusupov’s reign in the 
1940s – Sabir Kamalov and Arif Alimov – served predominantly outside of Tashkent. 
During the 1930s Kamalov was stationed in Bukhara, then First Secretary of the 
Karakalpak obkom 1933-36, first Secretary of the Margilan raykom in Ferghana 1937-38, 
Second Secretary of the Ferghana obkom 1938-1939, deputy Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers 1940-41, only to end up as First Secretary of the Karakalpak obkom 1941-
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1946, and First Secretary of the Ferghana obkom in 1949.37 At the age of 38 in 1950, Arif 
Alimov had served as First Secretary of Tashkent gorkom, Kokand gorkom and 
Namangan obkom in Ferghana, commissar of state security in Karakalpakstan, Second 
Secretary of Andijan obkom, and First Secretary of the Namangan and Samarkand 
obkoms. Down to 1950, the Tashkent-based phase of his career had lasted only two years 
even if he had traversed all oblasts of the republic but three.38   
The pattern during the Yusupov years was that elite careers were primarily 
pursued outside of native oblasts – “Ferghanites” served primarily in Tashkent and vice 
versa while several others crisscrossed the republic in a breath-taking pace. This all but 
made impossible the formation of regional cliques on the basis of place of birth. A 
Tashkent-clique may be said to have formed during Yusupov, based in part on figures 
from this region (e.g. Kamalov and Alimov) and those who had predominantly served 
there (Yusupov, Mavlyanov, and Mirza-Akhmedov) but the rapport established between 
these individuals was not based on region of origin since they hailed from diverse places. 
The Party Control Commission’s files on party violations in the early 1940s further 
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testifies to the diversity of origins among members of “protection pacts”.39 For example, 
Ferghana’s Party Control Commission head Abdurakhmanov was identified to have 
“secret ties” with the former Secretary of the Uzbekistan Central Committee on 
propaganda, Suleiman Azimov, and the former secretary of Tashkent obkom, M. 
Yuldashev.40 However, Abdurakhmanov was a native of Tashkent, Yuldashev form 
Kokand Ferghana oblast,41 and Azimov from Samarkand.42   
That Central Asian leaders exerted influence through mutual protection pacts is 
evident. But whatever the extent of such pacts and their occasional concentration to 
geographical regions, they were scarcely unique to Central Asia. In 1937, for example, 
A.A. Kulyakin alerted Stalin to the formation of a regional patronage group in Ukraine, 
where the First Secretary of Dnepropretovsk obkom M.M. Khataevich had contrived a 
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“loyal following of former co-workers and friends” at different levels of responsibility – 
all of whom shared the background of having been associated with Khataevich in party 
organizations and factories in the past.43  Indeed, Ukraine and the Black Sea area was the 
region most associated with nepotism -- not Central Asia. Declaring a “war on 
bureaucracy and nepotism” in 1937, Stalin averred that in “a number of regions of the 
Soviet Union, notably Ukraine and the Black Sea area, party executives were being 
‘chosen’ by a small group of insiders instead of being elected.”44   
Party Violations in Yusupov’s Uzbekistan 
In-depth investigations by the Party Control Commission in Tashkent, 
Samarkand, and Bukhara oblast in the early 1940s posit that the main predicaments here 
were others than violation of cadre policy, though of no lesser importance. The Party 
Control Commission highlighted four main areas of wrong-doings in Tashkent. First, 
Tashkent officials had splurged 50.000 rubles on a banquet, which together with other 
banquets and concerts for heads of enterprises, secretaries of the party bureau, komsomol 
secretaries, and raykom secretaries had “created conditions for semejstvennosti 
[nepotism]”. Although Tashkent was spotlighted in particular, such spendthrift was 
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pinpointed also in other oblasts of the republic, not seldom involving the throwing of 
lavish parties, the “drinking of wine and vodka”, and other disorderly conduct.45 A 
second target of criticism was the “low number of figures with worker backgrounds” 
among Tashkent officials (and also other oblasts of the republic) and the “liberal relations 
to judicial practice” among judges.46 Thirdly, and perhaps most serious, were allegations 
against Tashkent obkom and gorkom officials for their “violation of intra-party 
democracy”, “the question of collective leadership in the party apparatus”, and the 
“failure to hold party plenums as envisaged.” Such missteps were asserted to have been 
particularly pronounced in in Oktyabrskom, Stalinskom, and Kalininskom rayons. Not a 
single session of the Bureau of Tashkent gorkom between March and August, for 
example, was held with the attendance of all members and only four out of the nine 
voting members were present during the seven sessions held during these dates 
                                                 
 
45 RGANI, f. 6, op.6, No. 664, “Dokladnaya  zapiska – O faktakh razbazarivaniya gosudarstvennykh 
sredstv Tashkentskim obkomom KP/b/Uz na ustrojstvo banketov,” October 21, 1939, in “Dokladnye 
zapiski upolnomochennogo KPK pri Ts.K. VKP(b) po Uzbekskoj SSR…” 1939-1942.  In defense, First 
Secretary Yusupov claimed this had been unsanctioned by the SNK and the CC.  See, RGANI, f. 6, op.6, 
No. 664, in “Dokladnaya zapiska…” January 8, 1940. 
46 RGANI, f. 6, op.6, No. 664, in “O faktakh narusheniya…” July 7, 1940, and “Dokladnye zapiski…” 





(Kuznetsov, Kamalov, Kotov, and Ibragimov).47  This quadrumvirate of officials 
effectively monopolized decision-making to the others’ dismay. 
Samarkand oblast received its share of criticism, which focused on four general 
concerns: failure to absorb local nationalities in industrial work, insufficient party work 
in primary party organization, low response rates to complaints against the party, and a 
“feudal attitude” towards spouses and women in general. It is further mentioned how 
leading officials “violates the Bolshevist principle of development of cadres.” But this 
condemnation did not concern promotions based on kinship, nepotism, or promotion of 
rodstvenniki but the “high turnover of cadres” whereby in the first 8 months of 1940, as 
much as 35.3 percent of the 1497 nomenklatura employees in the obkom changed 
positions for various reasons. This was conceived to be an “unserious relationship to 
cadre development” with “cadre shifting from place to place”. The failure to include local 
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nationalities in the nomenklatura was also identified to be a problem, with only 634 of 
the 1497 being Uzbeks, and the share of women negligible.48     
Finally, in an evaluation of Bukhara oblast authored by the First Secretary of its 
obkom, T. Dzhuraev, the vast majority of party exclusions concerned misuse of state 
property or poor performance. Out of 50 exclusions from 1930 to 1952, 21 concerned 
embezzlement of state or kolkhoz funds, 10 related to “violations of socialist 
instructions”, 6 to “hooliganism”, and 2 for violations of “party discipline”.49   Another 
26-page long evaluation on performance and party violations in Karakalpakstan notes 
significant problems in virtually all spheres of political life, mostly in respect to plan 
fulfillment, but does not mention poor staffing of cadres.50  Instances of patronage 
(protektsiya) and embezzlement were observed in Namangan and Tashkent oblasts where 
in the former one Ubajdullah Khaipakhunov had protected “an associate” and in the latter 
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Kolkhoz funds had been plundered in Parkent rayon, but attention to cadre policy, 
nepotism, and favoritism was on the whole marginal.51   
Even taking into consideration the possibility that such violations may simply 
have eluded the Party Control Commission it is important to recognize that nepotism and 
localism were problems encompassing all of Soviet society to varying degrees. An article 
published shortly after Stalin’s death on August 4, 1953, in Pravda set the tone. Cadre 
selection in the USSR takes place on three criteria it proclaimed: First, on the basis of 
“political trust” and reliability; Second, on the basis of concrete work and merit; And 
third, more negatively, on the basis of “personal loyalty, friendship connections, and 
localism (zemlyachestvo or rodstva).”52  
In the sphere of nepotism, Soviet newspapers were filled daily with new 
revelations that were meant perhaps not so much to shock as amuse readers. In one of the 
more egregious cases, Ivan Voronkov, a director of the automobile factory restaurant 
Avtozavodsk in the Russian town of Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) was accused of putting 70 
relatives on the pay roll – cousins, nieces, aunts, and uncles – not to mention his brothers 
Nikolai and Georgy Voronkov and Alexandra Grigoriyevna, his wife.  Voronkov may 
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have upped the ante on nepotism even by Soviet standards but the shadow cast by the 
Voronkov family tree on this diner was scarcely an isolated incident.53  
Six months later Izvestija exposed analogous family trees running the Kiev 
Medical Institute: The Barchenko family, the Baranniks, the Benyumovs, the Bogdano-
viches, the Brauns, the Vinokurs, the Aizenbergs, the Gorodinskys, the Dukhins, the 
Zlatmans, the Zantbarts, and so on. “If you drew all the family trees present in the 
institute’s nepotism”, Izvestija cynically concluded, “you would have a whole grove.” 
Perhaps more conspicuously, the 13 wifes of department heads and administrators in the 
Tomsk Medical Institute were disclosed to have formed an informal “lobbying council” 
to which the institute’s formal male council “dared not talk back”.54 Perhaps there were 
“Ikramovs”, “Mukhitdinovs”, and “Khodzhaevs” running the medical institutes of 
Tashkent and Samarkand, although this did not make it into either Izvestija or 
confidential reports, but even if this was the case it would not have deviated much from 
nepotism and family rule elsewhere in the USSR.  
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Niyazov’s Uzbekistan  
Regionalism Reversed 
In 1950 First Secretary Yusupov was replaced with another Ferghana native, 
Amin Niyazov, who inhabited this office until 1955. Next to Supreme Soviet head 
Yuldash Akhunbabaev, Niyazov belonged to that small clique of individuals whose 
careers had commenced prior to the purges and prospered afterwards. His formative 
career experiences were unlike Yusupov primarily in his native Ferghana. Designated 
Minister of Finance in 1940, Niyazov held this post until 1946 when named deputy 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In 1947 he climbed an additional rung on the 
career ladder being elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and admitted member of the 
Central Committee Bureau. He would serve as First Secretary from 1950 until his 
dismissal in 1955.55  
Similar to the key officials during Yusupov, Niyazov’s “ruling coalition” was 
primarily based on figures who had not pursued their careers in their native regions. For 
example, Malik Abdurazakov (from Namangan) was appointed First Secretary of the 
Tashkent gorkom in 1952 and elected member of the Central Committee in 1956 after a 
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brief sojourn in the all-Union Council of Nationalities.56 Nurutdin Mukhitdinov, 
conversely, like many other Tashkent natives grounded his career in Ferghana Valley. 
Born in 1917 and having joined the party in 1942, he was appointed secretary for 
propaganda in the Namangan obkom in 1948, and then First Secretary of Namangan 
obkom in 1948-50. Thereafter he headed Tashkent oblast for two years till his 
appointment as Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1951. In parallel to this he served 
in the Central Committee Bureau 1952 to 1956 during the time of which he was chosen 
First Secretary of Uzbekistan in 1955.57 
That most leading Tashkent officials had served the greater part of their career 
not in their province but in Ferghana and vice versa created bonds of loyalties at 
workplaces, but not necessarily in their native regions. Thus, the Second Secretary of the 
Andijan obkom in 1946, the Tashkent native Arif Alimov, encountered another Tashkent-
native Abdurazak Mavlyanov when he served as First Secretary of Andijan obkom in 
1946 and Mavlyanov and Alimov would rise together: Mavlyanov was appointed 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1950 when Alimov was designated Minister of 
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Agriculture.58 Abdurakhmanov, the Tashkent native, served as head of the Yangijul 
raykom in Tashkent when Yusupov from Ferghana was First Secretary of Tashkent 
oblast. They rose and fell together in 1937 and 1950 respectively.59   
Parallels could surely be drawn to the Tsarist period and Stéphane A. 
Dudoignon’s pioneering study of non-place based loyalties among Bukhara’s Ulama. 
Here, the high presence of Ulama from Khatlon in Bukhara and vice versa was not a 
function of the rule of “clans” but derived from ties the Ulama formed when rotating in 
predominantly these provinces. Clientilism, corruption, and favoritism was pervasive, 
here as elsewhere, but it derived primarily from other forms of loyalties than kinship. The 
system was built “on exchange of favors” and “generosity” but did not relate principally 
to clan. Thus, factions such as the Kulabi or Temane have been “erroneously caricatures 
as a coalition of purely regional interests” instead of the “fluid landscape” of loyalties 
which it was.60      
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Maimed though not entirely defeated, Niyazov’s predecessor Yusupov returned 
to Tashkent in 1953 to chair the Council of Ministers but was soon undermined and 
demoted to director of a Sovkhoz. Yusupov was the first casualty of Khrushchev’s rise to 
power and he was replaced with Nurutdin Mukhitdinov who, using this office as 
springboard, two years later would be appointed First Secretary. At the plenum of the 
Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party in 1954, Arif Alimov, Secretary of the 
Tashkent Obkom, accused Yusupov of “nepotism and corruption” and Malik 
Abdurazakov, the Tashkent gorkom Secretary, lambasted Yusupov’s construction of 2 
million rubles personal mansions in Tashkent and Yangi-yol.61 True or untrue, such 
allegations were the modus operandi in the Soviet system and frequently concerned 
flamboyant lifestyles, house construction, and promotion of friends and relatives. 
Izvestiya’s “A Forest Tale” published in 1959, implicating Russian senior party officials 
with building dachas for 43 ministers, was but one example of similar charges of 
favoritism and housing construction elsewhere in the Soviet Union.62 If wealth in the U.S. 
more commonly has been a road to political office than political office has been a road to 
wealth,63 the reverse undoubtedly held true in the USSR. Doubtlessly, Soviet leaders 
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exploited the perquisites of public office to acquire apartments and other attractive goods 
for family and friends. It is doubtful, however, whether all such accusations should be 
taken at face value. That virtually every new leader chastised his predecessor for 
“nepotism”, housing violations, or related accusations made such accusations rather 
script-like. Besides, the figure who did not have an entourage of protégés would likely 
never had made it to the higher echelons of power in the first place.  
Party Violations in Niyazov’s Uzbekistan 
A more reliable indicator of localism than the opinions of a successor is the 
confidential reports of the Party Control Commission. Firstly, it is suggestive that the one 
Party Control Commission file relating specifically to mestnichestvo in the Soviet Union 
covers only cases in Rostov, Gorkov, and Karelo-Finn oblasts, the Ministry of Building 
Material, the Leninabad and Tatar obkoms, and others.64 Uzbekistan is not mentioned 
among them, even if this file is enlightening to these practices elsewhere. For example, in 
Russia’s Shelkov Cotton Kombinat the former Director, Comrade Bolshakov, had filled 
this enterprise with relatives, including among them his wife’s brother Shibaev.65 
                                                 
 
64 RGANI, f.6, op.6, no. 1652, “Spravki rabotnikov KPK pri TsK KPSS po proverke zayavlenij o 
narushenii gosudarstvennoj distsipliny, pripiskakh, ochkovtiraltel’stve i mestnichestvo,” October 1952-May 
1955.  





Likewise, in Tajikistan’s Leninabad oblast, the chairman of the Pobeda enterprise, 
Mirzaidov, had embezzled factory funds and engaged in favoritism.66 That no case in this 
file concerns Uzbekistan may have several explanation and does not necessarily imply 
that such practices were not part of Uzbek politics, which they in all certainty were to 
some degree. But it points to that localism as well as the related practice of nepotism was 
not more extensive than elsewhere in the USSR, including the European parts of the 
empire.   
Secondly, the violations that did occur in Uzbekistan appear to have been 
principally of other types. The Party Control Commission’s examination of Uzbek 
obkoms and gorkoms in the first half of 1953 reveals that of 101 party exclusions 
considered by the Uzbek Central Committee from 1923 to 1951, 23 concerned 
embezzlement or theft of state property, 15 various forms of misdemeanors in 
cooperatives, 5 for withholding compromising material on oneself or relatives, and 27 for 
drinking, hooliganism, or moral problems. Typical deficiencies among the rest of these 
neatly arranged violations pertained to desertion, feudal relationship to wives, 
“sloppiness” in work, and anti-Soviet activity.  Specific examples referred to include a 
prosecutor in Tyurya-Kurgansk rayon who illegally had made a mint totaling 9200 
rubles; tens of thousands of rubles had been embezzled from the Naryn Sovkhoz by a 
                                                 
 





judge in Kurgansk rayon; and the Chairman of the Kirov Kolkhoz had amassed a small 
fortune amounting to more than 300.000 rubles.67  A similar story could be told for 
spotted party violations in the second half of 1953.68 Of all eight examples of 
transgressions canvassed (K. Turgunbaev, M. Sanaev, Kh. Niyazov, Kh. Shermatov, M. 
Khodzhaev, K. Dzhanamurdov, M. Tasheva) none concerned localism, promotion of 
relatives, or favoritism.69 Furthermore, Uzbekistan during the Stalin years was accused of 
“wrecking” and “sabotage of the cotton industry” but such criticism was rarely linked to 
favoritism in cadre placement.70   
Thirdly, Central Committee plenum reports rarely referred to localism in 
Uzbekistan, even if they were part of similar reports elsewhere. A reading of public 
reports from the Uzbek Central Committee Party plenums in the late 1940s and early 
1950s confirm that the party violations referred to in secret correspondence square overall 
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with public reports on “the struggle against feudalist-landowner survivals”,71 failure to 
meet cotton targets,72 “district and province officials who…have even themselves stolen 
collective farm property”,73 “a trend toward private property acquisition, petty bourgeois 
corruption and nationalist and religious sentiment,”74 and “instances of a feudal-beg 
attitude to women”.75  Contemporaneous plenum reports from the Kyrgyz and Tajik 
Central Committees contain nearly the same content of party violations but here, in 
difference to Uzbekistan, the maladies of nepotism and related practices are emphasized. 
Thus, a Kyrgyz Central Committee plenum report remarks how “The struggle against the 
incorrect practice of selecting cadres for family reasons is being waged… Officials who 
have failed in their work are frequently transferred from one post to another”76. Likewise, 
a Tajik Central Committee Plenum report intimates that “[Second Secretary of Tajikistan] 
Perminov…was waging a principled struggle against existing shortcomings and had 
spoken out firmly against selecting personnel on the basis of friendship.”77   
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These differences are likely not coincidental since nepotism, zemlyachestvo or 
mestnichestvo, were precisely the ills emphasized in Tajik confidential party documents. 
Available data suggest that there was a qualitative difference between politics as 
conducted in at least these two republics, even if public bombast and blunder of 
“promotion of friends and relatives” was a means to denigrate one’s predecessor in most 
Soviet republics. The hegemony of the Leninabad faction in Tajikistan serves as a useful 
contrast to the comparatively less territorialized factions in Uzbekistan.   
Leninabad Hegemony in Tajikistan  
The previous chapter noted how Tajikistan’s Leninabad oblast emerged as the 
foremost source of political power following its detachment from Uzbekistan in 1930. 
This hegemony was tangible. While comprising less than a fifth of Tajikistan’s territory 
and less than a third of its population (in 1976),78 Tajikistan’s northwestern Leninabad 
oblast (with the capital Khojand) supplied all of Tajikistan’s First Secretaries from 1946 
to 1991 (Gafurov, T.U. Uldzhabaev, D.R. Rasulov, R.N. Nabiev, K.M. Makhkamov). 
This was in spite of that the population of neighboring Stalinabad oblast almost doubled 
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that of Leninabad.79 Likewise, all Chairmen of the Council of Ministers during this half-
century long period were born in Leninabad oblast (D.R. Rasulov, T.U. Uldzhabaev, 
A.K. Kakharov, R.N. Nabiev, K.M. Makhmanov, I.I. Khaeev, and K.M. Makhkamov) 
with the partial exception of N. Dodkhudoev (1956-61), hailing from Derzud in Gorno-
Badakshan oblast. None of these figures – heads of party and state – ever served outside 
of Leninabad or the capital oblast Stalinabad, except Uldzhabaev who was “exiled” to 
Khatlon oblast after he had fallen out of favor with the party in 1961.80 Whereas heads of 
party and state came from disparate origins in Uzbekistan and a majority, as a rule, had 
served in several oblasts during their careers, in Tajikistan political power was 
concentrated to a single region.  
Besides the low level of inter-oblast mobility within Tajikistan, it was on the 
lowest rung of Soviet republics in enlistments for positions in the center in Moscow. In 
fact, of the Soviet Union’s 129 oblasts in the post-Khrushchev period, Leninabad oblast 
occupied the 128th place when measuring the degree of upward mobility from oblast to 
union-level positions. Only the Ukrainian Sum’ska oblast was a more unfavorable spot 
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for the career-oriented official seeking promotion to Moscow.81 In other words not only 
was lateral mobility within Tajikistan impeded but vertical mobility was severely 
circumscribed.    
The tight-knit group of leading Tajik officials which formed in this soil was 
quite distinct from their Uzbek counterparts. One document dating to 1952 noted serious 
deviations from the party line by the Tajik Central Committee Bureau, and especially its 
stubbornly disobedient First Secretary Gafurov, including but not limited to anti-
government activities, fraud in the cotton industry, and localism.  “Gafurov and 
Rasulov”, it grumbled, “demonstrates a tendency of mestnichestvo and 
zemlyachestvo…[with] all attention directed to Leninabad oblast where they were born 
and where they have all of their relationships”.82  Nepotism was rife among this clique of 
Leninabadis. One case among many others cited referred to the former Secretary of 
Stalinabad gorkom Shomukhamedov who had smoothed the way for his 75-year old 
uncle and other relatives. Heads of kolkhozes, meanwhile, had reportedly been filled with 
“close friends” of Rasulov and Gafurov and ministers and others were appointed on the 
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basis of their origin (rod). Not limited to this, Russian raykom secretaries had been 
replaced with rodstvenniki of Gafurov and Rasulov.83   
In parallel, peripheral regions of the republic had overall suffered from chronic 
neglect, especially Garm and Gorno-Badakshan where no measures had been taken to 
“lift them from their low level of cultural and scientific development.” “Gafurov and 
Rasulov detest the mountain regions and their cadres” the document lamented, and they 
even went as far as liquidating the Garm oblast because of their dislike of the erstwhile 
secretary of the Central Committee, Isaev, and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet 
Presidium, S.S. Shogodaev. Funds earmarked to these regions had been programmed by 
Gafurov and Rasulov to Stalinabad and Leninabad instead, and attempts to raise this issue 
in Moscow had prompted the firing and exclusion of several raykom and ispolkom 
secretaries.84 By 1956 all other oblasts in the republic had been abolished apart from 
Leninabad,85 which served to reinforce this hegemony. Uzbek officials, too, readjusted 
rayons and oblasts to shore up their power bases (e.g. in the creation of Jizak oblast under 
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Rashidov and its abolishment by First Secretary Nishanov in the late 1980s) but they 
were not as bold to liquidate all other oblasts.  
While politics in Uzbekistan never approached the magnitude of nepotism and 
“localism” in Tajikistan, it is conceivable that bonds of loyalties were little different in 
Tajikistan than elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Earlier career ties as a source of cementing 
may have been as present here as in other Soviet republics. However, the concentration of 
a cadre pool to one single region created effects which were quite distinct from when 
power is dispersed between figures from a diverse set of regions and where officials 
inter-mingle. It amounted to a geographical territorialization of power, akin to the sway 
held of a geographically defined ethnic group over another.86  Being among the smallest 
of the Soviet republics, Tajikistan’s size impacted this concentration of power to one 
region as well since the cadre pool was much more circumscribed.  
The differences which can be observed in these two cases cast doubts on the 
thesis that localism and nepotism in Central Asia were culturally determined. Both 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were settled societies, had undergone similar transformations 
of identities in the pre-Soviet era, and were part of the non-tribally organized Central 
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Asia. Variations in Soviet cadre policy and the disparate sizes of these two republics 
nonetheless produced dissimilar outcomes: In Uzbekistan, localism was weak and 
nepotism certainly not more extensive than the Soviet average; In Tajikistan, localism 
was much more pronounced and nepotism fed into this since officials typically served in 
their home regions.  
Conclusion 
The previous chapter found some evidence indicating that career-based loyalties 
were present in early Soviet Uzbekistan, that national loyalties often trumped sub-
national ones, and that indigenous localism and “regionalism” were of marginal concern.  
The post-purge period, 1937-1953, lends further support to these observations. If 
regionalism was of indigenous origin, then why did the predominance of figures from 
Tashkent and Ferghana continue even after the first generation of leaders had been almost 
completely purged and a new leadership installed? The only conceivable explanation is 
that the Tashkent-Ferghana linkup was in part centrally determined and in part a function 
of the extensive career ties formed in this soil. Yusupov, the First Secretary 1937-1950, 
exercised some authority on cadre selection and even took over this prerogative from the 
Second Secretary but his cadres were drawn narrowly from Tashkent and Ferghana. 
While a native of Ferghana, Yusupov had spent most of his career in Tashkent, which to 





Committee and government.  This imposed regionalization supports the “regionalism” 
hypothesis in this respect, yet this does not necessarily entail that particularly strong 
regional identities defined Uzbekistan.  
Similar to the pre-purge period, the main antagonisms in the Central Committee 
were not among the indigenous elite but rather between Uzbeks and non-Central Asians.  
The Second Secretary was supposed to mediate these disputes but appears to have taken 
an active part in them himself. Informal politics overrode the formal distribution of 
powers between the First and Second Secretary, with the tacit approval of Stalin. The 
Second Secretary fulfilled his duty of reporting party-organization problem to the center, 
alleging that Yusupov had violated “cadre policy”. Yet this harsh criticism did not 
concern “localism” or nepotism but that he had given Uzbeks preferential treatment over 
Russians. In any case, it fell on deaf ears in Moscow. “National” loyalties among the 
Uzbek members clearly took precedence to particularistic ones, at least when facing the 
Russian and Slavic central appointees.  
Nor do other forms of party violations detected by the Party Control 
Commission instill much confidence in the hypothesis of “localism”, even if it is noted to 
have been present elsewhere in the USSR in the same reports. Tajikistan is perhaps the 
most clear-cut example of such “localism” where Gafurov and Rasulov favored cadres 
from their native Leninabad and neglected the other parts of the republic in the 
distribution of resources. This also accords with the publicly available Central Committee 





their Tajik counterparts, however, the Uzbek leading officials were highly mobile. The 
rule during Yusupov was that Central Committee members had done tours in several 
oblasts of the republic, except often for their native ones. This mobility implied that 
loyalties were formed among figures of disparate backgrounds whose careers happened 
to intersect in the oblasts.  
Taken together, the archival evidence and biographical data presented do not 
support the contention that tightly-organized regional groups ruled Uzbekistan or that this 
was the primary faultline of conflict.  Neither does nepotism appear to have been 
particularly severe in Uzbekistan. Cases of bribery, embezzlement, high turnover of 
cadres, and “failures of collective leadership” were identified in Uzbekistan but the 
marginal attention devoted to nepotism and localism, both in Soviet media and Party 
Control Commission documents, suggests that it was surely not worse than elsewhere in 
the Soviet Union. Loyalties were formed primarily on the basis of career ties, which is 
exemplified by Yusupov’s varied clientele. That the distinct trajectories of Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan should be traced to culture is improbable since both societies historically 
were settled, in difference to the nomadic Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.  A 
more plausible explanation is the particular elite-mobility patterns of elites in Tajikistan 





4. Crackdown on Zemlyachestvo and the Resurrection of 
Samarkand: The Khrushchev Era, 1953-1964 
Introduction 
With the partial exception of cadre policy, the post-purge Stalin period had been 
defined by a continuation of centralized government. Stalin’s successor, Nikita 
Khrushchev, reversed this pattern. Khrushchev centralized authority over cadre policy in 
an attempt to uproot the nepotism and zemlyachestvo that had plagued the USSR in the 
final years of Stalin’s rule. But in parallel he decentralized decision-making by carving 
up the USSR into regional economic councils (Sovnarkhozy) and relaxed the “branch” 
principle of centralized decision-making which had been in effect since the early 1920s.1   
These center-periphery power readjustments were paralleled with a rapid 
turnover of personnel and in the other Central Asian republics “nativization”. In 
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Uzbekistan from 1953 to 1964 three new First Secretaries were appointed, equaling the 
number of First Secretaries named during the 34 years of Brezhnev and the post-purge 
Stalin period together. Uzbekistan was alone of the Central Asian republics entrusted 
with a native First Secretary already from 1929 and thenceforth.2 By the early 1960s, 
however, native secretaries had been appointed in all Central Asian republics: Rashidov 
in Uzbekistan, Usubaliev in Kyrgyzstan, D.N. Kunaev in Kazakhstan, Gapurov in 
Turkmenistan, and Rasulov in Tajikistan.  
These new leaders were subjected to a forceful union-wide crack down on 
zemlyachestvo, affecting Tajikistan in particular. However, Uzbekistan did not become a 
part of this campaign. If anything, the charges levied against Uzbekistan in Khrushchev’s 
party housekeeping effort were related to “nationalistic” deviations and not sub-national 
loyalties. As in the 1940s, the Uzbek leadership again stood accused of ganging up on 
their Russian counterparts in the Central Committee. It was also chastised for 
“nationalism”, disregard of central priorities, and foot-dragging on the implementation of 
cotton mechanization. What did change was the reintroduction of Samarkand into 
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political power. Like a river that goes underground and later resurfaces, Samarkand 
resurrected with Rashidov’s appointment in 1959 after 25 years in the political periphery.  
Uzbekistan Under Khrushchev 
Attacking Stalin’s Legacy of Nepotism 
At the 19th Party Congress in 1952, Khrushchev (then a member of the Politburo 
and a Secretary of the Central Committee) resolutely attacked the selection of party 
cadres, nepotism and favoritism in the USSR. “It was a serious affair,” Khrushchev 
declared, “when friendship, family relationships, and local ties were put before 
professional and political considerations.”3 Georgii Malenkov’s speech at the 19th Party 
Congress, half a year before Stalin’s death, echoed these concerns. Devoting a not 
insignificant part of his speech to ”nepotism and indiscipline”, Malenkov lamented that, 
”one of the party’s main shortcomings was the fact that cadres were selected not 
politically but on the basis of family and friendship.”4  
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Examples of this assertion could be drawn from all corners of the USSR only 
during this decade, ranging from the domineering family of the Dagestan Tobacco 
Factory in the Caucasus,5 favoritism in Turkmenistan’s Ashkhabad television studio,6 
nepotism in the Sverdlovsk Philharmonic Society of Russia,7 the corrupt family-rule in 
Siberia’s Omsk province,8  the “family ties and ties of friendship” in the Soviet Scientific 
Research Institute of Hydro Technology and Soil Amelioration in Moscow, 9  Moldavia’s 
Minister of Light Industry who promoted his “relatives and acquaintances”,10 the ”family 
influence” and “party connections” pervading the Bolshoi Theater,11 Moscow’s V. M. 
Molotov Library Institute, where as many as twenty members of the staff were related to 
each other,12 the Kiev Glass Factory whose Director Ya. D. Meilman had “filled all 
executive positions with his own people,”13 and last but not least the “nepotism” of 
Uzbekistan’s Chirchik gorkom.14 
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Not satisfied with only trimming the local excesses, Khrushchev put the Uzbek 
nomenklatura and those of other republics firmly under his thumb. Thus, in 1954 
Moscow declared its intent to achieve more “effective cadre staffing” in Uzbekistan, 
resulting in the exclusion of 19 civil servants from the nomenklatura of Uzbekistan’s 
Central Committee, the transferring of 18 civil servants, and the exclusion of 156 from 
the party and removal from office. This encompassed the head of the Tashkent Institute 
of Irrigation, chairmen of factories, the chief engineer of Tashselmash, prosecutors, the 
deputy minister of Goskontrol, deputy minister of Justice, and others. Local input on this 
overhaul was insignificant and the Uzbek leadership retained only the shadow of what 
their former prerogatives had been. Hence a letter from the Uzbek Second Secretary, 
Melnikov, to Khrushchev declared that “The Central Committee of Uzbekistan agrees 
with [this reorganization] and encourages the center to send a new list of 
nomenklatura.”15 Ordinarily all of the positions cited above were the prerogative of 
Uzbekistan’s Central Committee to staff but the overlapping authorities of the 
nomenklatura system enabled the CPSU Central Committee to override it.   
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Uzbekistan’s Post-Stalin Leadership: “Dictators” and Dachas 
Having consolidated his powers in Moscow, Khrushchev in 1955 nominated 
Nuritdin Mukhitdinov new First Secretary of Uzbekistan, replacing Niyazov.16 Like 
many of his contemporaries, Mukhitdinov had built his career in Tashkent and 
Ferghana.17 Niyazov was sharply rebuked at the republican plenum in 1956: He had 
failed to direct the Central Committee Bureau and Secretariat successfully, left cotton 
quotas unfulfilled, neglected large areas of the republic, illegally constructed 100 houses 
in Tashkent for officials, and resorted to the “questionnaire" method in selecting officials. 
“Even Ministers and their deputies not to speak of other personnel,” the plenum report 
noted, “were sometimes approved without discussion by [the Uzbek] Central Committee 
Bureau.” As could be expected, Rakhimbabayeva and Alimov, who also were new 
secretaries in the revamped Central Committee, were less self-contained in their 
criticisms than the others.18   
All-Union evaluations of Uzbek cadre policy dating back to the same period, 
however, did not indicate that cadre policy was a particular area of concern. The deputy 
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director of cadre development in the USSR Central Committee, Alekseev, pinpointed 
Armenia, Georgia, and Tuva, Vologod, Kaluzh, Smolensk, and Yaroslavl oblasts as areas 
where cadre policy was unsatisfactory but did not mention the Central Asian republics. 
Uzbekistan was faulted for its failure to include local nationalities and minorities, 
especially Karakalpaks, in party organizations, a problem which also was present in 
Dagestan and the Karelo-Finn party organization, but Alekseev did not relate this to 
violations of “collective leadership” and other misconducts identified by Niyazov’s 
successors.19  The only “serious violations” of factionalism in Uzbekistan detected by 
Moscow’s sentinels were confined to Tashkent and Surkhandarya oblasts, where a 
number of Komsomolists and communists had been arrested and excluded for “groupism 
in criminal activities”.20 This stood in contrast to the faculty at Moscow State University 
where the “cadre [was] recruited on the basis of earlier connections and birth ties 
(rodstvennykh otnoshenij)”21 and the Soviet Minister Beshchev and his deputy Kuznetsov 
                                                 
 
19 RGANI, f.5, op.29, no. 33, “TsK KPSS” letter from Alekseev, deputy director of cadre, TsK KPSS, 
December 20, 1954. 
20 RGANI, f.6, op. 6, doc. 1106, “Spravki rabotnikov pri TsK KPSS o rabote partkomissii pri TsK KP 
Uzbekistana o rasmotrenii personal’nykh del kommunistov” April 1957 in “Material k otchetu KPK pri 
TsK KPSS po Uzbekistan 1957 i 10 mes 58g.”  
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who promoted figures on the basis of “prior connections” in Lvov, Northern Caucasus, 
and elsewhere.22   
The predominance of figures from Tashkent and Ferghana in the Uzbek Central 
Committee Bureau continued well into the mid-1950s (see appendix on composition of 
Central Committee Bureau) even if these, with few exceptions, had crisscrossed a number 
of oblasts.  Among the most prominent members admitted were Arif Alimov and 
Mukhitdin Nurutdinov (not to be confused with First Secretary Nurutdin Mukhitdinov). 
Alimov was a protégé of Mukhitdinov who had previously been his superior in the 
Namangan obkom.23 Nurutdinov, in turn, belonged to that nonconformist group of Uzbek 
politicians who had served uniformly in one oblast, Tashkent.24 Ferghana Valley and 
Tashkent officials also made their presence felt beyond the Central Committee Bureau, 
including in positions traditionally spoken for by non-Central Asians.25    
                                                 
 
22 RGANI, f.5, op.29, no. 28, “Spravka – po faktam, izlozhennym v pis’me t. Bryunina V.H.” Undated. 
23 From 1952 to 1955 Alimov headed the Tashkent obkom and became a member and candidate of the 
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Mukhitdinov’s time in office would be short since in December 1957 he was 
transferred to Moscow. However, his standing with Khrushchev ensured that he was not 
subject to the typical defamation but was quietly replaced with Tashkent’s Sabir 
Kamalov. Like several of his predecessors, Kamalov rose through the provincial 
apparatuses of Ferghana and Tashkent. This earned him a spot on the Central Committee 
in 1950, which he held until 1955 when named chairman of the Council of Ministers and 
First Secretary two years later.26 The new Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mirza-
Akhmedov, had served as secretary of the Tashkent gorkom in 1940 and then First 
Secretary of Andijan obkom from 1949 to 1956. In the intervening period he also was a 
member of the Central Committee.27 
Evidence is inconclusive but it is probable that Mirza-Akhmedov transgressed 
his authority as head of government by expanding the Council of Ministers’ Presidium 
beyond the lawful limits. According to the joint Party-Government decree of March 7, 
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1953, following Stalin's death, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers was to consist 
of only one vice chairman. However, Mirza-Akhmedov’s Presidium was composed in 
1959 of all vice chairmen, including the vice chairman of Gosplan, as well as the 
Ministers of Agriculture and Finance. It is conceivable that Mirza-Akhmedov put these 
officials on this prestigious organ to reinforce his power base, assure their loyalties, and 
create a set of loyal clients. On the other hand, it is unclear whether he could have acted 
in such outright defiance of this important Party-Government decree unless, of course, it 
served the central government’s interests.28 
Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization in Moscow touched on cadre appointments also 
in Uzbekistan, though arguably less than elsewhere. Kamalov was a Stalinist era 
politician catapulted to power after Stalin’s purges, yet he was still entrusted to lead 
Uzbekistan under Khrushchev. Several changes were also made in the Central 
Committee, in which a slew of First Secretaries of provinces were elected: Alimov, 
Gulyamov, Kambarov, and Nurutdinov – First Secretaries of the Samarkand oblast, 
Tashkent city, Ferghana oblast, and Tashkent oblast respectively. This reshuffle indicated 
the preferential status of these three areas as sources of cadre. It also reflected the 
changing dynamics of Soviet upward mobility, whereby the path to the national level 
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came almost exclusively through the obkoms and oblispolkoms.29 In March 1959, 
however, Kamalov was unexpectedly dismissed in part due to “serious problems” in 
cadre development in Uzbekistan, including insufficient education of party officials, poor 
job matching, few women in party organizations, and leaking of secret documents.30  
Like his predecessor, Kamalov lasted only two years as First Secretary of the 
republic and his removal coincided with the firing of the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, Manzur Mirza-Akhmedov. Noteworthy is that the downfall of these two 
officials were proclaimed together with the sacking of two Moscow secretaries – Ivan V. 
Kapitonov (First Secretary of Moscow obkom) and Nikolai F. Iganotov (head of a 
raykom in Moscow oblast). Demoted on similar charges, Kamalov had allegedly put his 
“toadies” in key positions, Mirza-Akhmedov had “behaved like a little dictator”, while 
the Moscow leaders had speculated in dachas and patronized each other.31 Malik 
Abdurazakov who earlier had chastised Yusupov in the earlier 1950s for corruption and 
greed now attacked Kamalov in a tirade which mimicked that against Yusupov verbatim. 
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In a retribution of his missteps at the party plenum, he highlighted the “flamboyant 
lifestyle of Kamilov’s wife”, the “spending of huge amounts of money on the renovation 
of Kamalov’s summer house and apartment which Mirza-Akhmedov authorized”. It is 
further noted how “Kamalov was trying to factionalize the bureau of the Central 
Committee and pit Russian and Uzbek members against each other.” And how he 
“grossly violated cadre selection” often “resolving these “on a friendly basis”.32  
Whatever the truth behind each of these allegations, they were not unique to 
Uzbekistan – indeed, they almost corresponded too closely with the forms of violations 
identified elsewhere. For example, in 1961 the First Secretary of a Krasnoyarsk oblast 
raykom was apprehended for “stealing of funds”, “construction of a house for state funds 
for personal use”, and for “running the raykom as a dictator, striving for concentration of 
power”.33 Likewise, the Estonian Chairman of the Council of Minister and later Foreign 
Minister, A.A. Myuris, stood accused of withdrawing double salaries, of having two 
apartments in Tallinn, and “violations of housing regulations” in general.34 In retrospect, 
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when comparing the public allegations against officials in the Soviet Union, it appears 
that many of these were carefully scripted, often resembling one another, and conforming 
to the rave of day.  
A further observation is the discrepancy between the Party Control 
Commission’s reports and those of the Soviet media. In the former, officials typically 
stood accused of one charge or a group of charges related to that particular charge (e.g. 
embezzlement). Media, however, often leveraged an entire battery of unrelated charges 
e.g. corruption, local favoritism, harems, flamboyant lifestyles etc., and bundled them 
into a neat package designed to discredit the individual in question. Perhaps this made for 
entertaining reading but this sensationalism should not be taken at face value. The 
confidential reports of the Party Control Commission are likely a better barometer on 
party violations than central media.  
The high turnover of First Secretaries during Khrushchev’s reign renders it 
difficult to determine who patronized whom and the influence of various forms of 
loyalties. The two-year stints of Mukhitdinov and Kamalov as First Secretaries of the 
republic likely precluded them from consolidating “coalitions of protégés” in this short 
span of time. Such consolidations were typically lengthy processes. In any event, it is 
unlikely that strong regional elite identities and loyalties resulted from this since the elite 
were transferred between oblasts in a breath-taking pace. It is hard to envisage how they 





must have been built new loyalties and incorporated new clients as they hopped from 
oblast to oblast. 
Samarkand Plunges Back into Power 
The hierarchy of cadre pools was by the mid-1950s shifting back towards 
Samarkand/Bukhara after more than 20 years in the political periphery. With the stroke of 
a pen, Samarkand in 1957 was suddenly portrayed in Moscow’s Central Committee as 
“second in importance of the oblasts of the republic” after Tashkent.35 This accorded with 
the share of party members in these three oblasts, in which the 53000 members in 
Tashkent oblast dwarfed Samarkand’s 21000 but this was still more than Ferghana’s 
19000.36  This opening of the Tashkent/Ferghana barrier was manifested in a re-
introduction of officials from Samarkand, of whom the most prominent was Sharaf 
Rashidov. Hailing from Jizak/Samarkand, Rashidov was appointed Secretary of the 
Central Committee in 1950 and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet the same year. Like 
Mukhitdinov, also born in 1917, Rashidov’s party credentials were less impressive than 
those of the more mature remaining Stalinists e.g. Sabir Kamalov, Sirodzh Nurutdinov 
                                                 
 
35 RGANI, f.6, op. 6, doc. 1106, “Spravki rabotnikov pri TsK KPSS o rabote partkomissii pri TsK KP 
Uzbekistana o rasmotrenii personal’nykh del kommunistov”. See “Spravka o resultatakh komandirovki v 
Uzbekskaya SSR Mart 1957 goda”.  





and M. Mirza-Akhmedov, but his literary background lent the Central Committee a 
degree of sophistication.37  
Rashidov enjoyed strong support in the center, which in part owed to that 
Rashidov had travelled with Khrushchev to India and was known in Moscow as a 
capable, loyal, and erudite man. In early February 1959 Rashidov departed for Moscow 
to attend the opening of an exhibition on literature and arts of Uzbekistan, the visit of 
which included meetings with Khrushchev, the British Prime Minister Harold 
MacMillan, and the deputy head of government Anastas Mikoyan. Rashidov undoubtedly 
made an impression on the General Secretary since a month afterward he was elected 
Uzbekistan’s First Secretary.  
S. Rizaev’s book on Rashidov provides a transcript of the historic 3-day meeting 
in March, 1959, which brought him to power. The support for Rashidov was nearly 
unanimous even if the deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, M. 
Mukhamedjanov, spoke in favor of the second contestant, Arif Alimov. Several of the 
Central Committee members motivated their choice by referring to their earlier career-
based encounters with Rashidov. Thus, Rasul Gulyamov declared: “I know Sharaf 
Rashidovich very well…he was secretary of party-organizational matters in Samarkand 
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obkom when I was in the personnel department. We know each other and we became 
friends. He is a good friend, a humble worker, and enjoys great respect…”. Likewise, the 
first Secretary of the Ferghana obkom supported Rashidov since he had known 
“Rashidov since 1944 through his work in the Samarkand obkom [and when] he came to 
Ferghanavodstroy [which he headed]”.38 Career-based loyalties evidently mattered in 
Rashidov’s appointment.  
On March 14, Rashidov was elected First Secretary and a number of changes in 
the top leadership ensued. Most prominently, Arif Alimov was appointed Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers, replacing Manzur Mirza-Akhmedov, and Yadgar Nasriddinova 
was named Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, taking over this office from Rashidov.39  
Before becoming head of the Council of Ministers, Arif Alimov had assignments in all of 
the republic but was particularly rooted in Andijan, Namangan, Tashkent, and Samarkand 
where he had served as First Secretary of obkoms or gorkoms for twenty years.40 
Conversely, a native of Kokand (Ferghana), Nasriddinova’s career was more 
concentrated to the Tashkent region.41 The Central Committee Bureau was also 
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overhauled. Only A. Alimov, Z. Rakhimbabeva, K. Murtazaev and S. Rashidov remained 
on the new 1959 Bureau compared with its 1956 predecessor. Coming straight from 
Russia’s Ivanovo obkom, F.E. Titov was appointed Second Secretary six months after 
Rashidov’s rise to power and a number of other new faces appeared on the revamped 
bureau. The number of central Russian/Slavic appointees doubled between 1956 and 
1959 – from 3 to 6, indicating a similar recentralization of authority as had occurred in 
the immediate aftermath of Stalin’s great purges (see Table 6 and 7 in the Appendix). The 
difference now being that the dormant Samarkand plunged back into politics as part of 
this Russification after having been dislodged under Stalin.  
Crackdown on Zemlyachestvo and Party Problems in Central Asia and Elsewhere 
This crystallization of central control emerged in conjunction with a nation-wide 
media campaign on the ills of zemlyachestvo in the early 1960s. The catalyst was the 
purge of the Tajik leadership, including First Secretary Uldzhabaev, Second Secretary 
Pyotr Obnosov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers N. Dodkhodoyev, secretaries of 
oblasts and several others, following startling revelations of “secret harems, nepotism, 
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blackmail, and falsification of cotton production”.42  “It is a fact, after all,” an editorial in 
Pravda sniped, “that hoodwinking (ochkovtiratelstvo) can flourish only where inner-
Party democracy is being violated, where criticism and self-criticism have not been 
developed, where personnel are chosen not on the basis of their professional and political 
qualifications but on the basis of zemlyachestvo, kinship (rodstva), and personal loyalty. 
It is precisely in such soil, for example, that nepotism (semeistvennost’), mutual 
protection (krugovaya poruka) and morals alien to our party appeared in a number of 
Party and Soviet agencies of Tadzhikistan.”43 In parallel the Tajik leadership had bribed 
officials both below in the oblasts and above in Moscow to conceal the overstatement of 
cotton yields, culminating in vertical “family groups” from the local to the union-level.44  
Thus, in July 1961, a new union-wide control agency, Goskontrol, was 
established to root out “corruption, falsification, localism (mestnichestvo), inefficiency, 
and waste”.45  The Party Control Commission was reinvigorated and given greater 
powers. Henceforth the agency was empowered to not only investigate organs of the 
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party and the state, but also the armed forces and even the KGB, and refer detected 
violations to the prosecutor’s office. A former KGB chief, Alexander Shelepina, was 
entrusted as head of the agency in Moscow and his counterpart in Uzbekistan was 
Ferghana’s Mirza-Akhmad Musakhanov, who was appointed head shortly after his 
nomination to the Bureau of the Uzbek Central Committee in 1961.46  
The crack-down eventually encompassed the whole of the USSR. In Kyrgyzstan 
First Secretary Razzakov was reprimanded for having reinstated a “punished” first 
secretary of the Tyan-Shan Province Party Committee as Minister of Internal Affairs;47 
The head of the Belarus Institute of Railroad Engineering had reportedly engaged in 
widespread nepotism;48 In the Abkhaz and Adzhar Autonomous republics of Georgia 
“personal loyalty, personal friendship, and nepotism” guided the placement of cadre;49 
And 18 billion rubles worth of uninstalled equipment had been defrauded in the Russian 
oblasts of Sverdlovsk, Perm, Irkutsk and a half-dozen others.50 In a measure of defense 
and self-introspection, F.S. Goryachev, the First Secretary of Novosibirsk oblast 
proposed during the campaign a statute to prevent the “selection of cadres on the basis of 
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friendship, kinship or personal loyalties”51 and his counterpart in Azerbaijan bluntly 
declared that “mutual support, kinship and devotion” had received “a new content”.52  
Likewise the First Secretary of Kazakhstan, D. Kunaev, remarked how the First Secretary 
of Kyzyl-Orda oblast had organized card games with several secretaries of district Party 
committees, chairmen of district executive committees and collective farm managers, 
leading to “cronyism, nepotism and corruption”.53 
Criticism of Uzbekistan, by contrast, related largely to the flamboyant lifestyles 
of officials in Samarkand oblast and the nationalistic inclination of the Uzbek elite. One 
report in Izvestija from June 11, 1961, for example, implicated the Chairman of 
Samarkand ispolkom and the Directors of the Clothing, Textile, and Household Articles 
Trade Trusts with building expensive villas for public funds, which only were dwarfed by 
the palatial houses of the former Director of the Samarkand ispolkom and the First 
Secretaries of Samarkand and Bukhara.54 Another article in Sotsialisticheskaya 
Zakonnost accused senior officials in Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Lithuania for localism. 
However, the meaning ascribed to the concept of “localism” was not the promotion of 
figures on the basis of region of origin but the favoring of republic interests over central 
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ones, which more accurately could be described as “nationalism”. Thus, Uzbeks were 
charged with failure “to fulfill the plans and assignments for the delivery of excavators 
and cable products to the economic regions of other Union republics,” the accusations of 
which were similar to those levied against their counterparts in Armenia and Lithuania.55  
A similar conclusion could be drawn from the Party Control Commission’s 
comprehensive evaluation of the Uzbek party and state apparatus in 1962. Several 
instances of “violation of Soviet law” on personnel matters were noted, resulting in a 
number of party exclusions of heads of enterprises, kolkhozes, primary party 
organizations, gorraykoms, and also obkoms officials. For example, N.G. Potanenko of 
Samarkand oblast was ostracized “for harshness towards subordinates, K.B. Kadyrov for 
“insufficient” work, and S. Dzhabbarov in Andijan for “corruption”.56 In an act of samo-
kritika (self-criticism), Sharaf Rashidov was the first to candidly expose to the Politburo 
all the faults of the administration he controlled, admitting these violations in toto while 
adding that several oblasts had failed to put able-bodied men to work. This problem was 
particularly acute in Samarkand oblast, where 216 such cases of party members and 
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candidates could be identified, 125 in Ferghana, 124 in Karakalpakstan, and 180 in 
Tashkent.57 The center’s envoy Fedorenko shared this assessment adding 20 more such 
figures lacking gainful employment in Tashkent gorraykom. The trouble spots, in his 
mind, were mainly concentrated to “kolkhozes, enterprises, local party organs, and 
primary party organizations”,58 reflecting similar observations for those of the USSR as a 
whole.59 
It should be recognized that many violations in the oblasts may simply have 
eluded the Party Control Commission. One would expect nothing less since in seven out 
of Uzbekistan’s 10 obkoms, the Party Control Commission comprised only one employee 
– the Chairman himself – and only in Andijan, Bukhara, and Karakalpakstan was the 
Chairman aided by instructors or administrative personnel. It is inconceivable that a 
single envoy would be able to discover and report all forms of party violations occurring 
in one oblast, especially in the larger ones -- Tashkent, Ferghana, and Samarkand. 
Members of the Uzbek Party Control Commission (Chairman Dzhuraev, three Central 
Asians, two non-Central Asians, and 2 instructors) were also assailed by the center for 
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inconsistent field work, insufficient preparation of material, and a generally poor work on 
appeals. For instance, requests from Moscow to look into appeals of specific persons 
were not acted upon. Other directives, e.g. the directive on “disorder” in Samarkand 
Tuberculosis hospital, went unheard.60  The absence of “localism” and nepotism in the 
Party Control Commission’s documents may simply have been due to understaffing or 
insufficient work.   
However, in several other parts of the USSR the Party Control Commission did 
probe and report these phenomena and the staff of these areas were not larger than in 
Uzbekistan. For example, in Azerbaijan’s Akhsuin rayon the rayispolkom chairman, Sh. 
Nazarov, and third secretary of the raykom, S.V. Ismailov, were charged with promoting 
their distant relatives (dal’nukh rodstvennikov) to power, including Nazarov’s uncle’s 
brother who was a kolkhoz chairman, a father-in-law to Ismailov who had been appointed 
chairman of a selsoveta, and dozen others who had acquired cars and houses on the basis 
of “connections” and blood ties. Similar accusations of “poor work with cadres” were 
levied against G.G. Aliyev, Secretary of Derbent gorkom in Dagestan61  and staffing on 
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the “principle of zemlyachestvo in Ukraine’s Donetsk gorkom.62  In a file relating 
specifically to the issue of mestnichestvo, only cases in Chelyabinsk oblast, the Ministry 
of Defense, Krasnodarsk, Novosibirsk, Moscow oblasts and Azerbaijan were noted.63  
Stated differently, media reports as well as the Party Control Commission’s 
secret reports canvassed several party problems in Uzbekistan in the early 1960s. Most of 
these concerned embezzlement, affluent lifestyles, and “hidden unemployment”. 
Localism and nepotism were identified as major questions in several Russian oblasts, 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and elsewhere but not to the same degree in 
Uzbekistan. The geographical concentration of localism and nepotism identified 
overlapped to some degree in confidential as well as journalistic reports, with the 
situation being particularly acute in Tajikistan and Azerbaijan.  
If nepotism had been extensive and if clan-ties and solidarities specific to 
Islamic society had been manifestly present in Uzbekistan they are unlikely to have 
escaped Khrushchev’s radar. Much more than any other Soviet leader, Khrushchev 
considered the family the most important place for shaping the communist citizen. The 
family was the channel through which churches and mosques disseminate influence to the 
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young and his repression of religion, which has by some been considered worse than that 
of Stalin, derived from this belief. Mothers were potentially harmful too if they did not 
indoctrinate their children with Marxist-Leninist ideology. To prevent the family from 
being a “transmission belt” for dissenting views and religion, Khrushchev used direct 
force against the family to change its values.64 With this background, it is conceivable 
that Khrushchev would have recognized and targeted clannism in Uzbekistan’s 
government had it been a significant problem.  
The degree of inter-oblast mobility in Uzbekistan in part explains why 
mestnichestvo was a lesser concern contemporaneously in Uzbekistan than in other parts 
of the USSR. The Uzbek obkom First Secretaries under Khrushchev were scarcely 
“rooted”. For example, of the five obkom First Secretaries who served in Andijan, 
Bukhara, Khorezm, Namangan, and Surkhandarya for the majority of the Khrushchev 
era, all had served in at least four oblasts in the course of their careers, none of them were 
natives of the oblasts in question in which they served, only one “rose” in the same oblast 
in which he was appointed First Secretary, and no one stayed in the oblast after 
termination of duty. Moreover, all of them served across the historic “divide” between 
the former khanate of Bukhara and Kokand during their careers and two of them also 
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served in the remote Karakalpakstan, previously belonging to the Khivan khanate.65 
Inter-oblast mobility served to uproot local networks and nepotism was conceivably less 
extensive when officials served far away from their home village or city.  
In this context of non-place based loyalties, many officials were both promoted 
and dismissed by their rodstvenniki. The chequered career of Ferghana’s Mirza-Ali 
Mukhamedzhanov is a case in point. From 1947 to 1950 he served as Minister of 
Sovkhozes. With Yusupov’s fall in 1950 he was demoted to academia only to rise again 
in 1953 as Minister of Agriculture. Two years later, in 1955, when Nurutdin Mukhitdinov 
was appointed First Secretary he was again demoted to his previous position in academia. 
When Kamalov came to power in 1957 he was reinstated Minister of Agriculture only to 
be demoted again in 1959 when Rashidov replaced Kamalov.66  In other words, the 
individual in question was promoted and dismissed by “Ferghanaites”, appointed and 
removed by Tashkentis, and demoted by Rashidov from Samarkand. Place of birth was of 
marginal importance in Mukhamedzanov’s roller coaster ride. What mattered was 
whether his patron was an enemy of the replacing First Secretaries, which they often 
were. 
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The only archival evidence of factionalism in Uzbekistan in the 1960s detected 
by this author concerns a group of engineers in GSKB, the state cotton producer, with 
“groupist” (gruppirovki) tendencies.67 Headed by comrades Prikhodko, A.N., 
Nekhoroshevym, and Iomdinym N.G. and others, this faction had for several years waged 
a struggle against leadership, failed to implement Central Committee decisions, been 
unreceptive to the cadre suggestions of the Goskomitet and Sovnarkhoz directorship, and 
refused to adopt new machinery and technology. Several predicaments in the cotton 
sector in the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, including in the crown jewel 
Tashsel’mash, were traced to this factionalism but the bone of contention was the type of 
machinery to use. None of the accusations concerned favoritism or even corruption, even 
if Iomdinym’s spending habits are touched upon in the Party Control Commission’s 
report and the group’s behavior was considered generally “offensive” and 
“threatening”.68   
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Such “groupism” flew from de-Stalinization and the opening up of the political 
system. Thinly veiled dissent, foot-dragging on policy implementation, and factional 
cleavages became increasingly commonplace. Broadly speaking, the cementing factor of 
such groups related to common outlooks on specific policies and were “loose informal 
clusterings that articulated distinctive interests.”69 Khrushchev’s many reforms, e.g. the 
division of the party into agricultural and industrial units, inevitably generated “winners” 
and “losers” who collaborated to further their interests. Khrushchev’s cadre centralization 
was in part a countermeasure to the resistance encountered from his reforms yet leaders at 
each level fought back. The career-based loyalties of Soviet politics were given added 
impetus since the interests of figures in the same organ or workplace tended to 
converge.70  
Conclusion 
Party violations in Uzbekistan throughout the Khrushchev era were undoubtedly 
extensive, as elsewhere in the USSR, but as before they were more related to theft and 
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general corruption than nepotism and locally based loyalties. Party violations were 
scarcely censored in Khrushchev’s USSR, especially following the crackdown on 
zemlyachestvo in the early 1960s. If localism and nepotism had been major problems in 
Uzbekistan, then Uzbek officials would have been exposed to comparable criticisms as 
their Tajik, Azeri, and Russian counterparts. However, neither confidential nor public 
reports attest to the presence of significant localism.  Rather, the party problems 
identified in Uzbekistan (corruption, renovations of personal property, failure to meet 
plans, and concentration of powers etc.) were observable throughout the USSR.  
The rapid pace by which the Uzbek elite were transferred from oblast to oblast 
explains, in part, the lesser presence of zemlyachestvo. With the partial exception of 
Nurutdinov, all other heads of party and state had crisscrossed most corners of the 
republic prior to reaching their offices. That Uzbek obkom First Secretaries were much 
more “rooted” than elsewhere in the Soviet Union and that this served to reinforce 
regionalism is not upheld by actual career trajectories. What regional faction could 
Kamalov, for instance, conceivably belong to after his long career encompassing 
Tashkent, Bukhara, Karakalpakstan, and Ferghana? Or Arif Alimov whose career 
spanned Tashkent, Kokand, Namangan, Karakalpakstan, Andijan, Samarkand and other 
places? Or the five obkom First Secretaries discussed who all had traversed on average 
half of the republic’s oblasts? This question is particularly warranted since most, as a 
rule, tended not to serve in their native regions for prolonged periods of time. Conversely, 





they rarely moved beyond the borders of their native Leninabad and the capital area. The 
official upgrading of Samarkand in party documents and the appointment of Sharaf 
Rashidov lends further support to the thesis that “regionalism” and its corollary, the 






5. Brezhnev’s Era of “Regionalism”, 1964-1982: 
Rashidov’s National Orientation 
Introduction 
The transition from Khrushchev to Brezhnev spelled the end to Khrushchev’s 
reorganizations, enabling the new leaderships installed throughout the Soviet Union to 
consolidate their powers. Venting his frustration on Khrushchev’s reforms, Rashidov at 
the Plenum of the Central Committee in 1964 declared how the republic was “tired of 
reorganization” in such spheres as production management organs and the dizzying 
administrative reforms in the rayons.1 A new “stable cadre” policy of long stints for 
secretaries at all levels ensued as part of Brezhnev’s going concern.  Brezhnev also 
ushered the USSR into a period of decentralization in the area of cadre policy, which had 
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been highly centralized under Khrushchev.2 The empowering of the local political elite in 
the republics in part offset the formal workings of the nomenklatura system. Empowered 
to recruit their protégés in the provinces with much less interference than earlier, 
republic-level political elites formed impervious cliques that were increasingly defined by 
“regionalism”. Modern analysts of clans and regions in Central Asia have identified this 
trend towards heightened regionally-based promotions under Brezhnev as a uniquely 
Central Asian development. Yet the same trend was observed throughout the Soviet 
Union.3  
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As Robert Kaiser notes in respect to the USSR in its entirety: “However, while 
de jure economic decentralization was more limited during the Brezhnev era than it had 
been under the sovnarkhozy system, decision-making authority devolved de facto to 
enterprise managers and local political elites. In turn, these local elites were increasingly 
comprised of socially mobilized indigenes, chosen not according to the dictates of a 
centrally orchestrated nomenklatura system but rather through a selective procedure 
increasingly dominated by ‘regionalism’”.4 
Thus, the thesis advanced in these writings was that regionally defined sub-
national and national elites had penetrated the USSR in the tranquility of the Brezhnev 
period and that the central nomenklatura system increasingly was being bypassed. The 
center was relegated to a background role, ratifying appointments but delegating 
authority over the process to the republics. Hegemonic regions formed at the national 
level as upwardly mobile actors entered into networks that controlled local or regional 
jobs. These actors advanced because they were patronized by influential officials. Even if 
key offices at the republic level were listed on the central nomenklatura, “the process 
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through which candidates appear[ed] on the appointment lists [was] endemic to the 
regions in which [the patrons] had carved out their initial careers.”5  
For example, in Kabardino-Balkariia of the North Caucasus, the First Secretary 
T.K. Mal’bakhov brought in clients from Tersk and packed the obkom Bureau and other 
strategic positions with former acquaintances from this district. That this happened to be 
Mal’bakhov’s native oblast generated a semblance of a “clan” centered on this territory 
but this was an epiphenomenon of the process of regionalization discernible in the USSR 
as a whole.6  
Rashidov’s powers mirrored the developments in Brezhnev’s Soviet Union: he 
was almost defenseless against central directives but was afforded some elbow room in 
choosing his personnel. Cadre appointment was formally in the hands of the Uzbek 
Second Secretary, decided collegially at the plenums and in the Bureau of the Central 
Committee, but Rashidov’s willfulness often encroached on these powers. His political 
valence as member of the bureau and ties to Brezhnev checked the Second Secretary’s 
control function, at least up until the late 1970s. Uzbekistan’s Central Committee 
exploited this and recentralized cadre policy to Tashkent from the oblasts. Early in the 
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Brezhnev era a new formal rule was enacted, requiring every change in nomenklatura 
positions at the oblast level to have the Uzbek Central Committee’s approval.7 Rashidov 
entirely usurped the autonomy of cadre appointment that rested with the obkoms, even if 
they still were entitled to initiate appointments and removals.  
This concentration of powers to Tashkent was a manifestation of the 
increasingly autocratic methods of leadership in the party, state, and economic organs 
under Brezhnev.8 Such autocratic tendencies have clearly a negative connotation but they 
must be viewed in context of the Soviet system. In contrast to Western liberal 
democracies, there were no rules in the Soviet system mandating an automatic 
replacement of personnel during leadership turnovers. Upon gaining office, American 
Presidents or British Prime Ministers could act immediately and install their protégés 
committed to their policy programs into power. Not so for the Soviet First Secretary or 
General Secretary.9 They had to incrementally force out their enemies and substitute 
them with their clienteles.10 Rashidov’s autocratic leanings and centralization of the 
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nomenklatura was to be expected since few Soviet leaders passed on such opportunities if 
they opened.  
The paradox of Rashidov’s leadership is that the imposed “regionalism” in place 
since the late 1920s partly dissolved under his reign when it flourished elsewhere in the 
Soviet Union. Not unlike other Soviet leaders, Rashidov gravitated towards individuals 
whose loyalty could be assured. However, because Rashidov had not presided over an 
obkom and because he spent most of his career in the metropol of Tashkent, the origins 
of his close associates were diverse. The sources of Rashidov’s elite diversity were not 
different from that of other Soviet leaders only that he followed a different career path.  
 
Rashidov’s Uzbekistan 
Sharaf Rashidov: A Biographical Sketch 
Born to poor parents on the eve of the Revolution in 1917, Rashidov occupied 
prominent state and party posts in Soviet Uzbekistan for 45 years and for almost 25 years 
he headed the republic. Rashidov’s father, Rashid Rashidov, was like many others of his 
generation a beneficiary of the revolution. As a newly minted policeman he guaranteed 
the Rashidov family a life beyond subsistence-level farming. However, after the death of 





prodigy. Like his patron Yusupov, Rashidov came from a literary background and he 
owed this predilection to his uncle Hamid who wrote poems and novels and taught at the 
Samarkand pedagogical academy. Following closely in his uncle’s footsteps, Rashidov 
enrolled at the Jizak pedagogical academy after graduation in 1931 and was considered a 
man of extraordinary talent.  Thus, he was elected Chairman of the Academy’s Trade 
Union Committee.11  
Stalin’s great purges in 1937-38 paved the way for Rashidov’s path to power. 
Being 20 years of age at that point, Rashidov’s career commenced at the precise time 
when Stalin throughout the Soviet Union staffed positions with the younger more party-
minded elite. He shared this fate with Leonid Brezhnev who was designated head of a 
department of the Dnepropretovsk regional committee in 1938; Yuri Andropov was 
appointed secretary of the Yaroslavl komsomol a year earlier; and Alexei Kosygin was 
named head of a department in the Leningrad obkom in 1938. In 1937 Rashidov was 
selected executive secretary of the Samarkand-based newspaper Lenin Yuli (The Lenin 
Path).12 
Rashidov was a dedicated communist and espoused the Soviet system because 
he as well as his family benefited from it. But events at the time would also instill in him 
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a pride in Uzbek culture and history. As a journalist for Lenin Yuli he covered the 
opening of Amir Timur’s tomb in 1939 and Uzbek history textbooks in that decade even 
depicted Timur as a hero. Timur had rescued Russia from the yoke, it was said, and 
Rashidov’s writings reciprocated by portraying the USSR as Central Asia’s savior.13 
Such developments together with Stalin’s reconciliation with Islam in the post-war period 
increasingly connected Rashidov with Central Asia’s historical heritage. These three 
influences: Soviet patriotism, pride in Uzbekistan’s past, and a conciliatory attitude 
towards Islam conditioned Rashidov’s future statesmanship.14   
Rashidov entered the party in 1939 but accomplished his major career leaps only 
in the post-World War II period. Prior to his appointment as Chairman of the Supreme 
Soviet in 1950, Rashidov served in a school in Namangan (1942-1943), editor of the 
Samarkand newspaper Lenin Yuli (The Lenin Path)(1943-44), in a factory in Bekabad 
outside of Tashkent in 1944, Secretary of party-organizational control in the Samarkand 
obkom (1944-1947), editor of Kizil Ozbekistan (Red Uzbekistan) in Tashkent (1947-49), 
and Chairman of the Uzbek Writers’ Union (1949-50).15  Rashidov’s outgoing character 
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and interpersonal skills facilitated strong loyalties with a number of prominent figures 
during these years, including the General Secretary of the USSR Union of Writers, 
Alexander Fadeev, and others in the Moscow intelligentsia. It was Fadeev’s support who 
secured Rashidov’s chairmanship of the Uzbek Writers’ Union and he owed his election 
to the Supreme Soviet to First Secretary Yusupov’s patronage.  
Rashidov presided over the Supreme Soviet for nine years, which was the 
springboard to the position of First Secretary. He was appointed candidate member of the 
(all-Union) CPSU Central Committee at the 20th Party Congress and became a full 
member after the 22nd Congress, holding this office through the 26th Party Congress and 
until his death in 1983. The most senior post that Rashidov occupied was that of 
candidate member of the USSR’s Politburo, which he was elected to in 1961.16   
Often described as a cautious man with broad visions and an innate sense of tact, 
Rashidov did not only survive the feuds of Soviet politics but climbed the career ladder. 
Anyone who could navigate through Stalin’s purges, the personnel turnover after Stalin’s 
death, Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization, and the Khrushchev-Brezhnev transition unscathed 
and then stay in power for an additional 19 years must have possessed extraordinary 
tactical skills. Most of Rashidov’s peers fell by the wayside at either of these points but 
Rashidov steadily rose in the hierarchy. Unlike Khrushchev who made foes everywhere, 
                                                 
 





Rashidov understood that his powers were limited and contingent on sustaining support 
from others.  
His steadfast promotion of Uzbek identity could scarcely have passed without 
such support from the highest levels. Cultural institutions operating in the vernacular 
languages flourished under Rashidov and these gradually took on nationalistic overtones. 
Brezhnev’s laissez faire opened the doors to explore literary and historical themes which 
had been banned under Khrushchev. Medieval heroes such as Amir Timur and Babur 
resurfaced together with the writings of Uzbekistan’s first set of leaders, Akmal Ikramov 
and Faizullah Khodzhaev.17 In 1963 Rashidov even inaugurated a planetarium in 
Tashkent inspired by the Timurid ruler and renowned scientist Ulug-bek. That the 
mahalla as a traditional institution was resuscitated from the day Rashidov took office in 
1959 further indicated the restoration of Islam in Uzbek society.18 Islamic pre-Soviet 
                                                 
 
17 See, e.g., Voprosy istorii, No. 2 (February, 1973), pp. 3-20.  
18 Thus, Uzbekistan’s 21st Party Congress in 1959 declared the need to “transfer several functions of the 
executive committees of Soviets to social autonomous organizations of workers, including the mahalla 
(kvartal) committee.” K. Kamilov, ”O Roli Makhallinskikh (Kvartal'nykh) Komitetov v Sovremennom 
Periode,” Obshchestvennye Nauki v Uzbekistane, Vol. 2 (1961), p. 60. Cited in David Abramson, From 
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traditions were no longer considered ills to be eradicated in the construction of Soviet 
society but as assets in building “new contemporary traditions.”19 
Rashidov’s Unrelated Relatives: The Tashkent Party Conference  
Rashidov has gone down in history as one of the most nepotistic of Soviet 
politicians who overwhelmingly favored relatives and figures from his native 
Jizak/Samarkand. This is a misinterpretation of history since many of those branded as 
his relatives were not his relatives and the Samarkand natives that experienced upward 
mobility during his reign were, with few exceptions, associates from his time in the 
Samarkand obkom. Tashkent’s obkom party conference of December 1964 affords us 
with a rare glimpse into the reality of Uzbekistan’s elite politics.   
Khrushchev’s removal triggered a “domino effect” in the republics: 
Kazakhstan’s First Secretary Ismail Yusupov was replaced with Dinmuhammed Kunaev 
a month after the General Secretary’s fall from grace and Uzbekistan was not unaffected 
since Rashidov owed his rise to Khrushchev’s patronage. Rashidov’s opponents seized 
the opportunity and hatched a scheme to eliminate him. Taking place shortly after 
Khrushchev’s ouster in October the same year and Brezhnev’s visit to Uzbekistan in 
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November, the conference revealed serious rifts within the Uzbek elite. Particularly 
venomous in his criticism of Rashidov was Vali Usmanov, the deputy head of the 
Organizational-Party Department of the Tashkent obkom.20  
In a speech lasting about 25 minutes, he assailed Rashidov’s cult-like devotion 
of Khrushchev and directed the audience’s attention to such provocative statements by 
Rashidov as that “there would be no life on Soviet soil without Khrushchev” and that 
Uzbekistan “owed its prosperity to Khrushchev”. Not limited to this, Rashidov had 
placed supporters in government on the basis of kinship (rodstva) and localism 
(zemlyachestvo). Three examples were cited: Sarvar Azimov, then deputy Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers; N.D. Khudaiberdyev, then Secretary of Uzbekistan’s Central 
Committee; and his brother Sahib Rashidov, head of the Party-State Control Commission 
under the Central Committee and Council of Ministers -- all of whom came from 
Rashidov’s native Jizak. “Friendship” had also guided several other of Rashidov’s 
appointments e.g. the Kashkadarya-born First Secretary of the Tashkent gorkom, Kayum 
Murtazaev.21  
This long tirade did not go unopposed. A member of Uzbekistan’s Supreme 
Soviet, Akhmad Kadyrov, took the floor, declaring: “I have been a member of the 
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Supreme Soviet’s Presidium for 10 years working with Rashidov and know him well. 
Many of you, almost everyone, will agree with me that Rashidov is a modest, 
sympathetic…and honest man”.22 The head of “Glavgolodnostepstroya” mounted a 
similar defense. Having headed the agency for five years, Ashot Sarkisov reminded the 
audience that Rashidov on several occasions had forthrightly objected to Khrushchev’s 
unrealistic demands in rice sowing and other spheres. He then proceeded to declare how 
“he had known Rashidov since 1944 when he, wounded, had returned from the war front 
to ‘Farkhadstroy’ [in Bekabad, Tashkent] and with 10000 kolkhozniky built Farkhad 
GES [Hydro-Electric Station]. I know him as a humble, principled, extremely simple, and 
honest man.” Not mincing his words, Sarkisov branded Usmanov’s charges “filth”.23 
The Tashkent obkom First Secretary, Malik Abdurazakov, seconded these 
points. Dismissing Usmanov’s speech as demagogic, M. Abdurazakov assured that 
Sarvar Azimov’s approval to deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1959 came 
not at Rashidov’s initiative but that of Arif Alimov, the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers [from Tashkent]”. Rasul Gulyamov, a former head of the Tashkent gorkom and 
native of Tashkent, murmured in the audience that: “he [had] put forward the nomination 
and Alimov supported it”. Turning to the appointment of Khudaiberdyev, Abdurazakov 








certified that “Rashidov had no relationship to him [Khudaiberdyev]. I have known 
Khudaiberdyev for many years. He was secretary of the obkom and secretary of the 
Central Committee and is a respectable person.” That Murtazayev was “full of flaws” and 
a “sycophant” was considered similarly unfounded.24 
Politely waiting until all had spoken, Rashidov finally intervened in this 
crossfire. He assured that Azimov and Khudaiberdiyev had been “approved by the CPSU 
Central Committee on the recommendation of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee, not 
[him]”.  He knew them “only from Tashkent when Comrade Khudaiberdyev had worked 
as a deputy to Comrade Mukhitdinov, then head of the agricultural department of the 
Central Committee.” In Rashidov’s version of events, they “decided on his appointment 
collectively”. And, he continued, “about my brother [Sahib Rashidov] he served for five 
years in the Soviet army and worked for seventeen years in the rayon [presumably in 
Jizak]. He was promoted to deputy prosecutor of the republic before I came to the Central 
Committee. That is it.”25 
What can be derived from this exchange in Tashkent’s halls of power? First, the 
three prominent figures from Jizak – Azimov, Khudaiberdiyev, and Sahib Rashidov – 
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have all been noted in the literature as “relatives” of Rashidov.26 While this is true in the 
case of his brother Sahib, Sharaf Rashidov claims to have barely known the other two, 
much less them being his relatives. Demian Vaisman, Kathleen Bailey Carlisle, and 
others have translated rodstvenniki into “relatives”. But rodstvenniki has a dual meaning, 
implying both relatives and people from the same place. In this case, it clearly denoted 
individuals from Rashidov’s native Jizak and not relatives. This is important since these 
three individuals belong to the few examples of real persons assumed to have formed part 
of Rashidov’s “clan”.  
Second, this in-fighting shows that place of origin was of negligible importance 
in determining loyalties. Rashidov from Samarkand was supported by Kashkadarya’s 
Murtazaev and Abdurazakov from Namangan as well as Gulyamov, Sarkisov, and 
Alimov from Tashkent.27 The ties between these individuals resulted from intersecting 
careers: Rashidov was acquainted with Azimov and Khudaiberdyev from Tashkent; 
Sarkisov encountered Rashidov in 1944 at “Farkhadstroy”, located on the outskirts of 
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Tashkent; and Akhmad Kadyrov knew Rashidov from their work in the Supreme Soviet. 
In other words what this faction amounted to was a “family group” bound by prior work 
connections and mutual support. It is possible that the appointments of Azimov and 
Khudaiberdyev came at Rashidov’s initiative and that Gulyamov and Abdurazakov were 
being disingenuous and protected him. Even so, such mutual solidarity would still 
conform to the definition of “family group”.  
The Primacy of Career-Based Loyalties 
The snapshot above provides clues to the nature of loyalties in Rashidov’s 
Uzbekistan. His elite were composed of individuals that he had encountered in the course 
of his career. Other individuals could be cited, many of whom shared Rashidov’s 
intellectual leaning. Thus, Egemkul Tasanbaev, Minister of Sovkhozes 1971-1975, had a 
long history in journalism as editor of “Our Bolshevik Kolkhoz”.28 Mansur Mirza 
Akhmedov, the Minister of Housing from 1961 to 1966 and subsequent deputy Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers also had a background in culture as director of the Tashkent 
Institute of Cinematics. 29  Both Tasanbaev and Mirza Akhmedov were born in southern 
Kazakhstan but they served in Uzbekistan for most of their careers. Another example of 
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the intellectuals who experienced upward mobility under Rashidov is Ubaidulla 
Abdurazakov. A graduate of Tashkent Pedagogical Institute and a teacher by profession, 
Abdurazakov was in 1971 appointed Managing Director of the Council of Ministers and 
then editor of the journal Mekhnat. Twenty years later he chaired Uzbekistan’s Writers 
Union, the prestigious position of which Rashidov, First Secretary Yusupov, and Foreign 
Minister Sarvar Azimov all had held.30 These well-bred individuals came from diverse 
places but their literary backgrounds resonated with Rashidov.  
The Samarkand clique was predominantly composed of figures Rashidov had 
encountered during his time in its obkom. For example, the Minister of Internal Affairs 
Khaidar Yakhyaev served as department head in the obkom in 1944 when Rashidov held 
the cadre portfolio.31  Likewise, the KGB head Leon Melkumov was stationed there as 
secretary of Komsomol together with Rashidov but when Yusupov was dismissed in 
1950 he was dispatched to Moscow. A year after Rashidov came to office in 1959, 
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Melkumov returned to Uzbekistan and was instated KGB officer in Samarkand oblast.32 
Bektash Rakhimov, First Secretary of Samarkand oblast in the 1970s, had been a co-
worker with Rashidov in the obkom 30 years earlier.33  And N. Makhmudov from 
Kokand in Ferghana Valley, one of Rashidov’s closest confidantes, was yet another 
acquaintance from this time. Also a writer, Makhmudov penned articles for Shavot 
Khakikati in the 1930s and was First Secretary of Samarkand in the decade thereafter 
(1943-48).34 In 1963 with Rashidov’s patronage he assumed the post of First Secretary of 
Syr Darya obkom which he held until 1969 when he was put in charge of the People’s 
Control Commission (Komiteta Narodnogo Kontrolya).35    
Such concentration of former co-workers from native or non-native regions was 
the rule in the Soviet system. Uzbek party functionaries reportedly joked that Russia’s 
history was divided into three periods: “the pre-Petrine, Petrine, and Dnepropretovsk”.36 
That Brezhnev had smoothed the way for such individuals from Dnepropretovsk as 
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Shukanov (his assistant), Novikov (the deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers), 
Pavlov (director in the CPSU Central Committee), Shelokov (Minister of Internal 
Affairs) and several others did not pass unnoticed in Tashkent.37 Brezhnev’s “cadre pool” 
of ca. 130 oblasts, of course, also made this favoritism even more blatant compared to 
Uzbekistan’s eight oblasts from which the leadership could pick its staff.  
One of a few from Samarkand who did not share this background in the 
Samarkand obkom was the President of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Ibrahim 
Muminov. That he was remunerated with a monthly salary of 9000 rubles shortly after 
Rashidov came to office, above the pay grade of a Minister in the Central Government 
(7000 rubles) and almost three times that of the Chairman of the Tashkent city soviet 
(3500 rubles), shows that he was held in high esteem.38 Yet Muminov rose to prominence 
long before Rashidov and it was he who sustained Rashidov and not vice versa, at least 
initially.  Their common denominator was clearly professional bonds, not region of 
origin.  
The share of Samarkand-associated figures under Rashidov was unprecedented, 
which owed to that the region had been in the freeze box since Stalin, Rashidov spent his 
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formative years in its obkom, and Yusupov initially had patronized several of the rising 
stars from Samarkand – Rashidov, Muminov, Azimov, Khudaiberdyev, and others. Yet 
an equally voluminous number in Rashidov’s elite were drawn from Tashkent and 
Ferghana,39 of which the composition of the Central Committee was a miniature 
expression. According to the Uzbek Soviet Encyclopedia, of the 16 members and 
candidates admitted to the 1976 Bureau, five were Russian non-natives, three hailed from 
Tashkent, two from Uzbekistan’s Karakalpak ASSR, two from Ferghana, one from Jizak 
other than Rashidov himself, one from Khorezm, and one from Osh oblast in the Kyrgyz 
part of the Ferghana Valley (see Table 8 in the Appendix).  
In sum, what united Rashidov’s coalition was that the figures he patronized were 
his associates. He had encountered them in different phases of his work life in Tashkent, 
Samarkand, and elsewhere, many of whom shared his intellectual abilities. The result was 
a non-territorialized coalition of protégés whose cement of loyalties did not deviate much 
from Soviet norms. That Rashidov one-sidedly established rapport with figures from his 
native Samarkand is not upheld by biographical data on the key office holders. The 
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formative influence behind his coalition was similar as for other Brezhnev era factions in 
other parts of the USSR, only that in some places the career trajectory of the patron in 
question resulted in more pronounced territorial factions.40  
The proposition of the “solidarity networks” hypothesis, i.e., that power holders 
rose to the top with the assistance of figures from their native regions, does not hold. 
Rashidov was patronized by Yusupov from Ferghana and Rashidov reciprocated by 
favoring figures that had been loyal to Yusupov, e.g., Muminov. Conversely, some of 
Yusupov’s critics, e.g., Namangan’s Malik Abdurazakov, prospered under Rashidov 
since he had been a critic of Rashidov’s predecessor Kamalov. The individuals loyal to 
Rashidov were tied in webs of relationships to each other, and the bonds betweem them 
related principally to professional ties and their joint opposition to Rashidov’s enemies. 
The Uzbek factions clashed on the terrain of non-territorial patron-client relations and not 
region.   
Rashidov’s Putinesque Governor Policy 
Just as contemporary analysts have misinterpreted the nature of loyalties in 
Rashidov’s Uzbekistan, so they have mischaracterized his policy aimed at uprooting 
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regionally articulated patronage networks. Rashidov centralized powers from the oblasts 
to Tashkent and did so in part to prevent local cliques from consolidating. The issue was 
a delicate one since obkom First Secretaries who served in their native provinces for long 
periods of time tended to be more rooted, susceptible to nepotism and zemlyachestvo, and 
thus able to consolidate their own “cliques”. Conversely, non-natives transferred between 
oblasts had to start afresh and had greater difficulty building their own power bases. 
Rashidov adhered to Brezhnev’s “stable cadre” policy, which entailed long stints of 
Uzbek obkom First Secretaries and at times life tenures, but supplemented this with a 
policy aimed at uprooting them.  
Thus, the vast majority of Uzbek obkom First Secretaries under Rashidov were 
parachuted into these positions from elsewhere and did not rise through the oblasts in 
question. Of the 32 obkom First Secretaries for whom complete data are available under 
Rashidov, only 10% percent had served in the oblast of appointment immediately prior to 
being named First Secretary, only 4% remained in the province after terminating service, 
and around 45% came from a position in the republic-level government. Notably, more 
than 76% of these obkom First Secretaries had served in more than three oblasts during 
their careers and only 21% were natives of the oblast in which they served (data 
calculated from Table 1, Appendix A) These numbers are low when compared to other 





served and a majority came straight from a previous position in the same oblast.41 Finally, 
72% of the obkom First Secretaries under Rashidov served in both parts of Uzbekistan’s 
“historical divide”, the former Khanate of Kokand and Emirate of Bukhara.  
Why did Rashidov engage in this dizzying transfer of officials from their home 
turfs? In all likelihood for the same reasons that have guided similar policies elsewhere, 
i.e., to prevent localism and preempt the consolidation of regional power bases. This held 
as true for provincial appointments in pre-1965 China as for Putin’s Russia.42 The 
establishment of Putin's Federal Districts was accompanied by a trend whereby “regional 
and national actors were rotated through the levels of the new presidential bureaucracy en 
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route to a new post or in compensation for loss of their old post.”43 Such rotation was a 
means to inculcate loyalties to the nation rather than the localities in which they had 
served or were about to serve. Rashidov acted no differently: governors moved 
“upstream”, “downstream”, and sideways which enabled stronger central controls. 
Careful not to be devoured by the figures he empowered, Rashidov’s gubernatorial policy 
was a conscious policy of nation-building and approximates Putin’s drive to reverse 
Yeltsin’s loss of regional control in Russia.  It was a way to curb regionalism in a system 
where the party hierarchy, career trajectories, and its associated regionalism virtually 
ensured regionalism.   
The high mobility of regional secretaries had important ramifications for 
patronage politics; factions become more geographically dispersed and less territorialized 
as the heads of oblasts built loyalties across the region.44 Brezhnev’s “stable cadre policy 
was “stable” among Uzbek obkom First Secretaries in the sense that they served longer 
than under Khrushchev, but this did not entail that they were “rooted” in their home 
region or only one oblasts. New loyalties were formed in their non-native territories and 
when they climbed to the republic-level they patronized their former colleagues. Yet 
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because the majority had served in three oblasts or more and a majority had been 
stationed in both Bukhara/Samarkand and Tashkent/Ferghana, such cliques became 
essentially non-territorial.  This “unrooted” cadre policy impeded the consolidation of 
identity-bound territorial factions and required concentration of powers from the oblast to 
the center to effect it. Alongside elite diversity and promotion of Uzbek national culture, 
it formed part of Rashidov’s national orientation.  
This assessment stands in sharp contrast to the prevailing view in the literature. 
Luong, for example, points to “the widespread practice, both before and after Rashidov’s 
reign, for obkom First Secretaries to be promoted from within the region in which they 
serve [and where] officials spent their entire careers serving within the same region”.45 In 
support, Luong has compiled a list of Uzbek obkom First Secretaries and the extent to 
which they had held “a previous position in the same oblast”. However, the category 
used, i.e., “previous position in the same oblast”, obscures more than it tells about 
rootedness since Uzbek obkom First Secretaries were transferred between oblasts in rapid 
pace and often returned to oblasts in which they had previously served. Literally, then, 
they had often held a previous position in the same oblast but this is misleading since the 
accuracy of this rests on the fact that they were highly mobile and not “rooted”. The 
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category that most scholars studying “regionalism” elsewhere in the USSR have used to 
determine “rootedness” is “position in oblast immediately prior to appointment” or 
“promoted from within oblast”.46 This category is no less relevant when measuring the 
degree of “rootedness” in Uzbekistan.  
Luong’s proposition that long tenure in oblasts served to reinforce regional and 
local leaders’ political affiliation with their specific regions is sound. It may hold for 
some of the other Soviet republics, especially Tajikistan. If Luong is correct, however, 
the opposite would be true in Uzbekistan. That is, because they were not “rooted” 
regional political identities among the elite are unlikely to have crystallized to the same 
extent as elsewhere.  
The Twilight of Rashidov’s Rule  
The laissez faire that enabled Rashidov’s relative autonomy was increasingly 
being suffocated in the late Brezhnev era when the central government took a firmer 
stand against the spread of Islamic practices, nationalism, and corruption. Rashidov’s 
hold on power was also crumbling, the signs of which were evident already by the late 
1970s. The turning point was the replacement in 1978 of Khiva’s Matchanov as head of 
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the legislature with I. B. Usmankhodzhaev, a native of Ferghana, former First Secretary 
of Andijan obkom and Namangan oblispolkom, and staff member of the CPSU Central 
Committee.47 Usmankhodzhaev was no less immune to the promotion of associates than 
other Soviet politicians. Having reached the Supreme Soviet chairmanship, 
Usmankhodzhaev promoted his old acquaintance from Namangan oblast, the head of the 
Ministry of Interior of Namangan, Kudrat Ergashev to Minister of Interior. He replaced 
the Rashidov protégé from Samarkand, Yakhyaev, who was demoted to deputy of the 
People’s Control Commission.48 The Uzbek KGB head Nordman was similarly ousted 
along with many others.49  
That this was the twilight of Rashidov’s rule can be shown by looking at 
appointments and dismissals during 1977-1978 and how the new appointees fared after 
Rashidov’s demise. Beyond Usmankhodzhaev, two figures stand out: Timur Alimov and 
Ismail Jurabekov. Alimov was elected to the Supreme Soviet Presidium on the very eve 
of Usmankhodzhaev’s appointment in December 1978.50 He would become the 
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republic’s second or third most powerful person in the Gorbachev era and the same held 
true in the post-independence era. Another power broker of almost identical potency was 
Ismail Jurabekov who in 1977 replaced Rashidov’s longstanding protégé Salidzhan 
Mamarasulov as Minister of Reclamation of Water Resources.51 Most noteworthy, 
Alimov, Jurabekov, and Usmankhodzhaev were among the selected few who survived 
the shake-ups of Rashidov era politicians during 1982-1985. Usmankhodzhaev would 
also turn out to be Rashidov’s fiercest critic after his death in 1983, and the one who most 
vigorously planted the accusation of “kinship-based” promotion in Rashidov’s 
Uzbekistan in Soviet media. The post-Brezhnev leadership’s continued trust in these 
individuals suggests that they were a local cabal of officials in the hands of some 
influential forces in Moscow, in all likelihood Yuri Andropov, the then-KGB chairman 
and future General Secretary of the CPSU.  
Zemlyachestvo in Rashidov’s Uzbekistan: The Party Control Commission’s Scoresheet in 
1982  
Brezhnev’s earlier “kid-glove treatment” of Uzbekistan scaled down with this 
tightening of central controls.52  The Party Control Commission’s “scoresheets” for 1982, 
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evaluating party violations in Rashidov’s final year in power, is thus of great value since 
it arguably portrayed a more nuanced picture of Uzbekistan than those of the central 
media at the height of the Brezhnev era. Yet these assessments give no indication to that 
zemlyachestvo or nepotism were worse in Uzbekistan than elsewhere even if 
“speculation” and “plan discipline” were targets of criticism.  
That the Soviet leadership in several parts of the USSR was teetering on the 
tightrope between unearthing widespread corruption and praise for disclosing it was, 
however, manifestly evident. Thus, in a volume on Party Control, the Chairman of the 
Party Control Commission, N.S. Guslov, stated that “excellent results” had been achieved 
by the control agency in the communist parties of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Latvia, Moscow obkom and gorkom, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, 
Ivanov, and Dnepropretovsk. Improving its framework of controls, the Central 
Committee of Kyrgyzstan was considered to have been particularly “disciplined” in its 
work. The case of T.Iyazaliev, a former first deputy chairman of the Kyrgyz republican 
society ‘Znanie’, who had been excluded for “serious shortcomings” in his work was 
cited as evidence of the improved discipline in the Kyrgyz party organization.53 Likewise, 
Kazakhstan’s Alma-ata obkom together with the control commission was praised for its 
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exemplary work in protecting “socialist property”.54 Criticism in the Chairman’s report 
was directed almost uniformly to Russian oblasts. For example, the leadership of 
Volgograd was accused of engaging in razbazarivenniya of state property and in 
Orenburg “several measures had not been adopted” to correct the recommendations of the 
Party Control Commission.55 Since half of the control commissions in each republic and 
oblasts were comprised of indigenous elites and half representatives of the center,56 these 
assessments could be interpreted as conditional praise in those republics and oblasts 
which would later be subject to some of the most vicious criticism for laxity in party 
control. That Uzbekistan was never mentioned in the Chairman’s assessment, neither as a 
“negative” or “positive” example, indicates either that: a) the party control work there 
was neither worse nor better than anywhere else, or b) that the subject of Uzbekistan was 
taboo. 
An indication to that it was a) rather than b) is in that Uzbekistan, along with 
Ukraine, Armenia, several Russian oblast, and other republics were given their own 
“republic chapters” in this volume in contrast to the troublesome Tajikistan, which was 
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entirely excluded. In the Uzbekistan chapter, U.A. Atakulov, Chairman of the Uzbek 
Party Control Commission, acknowledged several violations of Soviet discipline: 
“hooliganism”, complacency (samodovolstvo), conceit (zaznajstvo), “deep violation of 
plan discipline”, and “speculation” (spekulatsiya).57 Pharmacist A. Kazymov, for 
instance, ran a “speculative machinery” together with the head of Uzbek pharmacies, I. 
Dzhuraev, while the Chairman of Papskogo Rajtrebsoyuza in Namangan had deeply 
violated financial discipline. But overall the majority of cadres were conceived to be 
“industrious, active, and result driven” and no attention was paid to either mestnichestvo, 
nepotism, or related concepts.58 If nepotism and localism had been particularly serious 
problems Atakulov likely would have said it since these were surely not regarded as 
worse than violation of plan discipline in Soviet discourse at the time.    
That these ills were identified elsewhere in the USSR in the same volume testify 
to that these subjects were not taboo. For example, the Chairman of the Party Control 
Commission in Moscow gorkom, K.S. Buchin, the Party Buro Secretary V.P. Surin in 
Kaluzhskoj oblast, and the head of a local hospital had for several years used connections 
and relatives (rodstvennye svyaz) to acquire a large sum of money from the 
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Ordozhonikidze kolkhoz in the same oblast.59 Likewise, the Chairman of Armenia’s 
Party Control Commission, S.M. Khachatryan, chastised the former Chairman of the 
Ispolkom in Noemberjanskogo rayon, S.S. Antonyanom, for having acquired “two 
apartments for his sons”, constructed a “two-story dacha for state funds”, and engaged 
“in other illicit affairs with his rodstvenniki”, the success of which was contingent on his 
“cooperation” with the former First Secretary of the rayon, G.S. Nakhshkuryan, whom he 
was connected with from “prior work”.60 Public reports of the Party Control Committee 
published in Pravda, from 1982 to mid-June 1983, similarly pinpointed nepotism and 
localism in all corners of the USSR: the director of an Azeri natural gas institute was 
charged with selecting personnel on the basis of personal devotion, regionalism, family 
ties and subservience;61 in Chelyabinsk, report padding, deception, extortion and 
nepotism had been ubiquitous;62  and in the city of Volgodonsk “gross violations” of 
cadre discipline had been disclosed among other cases.63 
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Needless to say, the Party Control Commission’s reports should not be taken as 
definitive. But they serve as a reminder that nepotism and localism were not concepts 
primarily associated with Central Asia or Rashidov by the time of Brezhnev’s death in 
November 1982. They were perceived as encompassing all of Soviet society and they had 
been declared by authorities to be ills since at least the 1920s and 1930s.64  If anything, 
Uzbekistan was less frequently linked with these predicaments.  This is not only evident 
from the material cited above and media reports but also party resolutions, whose 
contents correspond to the party control agency’s. For example, an all–Union Resolution 
on party violations in Samarkand oblast identified problems in plan fulfillment, low 
quality of goods, and unkempt equipment but nothing beyond this.65 However, as the next 
chapter will explore, 1983 would be a turning point in the perception of localism and 
nepotism and their presumed geographical concentration within the USSR. From that 
moment on they were to become inextricably intertwined with Central Asia as a whole 
and Uzbekistan in particular.       
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What distinguished the height of Rashidov’s reign in the 1970s was not the 
concentration of officials from Samarkand/Jizak but the varied origins of his closest 
allies, most of whom he had encountered during his professional career. This was made 
manifestly evident at the 1964 Tashkent obkom Party Congress. Almost everyone that 
came to Rashidov’s defense in this heated exchange testified to their professional 
encounters with him. By all intents and purposes, Rashidov’s promotions and 
appointments did not differ much from the coalitions of protégés elsewhere in the Soviet 
Union. His lack of a substantial background in the obkoms entailed that his principal 
clientele was drawn from the central apparatus, the cultural elite, and from his brief stint 
in Samarkand. That this “de-regionalization” was most pronounced in the period when 
powers over cadre appointment were extensively de-centralized further strengthens the 
hypothesis that Uzbekistan’s “regionalism” was of external rather than internal origin.   
Rashidov’s promotion of Uzbek culture and identity was intertwined with the 
diversity of his elite. The introduction of Karakalpaks on the Central Committee Bureau 
was a conscious attempt at nation-building just as his rediscovery of Amir Timur and 
national symbols served a similar purpose. Further, reshuffling of obkom first Secretaries 
and routing them via the national level generated national loyalties as opposed to 
particularistic ones. This necessitated concentration of powers to Tashkent from the 





formation of local cliques in the provinces; most officials were reluctant to be 
disconnected from their “family groups” unless they were compelled to. These separate 
areas formed part of a whole in Rashidov’s Uzbekistan which in a nutshell can be 
expressed as a national orientation. Contemporaneous analysts took note of this. Even 
critics of the notion of strong national identities in Central Asia conceded that Uzbekistan 
was an exception to this rule. It is not for nothing that Alexander Bennigsen considered 
Uzbekistan the only Soviet Muslim republic becoming “a real nation” when discussing 
the strength of sub-national, national, and supra-national identities in a 1979 article. 66  
Evidence will remain inclusive until declassified material from this period is 
made available, but a fair appraisal of Uzbekistan under Brezhnev on the basis of existing 
evidence is that nepotism and locally based loyalties at maximum approximated the 
average Soviet republic or oblast. The Party Control Commission’s evaluations, at least, 
do not indicate that zemlyachestvo was a problem in Rashidov’s Uzbekistan even if it was 
pinpointed in Armenia, Moscow, and elsewhere. Other violations were identified e.g. 
violation of plan discipline, “speculation”, and “conceit” but these did not extend to 
violation of nomenklatura rules. The official Soviet perception at the time was that 
nepotism and localism were not major problems in Uzbekistan.  In the post-Brezhnev 
                                                 
 
66 Alexander Bennigsen, “Several Nations or One People? Ethnic Consciousness among Soviet Central 





period, however, the presence of zemlyachestvo in Uzbekistan was grossly exaggerated 
by Rashidov’s successors; Andropov, Chernenko, Gorbachev and others in the Soviet 
politburo; Moscow’s anti-corruption investigators Gdlyan and Ivanov; Soviet and 






6.  Rashidov Reevaluated: Uzbekistan’s “Cotton Affair”, 
1982-1986 
Introduction 
Whether Uzbekistan was an “untouchable” or not under Brezhnev’s reign, his 
successors ruling the Soviet Union from late 1982 to 1991 – Andropov, Chernenko, and 
Gorbachev – were less apologetic.  From 1982 to 1986, Moscow and the central media 
singled out Uzbekistan as the most corrupt and nepotistic of the Soviet republics and the 
Uzbek leadership was purged at all levels. The catalyst was the “cotton affair” which 
unfolded in 1983; later, in the 1980s, it would even implicate members and candidates of 
the Soviet Politburo. This was a remarkable turnaround since publications of the Party 
Control Commission just prior to the break of the “cotton affair”, as detailed in the 
previous chapter, did not conceive of Uzbekistan as more corrupt or prone to party 
violations than any other Soviet republic. Favoritism on the basis of place of birth was 
identified elsewhere but not in Uzbekistan.  
That Rashidov’s successor, I. Usmankhodzhaev, accused his predecessor for 





kinship, was not surprising. This was the rule rather than the exception among Soviet 
successors. A battery of allegations were unleashed against him out of which padding of 
cotton reports probably was the real transgression from which a series of other violations 
were spun, whether truths, half-truths, or false. Uzbekistan’s “cotton affair”, however, 
was only the prelude to another affair which justifiably could be designated Moscow’s 
“cotton affair”.  Unfolding in secrecy in 1989, the Politburo concluded that many of the 
claims held against Uzbek officials had been fabricated. The contents of these documents, 
detailed in Chapter 7, were never publicized and the wrong-doings in the Uzbek 
investigations that were exposed in media solely concerned the false allegations against 
officials in the CPSU Central Committee. Uzbekistan’s “cotton affair” is the focus of the 
present chapter; Moscow’s “cotton affair” is the subject of the subsequent final chapter of 
this dissertation.   
The Ubiquitous Nepotism in the Soviet Union as a Whole 
Only a few minutes remained at the 19th Party Congress in early July, 1988, 
when an evidently frustrated Moscow representative rose to the podium. Yu.F. Surkov, a 
worker at the Moscow Special Alloy Plant, was reportedly unprepared but blunt: “I 
cannot sit here idly and watch as speakers literally squander our time. The reports by the 
First Secretaries are marked by a stereotyped approach.” Striking at the core of party 





by the robotization of the work of the party apparatus. Why is this happening?”, he 
rhetorically asked, “Because one official can decide the fate of all others. Favoritism 
exists in our ranks when family ties determine who gets the top and middle-level jobs. 
This can be felt in all areas…and we are doing a poor job in the Party as regards the 
upbringing of leaders.”1 
The problem Surkov addressed was, of course, neither novel nor unknown. 
Earlier Soviet leaders, starting with Lenin, had smoothed the way for family members, 
relatives, and trusted colleagues. Positions that involved travelling in the West were 
particularly attractive since these allowed the sons, daughters, and other kin of senior 
Soviet officials to find respite to the dust of everyday Soviet life. Thus, Anastas 
Mikoyan’s son was named editor of the Institute of International Relations and World 
Affairs’ Latin American Review; Galina Brezhnev and Igor Andropov, the daughter and 
son of the General Secretaries, held positions in the Institute for the Study of the United 
States;2 and Yuri Brezhnev, another less than indigent child of Brezhnev, was Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Trade.3 The opaque webs of hegemonic families ruling local 
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factories, schools, and other institutions during the first 60 years of Soviet rule held true 
also during the 1980s. Only to take one example of at least a hundred similar ones, the 
head of the Vladivostok Medical Institute, B. Strelnikov, selected his “protégés on the 
basis of how much they or their parents could do for him”.4 Newspaper readers were not 
unlikely to encounter several intricate stories of nepotism and family rule in a single 
edition. The only difference now was that it began to encompass secretaries at all levels, 
Politburo members, and other ranking members of the nomenklatura.  The senior Soviet 
leadership was exceptional only in that they rarely were caught until the advent of 
glasnost and perestroika.   
The Cotton Affair 
The Cotton Affair Unfolds   
Addressing the Paakhthabad electors of Moskovskiy rayon in January 1980, 
Sharaf Rashidov touted Uzbekistan’s rapid economic development. “Even under last 
year's extremely difficult conditions,” he said “the Republic's cotton farmers fulfilled 
with honor their patriotic duty to the homeland. A record harvest was gathered in: 
5,763,000 tons of cotton…and 62% of the harvest was gathered in by machines… The 
                                                 
 





Party teaches us not to tolerate sham efficiency and sensation-seeking.”5 A Candidate 
member of the Politburo, Rashidov was decorated with his tenth Order of Lenin two 
months later.6 
This glory came to naught in late 1982 with the death of his patron Leonid 
Brezhnev. How Brezhnev’s clients – Kazakhstan’s Kunaev, Ukraine’s Shcherbitsky, 
Uzbekistan’s Rashidov, Azerbaijan’s Aliyev, and Grishin of Moscow – were to be dealt 
with was at first unclear since they belonged to what Gorbachev later designated a “zone 
closed for criticism”.7 This taboo ended with the election of the former KGB head Yuri 
Andropov to General Secretary on November 12, 1982. Determined to reverse 
Brezhnev’s decentralization of authority, Andropov launched a nation-wide anti-
corruption campaign, examining in particular corruption charges held against Central 
Asian officials. What began as a KGB routine investigation against an official in Bukhara 
ispolkom, Muzaffarov, soon implicated not only grand embezzlement by Uzbek cotton 
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procurement agencies, the top Party officials in Uzbekistan, and hundreds of lower level 
secretaries, but also key figures in Moscow.8    
In April 1983, four months after, Yegor Ligachev was appointed head of the 
Party Organization Department of the Central Committee. The “problem of Uzbekistan”, 
he solemnly recalled, was brought to his attention on the very day he assumed office 
since “thousands of letters were coming in from ordinary Uzbeks complaining about 
lawlessness and arbitrary and unfair actions”.9 Rashidov was summoned to Ligachev’s 
office in the Fall of 1983 and confronted with the pile of letters on his desk.10 Two 
separate investigations were begun.  One was headed by K.N. Mogilnichenko, the deputy 
director of Ligachev’s Party Organization Department, working under the authority of the 
Central Committee. A parallel enquiry was conducted by the KGB and, later, the 
Prosecutor’s office of the USSR headed by the two chief investigators, Gdlyan and 
Ivanov.11 “Heinous violations” were unearthed by the Mogilnichenko investigation and 
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Ligachev himself was sent to Uzbekistan in 1984 to chair Uzbekistan’s Central 
Committee Plenum, now working with Rashidov’s successor I. Usmankhodzhaev.12 
These violations would subsequently be dwarfed by the haul of evidence Gdlyan and 
Ivanov returned to Moscow with.  
In the course of 1983 it transpired that significant chunks of Uzbekistan’s 
production had been falsified, that the republic had been paid for cotton never produced, 
and that as much as three billion rubles had been embezzled by Uzbek officials between 
1978 and 1983 alone.13 Around half of the total was believed to have accrued the 
secretaries at the provincial and republican level, with the remainder spread on both 
lower and higher levels.14  The “cotton scandal” was portrayed as the tip of the iceberg of 
a massive corruption scheme involving especially Uzbekistan but also other Soviet 
republics.   In what was officially declared to be a heart attack, Rashidov died in late 
1983. 
 “What we are talking about,” Gdlyan asserted, “is a well-planned system of 
organized crime, in which every stolen ruble is earmarked for some future use [where] 
present-day emirs are systematically feeding (kormlenie)  on the  ‘golden calf’”.  Heaped 
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with treasure beyond imagination, First Secretaries of local Party committees had forced 
collective farm chairmen to “pad reports and accept bribes” and the First Secretaries, in 
turn, had been bribed by provincial level officials whose activities were sanctioned and 
profited from by the republican leadership. Avduvakhid Karimov, for example, First 
Secretary of the Party in Bukhara oblast from 1977 to 1984, was legally convicted not 
only of receiving but of offering bribes “higher up”. That is, to the First Secretary of the 
Republic, Sharaf Rashidov, and Rashidov himself had bribed the central level leadership 
in Moscow,15 including the former Minister of Cotton Ginning, V. Usmanov.16 This 
vertical “feeding” did not only extend to the cotton and agricultural sphere but to 
manufacturing. Muzaffarov, for instance, the head of the Department for Combating the 
Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation, was charged with “protecting” staff 
of the Bukhara city organization for trade in manufactured goods, which was selling 
commodities on the market at inflated prices, the director of which reportedly beat 
subordinates who had dared to object when confiscating a store's daily receipts.17     
Those unwilling to take part in such schemes faced consequences. Some 
collective farm chairmen who refused to pad reports were coldly murdered, Pravda 
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reported, even if recalcitrant First Secretaries at the provincial level were generally 
treated more leniently. Thus, the cautious Kayum Murtazaev, First Secretary of Bukhara 
obkom 1965-1977, was merely replaced with A. Karimov.  Akhmadzan Adylov, the head 
of the Paisk industrial complex, received particular publicity and turned into a symbol of 
corruption, dictatorship, and medieval legacies. Residing in a multi-million ruble 
mansion equipped with a private zoo, Adylov had according to Soviet press turned a rural 
settlement into a private empire with roughly 30.000 subjects, a large underground 
dungeon, and a private security force.18 "In school we learned about the Middle Ages in 
Central Asia,” a veteran Uzbek farmer, Rustam Sadkhamedev, quipped “and these men, 
like Adylov, are just the descendants of the old evil lords. They wanted to live like 
Tamerlane the Great."19   
Like condemnations streamed in from Soviet officials. Commenting on 
Ligachev’s report on Uzbekistan in the Politburo in 1984, A. Chernaev penciled in his 
diary “The horror, the complete decomposition…the fiber yield decreased annually even 
though the crop was growing, robbing the state on hundreds of thousands of rubles…In 
Tashkent was constructed palaces and magnificent squares…and all the party secretaries 
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in Samarkand had acquired mansions and villas and some five cars…in all the oblast 
committees sat rodstvenniki… but it’s unclear why it’s decided to expose the whole 
system”.20 Even though Chernaev questioned the scorched earth tactic used, he too lept to 
the conclusion that the rapacity knew no bounds.  
Whatever was uncovered after Uzbekistan reared his head, cotton corruption 
must be viewed in context of the Soviet system and with the Stalin period as backdrop. 
The coercive institutional environment that Soviet politicians had been raised in under 
Stalin coupled with unrealistic goals of central planning made false and padded reports 
the norm. Stalin’s dizzying demands of a 20 percent industrial growth per annum, the 
“hopeless” bureaucrats who failed reached them, and the petrified local commissars who 
were compelled to report successes, all fuelled a fear-saturated economic system whose 
foundation was based on what superiors wanted to hear. In other words, the coercive 
institutional environment that Stalin nurtured institutionalized corruption.21 Uzbekistan’s 
excessive specialization in one single good, cotton, also made it more easily detectable 
                                                 
 
20 The Diaries of A. Chernaev, July 15 1984, “1984” in Sovetskaya Politika 1992-1991, Unpublished, p. 34. 
21 Robert Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W. W. Norton, 





and blatant compared to other republics whose economies were more diverse and 
complex.22  
Rashidov’s challenge was not only to meet the cotton plans set in the center but 
also to satisfy the wants of the Uzbek population and his clients. This was easier said than 
done when procurement prices for cotton, i.e., the prices at which Moscow purchased 
cotton from Uzbekistan, were increasing at a disappointing rate. In relative terms cotton 
procurement prices increased less during Brezhnev’s 18 years as General Secretary than 
they did under Khrushchev. By forcing cotton farmers to operate in the red, the central 
leadership could keep pressure on them to increase harvests.23 Thus, at the 1964 March 
Plenum Brezhnev declared an increase for many farm products in Uzbekistan, but not for 
cotton.24 At the same time, ever since 1935 an over-plan premium (premii-nadbavok) had 
been in effect to motivate farmers to increase production.25 These pecuniary incentives 
                                                 
 
22 Though country-wide industrialization had taken off during the Stalin period, agriculture was still the 
mainstay of Uzbekistan’s economy. In the late 1950s, around 40% of the work force was employed in 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes as compared to 25% in industry. See RGANI, f.6, op. 6, doc. 1106, “Spravki 
rabotnikov pri TsK KPSS o rabote partkomissii pri TsK KP Uzbekistana o rasmotrenii personal’nykh del 
kommunistov”. “Spravka o resultatakh komandirovki v Uzbekskaya SSR Mart 1957 goda”.  
23 Gregory Gleason, Between Moscow and Tashkent: The Politics of the Uzbek Cotton Production 
Complex, PhD Dissertation, University of California, 1984, pp. 128-130. 
24 Ibid., p. 110.  
25 Grey Hodnett, “Technology and Social Change in Soviet Central Asia: The Politics of Cotton Growing,” 
in Henry W Morton and T.K. Rudolf (Eds.) Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's (New York: The Free 





were retained under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The result was that Uzbekistan was 
amply compensated for over-plan production, which benefited the Uzbek people and 
elite, but the demands for continually increasing cotton yields were also raised with this 
higher level of performance.  
A reticent attitude towards the center’s ever increasing cotton targets would have 
resulted in strengthened controls by the Russian central appointees. This, in turn, would 
have unnerved the indigenous elite since their work would be put under closer 
supervision. In other words, Rashidov would have been squeezed from both ends, i.e., the 
Moscow and the Uzbek elite.  
But words had to be translated into deeds. Fulfilling these ambitious targets was 
a delicate problem since First Secretaries were held as “personally responsible” and 
failure was political suicide. The price for failure was, to quote Fainsod, “disgrace, 
demotion, or even worse”.26 This was made abundantly clear to the Azeri leadership 
whose inability to raise cotton yields and “anti-cotton” activities led to the sacking in 
1969 and 1970 of the First Secretary, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the 
Minister of Agriculture and others.27  
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On Moscow’s part, in contrast, deeds were rarely translated into words. Neither 
Brezhnev nor Khrushchev, let alone Stalin, went into great detail how ambitious plan 
targets were to be met. Thus, Brezhnev acknowledged that there were no “prepared 
recipes” or “universal advice” in raising cotton production by the one million tons 
specified in the 9th and 10th plans.28 These plan targets rarely erred on the low side. Under 
Khrushchev it was not uncommon to find plans in classified briefings demanding a 25 or 
30 percent raise in cotton output annually, yet without specifying the specific 
technological changes or manpower increases that would allow this upward adjustment.29 
That the tempo was extraordinarily high is testified to by the realization of this when the 
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26th CPSU Congress in March 1981 adopted “stable” cotton targets, reducing the ill-
apportioned burden of the foregoing.30  
The padding of cotton reports was merely a facet of the frantic search for 
solutions to the unrealistic and often contradictory central directives which had 
characterized the USSR’s since its creation. Falsification of cotton production gave the 
elite breathing room in face of the center’s relentless pressure. In many ways, the Cotton 
Production Complex served as a first line of defense for the republic’s autonomy.  In the 
eyes of the Uzbeks, the falsified part of production only reclaimed what was perceived as 
theirs had cotton procurement prices evolved with the indices in other sectors.  
Usmankhodzhaev and Rashidov’s “Local Favoritism” 
Rashidov’s demise catapulted a new triumvirate of leaders to power: I. 
Usmankhodzhaev, A. U. Salimov, and G.Kh Kadyrov – heads of party, legislature, and 
state respectively. Usmankhodzhaev’s appointment was preceded by intense politicking 
among the Politburo members in Moscow. Formally, the main figures responsible for 
vetting, selection, and appointment of First Secretaries in the Union republics in 1982-83 
were the director of the CPSU Secretariat’s Party Organization Department (Ligachev), 
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the General Secretary and Second Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (Andropov 
and Chernenko),31 while final decisions were to be taken collegially in the Politburo. This 
formal process was partially altered by Gorbachev. “Gorbachev could not have decisive 
influence on nominations to party positions,” Ligachev recalls, “but I often found 
Gorbachev in Chernenko’s office, and he took active part in the review of candidates.” 
That the choice fell upon Usmankhodzhaev is attributed principally to Second Secretary 
Chernenko, Gorbachev, and other supportive members of the Politburo and Secretariat.32    
Seeking to enlist the hand of the center in his vendetta with the Rashidov 
leadership, First Secretary Usmankhodzhaev at the 16th Plenum of the Uzbek Central 
Committee in 1984 singled out Kashkadarya, Jizak, and Bukhara oblasts as particularly 
prone to violations of cadre selection and promotions on the basis of “kinship, local 
favoritism, or personal devotion”. Kashkadarya’s former oblispolkom chairman, B. 
Elbayev had built luxurious housing for his children and the erstwhile party raykom First 
Secretaries N. Khikmatov, T. Tillayev, D. Khushnazarov, A. Umirov, Kh. Kalilov had 
engaged in “deception and falsification”; Jizak’s former gorkom secretary U. Turakulov 
had patronized workers who had broken the law; and in Bukhara the then-obkom First 
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Secretary, A. Karimov, had promoted several figures on the basis of “friendship or local 
favoritism”, including the oblast state prosecutor and the chiefs of the Internal Affairs 
Administration.33  An article in Izvestija buttressed these claims, identifying Rashidov’s 
region of origin, Jizak, as the most troublesome of Uzbekistan’s oblasts. “It was here” the 
journalist G. Dimov lamented, “that the ugliest sprouts of nepotism shot up…what more 
could one expect, when half the members of the province Party committee's bureau were 
related.” Embezzlement had been a direct function of the lack of supervision, local 
favoritism, and mutual protection, which had been especially palpable in the 
Zagotkhlopkoprom (the Cotton Procurement Industrial Association).34    
Yegor Ligachev’s report to the Uzbek Central Committee’s 16th Plenum was 
less damning, noting how there had been many achievements in the socio-political 
development of Bukhara oblast but that it had erred in the “resolution of cadre issues”: 
political, professional, and moral qualities had been replaced with “selection on the basis 
of kinship, common origins, or personal loyalty.” As regards Samarkand oblast, however, 
Ligachev’s attention was directed other issues: to raise “production capacities,” 
strengthen “labor resources”, “output quality” etc., with no shortcomings detected in the 
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sphere of cadre policy.35 Still, a month later the Uzbek party congress accused a son of 
Samarkand oblast – the Uzbek Minister of Internal Affairs, Kh. Yakhyayev -- for gross 
misconduct. Citing documents of an unknown origin, the Secretary of the Uzbek People’s 
Control Committee, G. Shamshiyev, alleged that Yakhyayev had engaged in systematic 
abuse of official position, toadyism, amoral way of living, among other reprobate 
behavior.36   
Rashidov’s demise became the inception of a deep purge of the Uzbek state and 
party apparatus. In 1984 and 1985 alone, 1813 officials in the nomenklatura, or 45.7 
percent of the total, were excluded. As many as 52 out of 65 secretaries of obkoms were 
ejected, of whom 11 were First Secretaries, and 400 new secretaries (equivalent to 70 
percent of the total) at the raykom and gorkom levels were elected of whom 149 were 
First Secretaries. Forty six chairmen of oblispolkoms and deputies were changed, 29 
figures on the Central Committee were replaced, 232 deputies in the Supreme and local 
soviets were demoted, and 6663 party members were expelled from the communist 
party.37 Having a taste for statistics, First Secretary I. Usmankhodzhaev proudly touted 
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this purge at the October Plenum of the Party Congress in 1984, citing these numbers and 
others, acknowledging meanwhile that several difficulties remained “after years of 
deficient leadership” that “cheated the party and the state.”38 Eventually, the fallout of 
this scandal would radiate even to Brezhnev’s son-in-law Yuri Churbanov, deputy 
Minister of Interior, who was convicted along with other Moscow officials in the central 
party apparatus. The long-standing First Secretary of the Tashkent obkom, Musakhanov, 
was similarly dismissed and reprimanded on the eve of the 1986 Communist Party 
Congress.39  
Usmankhodzhaev presided over an almost completely revamped Bureau of the 
Central Committee. Only Salimov and Usmankhodzhaev remained from the 1981 Bureau 
whose Brezhnev era native and non-native members had been thoroughly purged. 
Determined to reverse the corrupt and negative tendencies in Soviet society, Alexander 
Yakovlev in 1985 penned a letter to Gorbachev on the imperative of further economic 
and political centralization.40 This thinking extended to cadre policy which was put under 
much stricter surveillance. Thus, a party document from 1986 notes “how the work of 
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party…organs of Uzbekistan continues [but that they are now placed] under the control 
of the otdel of the Central Committee of the Communist Party [KPSS]” in Moscow “to 
strengthen discipline”.41   As during the post-purge Stalin and Khrushchev eras, the 
Central Committee Bureau was “Russified” where the number of non-native central 
appointees jumped from five in 1981 to eight in 1986.42 Gorbachev refrained from taking 
such drastic steps as in Kazakhstan, however, where in 1986 he dismissed the long 
standing Kazakh First Secretary Kunaev and replaced him with an ethnic Russian, 
Gennady Kolbin. Uzbeks preserved the leading posts in the Uzbekistan and at the rayon 
level, 86 percent of First Secretaries were in 1987-1989 “Muslim”, indicating that Uzbeks 
remained preponderant at lower levels as well.43    
Usmankhodzhaev, in an attack on Rashidov’s leadership, noted in a letter to the 
all-Union Central Committee on April 30, 1986, how he “seriously…violated the work 
with cadres,” how “cadres were promoted on the basis of birth place (rodstva and 
zemlyachestvo), personal loyalty, and workplace”. Many positions in the party, soviet, 
and governmental organs were filled with his close rodstvenniki who “benefited from 
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appointments”. Not limited to these, Rashidov had bestowed the Hero of Socialist Labor 
Order on “his uncle Nasirov” and awarded doctorates to his brother N. Rashidov and 
daughter S. Rashidova.44 As many as eight Jizak natives were allegedly employed in 
Uzbekistan’s Central Committee and three with kinship relations to Rashidov could be 
pinpointed in the Jizak obkom.45 Throughout the Rashidov-period and especially during 
the 1970s, Rashidov had created a spirit of “parading nationalism” whereby anti-Soviet 
and anti-governmental figures such as the First Secretary of Kashkadarya oblast, Gaipov, 
his counterpart in Bukhara, Karimov, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the head of Paisk 
agro-industrial complex Adylov, and the former Secretary of the Central Committee 
Umarov had escaped unpunished. Last but not least, widespread corruption had resulted 
in the “embezzlement of billions of rubles” Usmankhodzhaev concluded.46       
The CPSU Central Committee’s response on Usmankhodzhaev’s tirade in 1986 
was less damning, though still acknowledging Rashidov’s deficiencies.  The Central 
Committee affirmed flaws in the “placement and training of cadres” and that serious 
violations on party norms occurred, including “widespread corruption” and “bribery”, 
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resulting in the misappropriation of more than 3 billion rubles between 1970 and 1983. 
What is more, the Central Committee remarked that practically all of the senior 
leadership of the Procurator’s Office, MVD, Supreme Court, and Ministry of Justice had 
been replaced, in addition to the dismissals cited in Usmankhodzhaev’s telegram.47 While 
addressing many of Usmankhodzhaev’s points, noteworthy is that no reference is made to 
Rashidov’s “favoritism”, kinship connections, or any other of the allegations made by the 
Uzbek First Secretary, which may possibly denote that these were the opinions of a 
“successor” rather than established facts.  
Rashidov’s kin-based promotions were neither a subject in an article on Uzbek 
party violations in Pravda Vostoka. Not being apologetic, the article still chastised 
several Uzbek officials whose offices had been sources of personal enrichment. All of 
those standing “puzzled” to the allegations, the newspaper charged, were in fact guilty: 
N. G. Kurbanov, the Minister of Rural Construction, had been preoccupied with 
providing for his family and mistress; Kh.R Rakhimov, previous Director of the Agency 
of Foreign Tourism, had smoothed the way for his son’s acceptance to Tashkent 
University’s Oriental Studies division, which had “allowed his son to travel abroad”; 
U.A. Aripov, the former Rector of Tashkent’s Medical Institute, had endowed his five 
                                                 
 
47 Ts. K. KPSS, “O Zapisie t.t. Chernikova V. i Rekunkova, A.M.,” May 5, 1986, in Dmitrii Antonovich 
Volkogonov Papers, Container No. 16, "Uzbek Affair", Materials of the Central Committee of the 





daughters with higher education in the university he was heading; and the then-head of 
Uzbekistan Writers' Union, S. A. Azimov, was charged with reissuing works published 
years ago (an “operation” valued at 15.000 rubles) and of using public funds to pay for 
800 plates of kebab at his son’s wedding.48    
“Tribalizing” Central Asia 
Perhaps alluding to more serious troubles, President Gorbachev at the CPSU 
Party Congress in 1986 identified the Uzbek republic as the place where “negative 
processes have been manifest in their most acute form”. A Party Control Commission 
publication from a year later, analyzing the Samarkand party organization, similarly 
noted how “negative processes crystallized in Uzbekistan”, where the leadership 
“organized banquets”, and even several Party Control Commission central appointees had 
been “drawn into disloyalty and localism (mestnichestvo)” (even if “localism” in this 
context almost certainly meant the favoring of Uzbek interests over central ones and not 
“localism” as preference for certain Uzbek regions).49  
Corruption was not limited to cotton embezzlement. When Boris Yeltsin, then 
Central Committee Secretary in charge of construction, visited Tashkent in 1985 he 
                                                 
 
48 Pravda Vostoka, November 22, 1986.  





scourged the leadership for “constructing prestige objects” of culture, sports, political 
education, and science while neglecting the “social development of the city”.50 Krasnaia 
Zvezda, meanwhile, identified all of the Soviet officials protecting their sons from being 
sent to Afghanistan as Uzbeks.51   Chernaev was even brusquer, depicting the Central 
Asian leaders as “illiterates” and “criminals” who needed to be replaced with new, young 
cadre. The Turkmen leader Gapurov was derided as particularly “pathetic”, having been 
unable to eradicate polygamy, “religious relics”, the “thousands of illegal mullahs” while 
standing passive to the 85 percent of able-bodied women who “do nothing”, as it was 100 
years ago.52 In a report on the agricultural situation in 1988, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan were distinguished as in a particular “unfavorable state of 
affairs”, where as much as 55 percent of enterprises violated the requirements of 
regulatory documents.53   
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Kazakhstan also received its share of criticism. For example, the head of the 
Kazakh Academy of Sciences stood accused of alcoholism, improper conduct, and the 
selection of personnel on the basis of favoritism, nepotism and preference by geographic 
origin.54 Nearly identical accusations were levied in 1987 against the former First 
Secretary, D.A. Kunaev, whose work violated the principle of collective leadership and 
encouraged nepotism and toadying.55 The Kazakh Minister of Higher and Specialized 
Secondary Education, K. N. Naribayev, was similarly alleged to have a predilection for 
“hometown friends” patronizing each other.56 Thus, a Coordinating Council for 
Combating Crime, Alcoholism, and Unearned Income was established, whose raison 
d'être was to wage an uncompromising struggle against favoritism, nepotism, and 
“preference for people of similar geographic origin”.57 At a Politburo meeting on June 
11, 1987, addressing the problem of favoritism in the USSR, Kazakhstan was also the 
sole focus of deliberations. The proceedings noted that: “favoritism and the selection of 
personnel on the basis of kinship, tribe, hometown or friendship [in Kazakhstan] must be 
eradicated”.58    
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Testimony from Gorbachev’s memoirs even attributes Kazakhstan’s Alma-Ata 
riots in December 1986 not to nationality conflicts but to the “the advantages extracted by 
the relatives, close and distant, of the top man Kunaev” and his “Dzhuz clan”, which 
made people “upset and dissatisfied”.59 This was in spite of that the riots started a day 
after Kunaev was dismissed and the Russian Gennady Kolbin was installed in his place. 
Of course, no parallels were drawn to that Gorbachev himself immediately when coming 
to power in 1985 elevated his protégé Murakhovskii, the former Party Secretary of 
Gorbachev’s native Stavropol, to Chairman of Gosagroprom60 and that the new chairman 
of the Council of Ministers in 1985, Nikolai Ryzhkov, smoothed the way for three of his 
clients from the Tyumen’ region – Evgenni Varnachev, Iurii Batalin, and Sergei 
Bashilov.61  Likewise, in Ulyanovsk oblast’s Staraya Kulatka district, media uncovered 
“report-padding”, “suppressions of criticism,” and “toadying and nepotism”.62 However, 
neither there nor in most other areas of USSR, was this described as having a social basis 
in tribe, clan, or home-town. Whereas favoritism in Kazakhstan concerned century-old 
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tribal solidarities, analogous practices in Moscow were merely considered the mores of 
“normal” Soviet politics.63  
Reasons for Skepticism 
There are at least three factors which cast doubt on the accuracy of the judgments 
above. First, the authority responsible for party organization, Yegor Ligachev, reported 
many figures which were inconsistent with other party documents, including those 
authored by Gorbachev. For example, Ligachev’s memoir avowed that “in the three years 
from 1980 to 1983, the Central Committee received tens of thousands of letters from that 
republic [Uzbekistan]”.64 A confidential document authored by Gorbachev in 1989 to 
members of the Politburo, by contrast, noted that “From 1978 to 1983 the Central 
Committee had received on average 736 letters per year from Uzbekistan”, i.e., a total of 
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3680 letters over five years.65 Either Ligachev was prone to exaggeration or Gorbachev’s 
numbers were inaccurate, but one of them was evidently wrong. Substantial variations on 
the declared amount of cotton embezzled could also be discerned, ranging from a total of 
$3 billion for the five years 1978-1983 (reported in Central Committee documents) to $3 
billion for the thirteen years between 1970 and 1983 (also reported in Central Committee 
documents). Whichever was correct, if any, Uzbek cotton was worth $35 billion on the 
international market in 1975 alone, equivalent to 26 billion rubles (with the 1975 
exchange rate of 0.75 rubles per U.S. dollar), which makes even the “high estimate” a 
theft of roughly 2 or 3 percent of the total harvest when calculated over five years.66 
Other observers have claimed that the amount of cotton embezzled approximated almost 
20 percent, at least in the year immediately prior to Rashidov’s demise.67 That the 
tumultuous nature of the circumstances caused these discrepancies is likely and should be 
duly acknowledged. On the other hand, perhaps this is the very reason why any figure 
cited during this period warrants a degree of skepticism.  
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Second, that Andropov and Chernenko were to crack down on Central Asia and 
the Caucasus was to some degree to be expected. In an insightful quantitative study of the 
attention given by the Politburo members and candidates from 1972-79 to the 15 union 
republics in public speeches, Philip D. Stewart et al. uncover how Andropov and 
Chernenko were the two Politburo members of the 19 members and candidates whose 
priorities most clearly lay elsewhere. They lobbied primarily for the interests of Russia, 
Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia, and Estonia and were set firmly against the faction 
composed of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Masherov and others “defending” Central Asia.68 That 
“their” republics were footing the bill of the net-recipients in Central Asia and Caucasus 
almost certainly touched a sensitive nerve. In other words, the objectivity of both the 
Brezhnev and post-Brezhnev leadership could be questioned. They clearly had their pet 
republics in the Eastern and Western parts of the empire respectively. Andropov and 
Gorbachev’s criticism towards the Western parts was as muted as Brezhnev’s for the 
Eastern parts.  
Third, Ligachev claims that the party, soviet, management and law enforcement 
personnel were chosen “largely on the basis of personal loyalty to Rashidov”. Thus, it is 
said that “no fewer than 14 of his relatives worked in the republican Central Committee 
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apparatus.”69 Recall that I. Usmankhodzhaev made a similar remark, declaring that eight 
in the Central Committee hailed from Jizak and three in the Jizak obkom had kinship 
relations with Rashidov. Izvestija likewise claimed that half of the Jizak obkom’s bureau 
were related to each other. Noteworthy is, however, that not a single example ever is 
given on who these persons were.  As sparing in their exhaustiveness as they were in 
their sources, none of these accounts ever gives any information about what particular 
data point they are referring to; Rashidov ruled Uzbekistan for 23 years but the data are 
static pictures of unspecified dates. That the Central Committee of Uzbekistan was made 
up of sixteen departments in 1962 and 180 members and several dozen more candidates 
also make eight Jizak natives roughly proportional to its weight in national affairs.70 A 
similar ambiguity defines the scholarly literature. For example, James Critchlow remarks 
that Jizak-natives “seemed to do well in their careers”, yet without providing any source 
or specific persons.71 Demian Vaisman makes equally strong claims about Rashidov’s 
“clan” of relatives in power, acknowledging still that exactly who they were is hard to pin 
down since Rashidov did not “advertise” his family connections.72  
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Moreover, if nepotism was as pronounced during Rashidov as has been claimed, 
why did confidential documents, media reports, and scholars all fail to provide a specific 
documented example? Izvestija, for instance, supplied a wealth of examples in minutiae 
about fairly benign violations in Uzbekistan but did not identify a single person in the 
nepotistic Jizak obkom bureau. Why did Usmankhodzhaev name Rashidov’s uncle 
Nazirov, who was awarded the Order of Lenin, and his daughter’s and brother’s 
unwarranted doctorates, but leave the Jizak natives in the Central Committee or his 
relatives in the Jizak obkom unnamed? That neither Usmankhodzhaev nor anyone else 
were able to come up with a real person, even while being sharp-eyed on such figures in 
other spheres, points to that these claims were either spurious or exaggerated. Had he, 
media, or scholars known any such examples they would almost certainly have 
mentioned them. Perhaps this is also why the Central Committee in Moscow left this 
particular concern aside when responding to Usmankhodzhaev’s litany of accusations.   
Conceivably, Rashidov’s ostensibly kinship-based promotions were derived from 
the corruption and padding of cotton reports during his reign. Like other Soviet and 
Uzbek leaders before him accusations came as part of a “package” since few leaders 
could be or were dismissed solely on one charge. The re-labelling of career associates as 





this case.73 Such “bundling” of kompromat aimed at disreputing Rashidov, and was no 
different than any of those levied against the several dozen of other Soviet politicians 
cited in this dissertation who had fallen from grace. What is puzzling is that few, if any, 
of the scholars writing on “clans” in Soviet Uzbekistan have seriously acknowledged 
either the possible fabrication of such accusations or the “rebranding” of former 
colleagues as rodstvenniki. Many appear to have taken the claims in public sources at 
face value, as will be returned to in the next chapter.  
Conclusion 
If there is any period in Soviet Uzbekistan’s history for which material relating 
to “clans” or strong regional identities could be found, it is this one. Usmankhodzhaev’s 
letter to the Central Committee, journalistic articles, and plenum reports all testify to that 
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kinship was of some importance in Rashidov’s Uzbekistan. On the other hand, Surkov’s 
declaration at the 19th Party Congress, that “family ties determine who gets the top and 
middle level jobs” in the entire Soviet party apparatus, attests to that blood-ties and 
nepotism were not only associated with Central Asia. Assuming that the charges against 
Rashidov are correct, it is not entirely clear why Uzbekistan’s patronage should be 
conceived as distinct from the rest of the USSR.  
Either way, Usmankhodzhaev’s allegations can scarcely be taken at face value 
since he had a vested interest in sullying the reputation of his predecessor. Events that 
unfolded later would also put a big question mark regarding this entire episode. Just to 
take one example out of many, the Minister of Interior, Kh. Yakhyaev was accused by the 
Uzbek Party Congress in 1984 for “toadyism” among many other allegations. In 1989, 
however, as will be detailed in the next chapter, it was revealed that the accusations 
against not only him but dozens of others were fabricated. This poses the question of 
what, if any, of the accusations revealed in course of the “cotton scandal” that are to be 
believed, including those levied against Rashidov. 
Rashidov’s falsification of cotton reports is likely what unleashed all other 
claims on his persona and policies. It is conceivable that Rashidov’s clients, most of 
whom he had encountered during his career, were relabeled rodstvenniki by 
Usmankhodzhaev in a similar vein as was documented by the Party Control Commission 
in other republics. That is likely why the CPSU Central Committee in confidential reports 





and public sources. The most “objective” source among the party organs is undoubtedly 
the CPSU Central Committee and Politburo reports. This was most clearly revealed as 






7. Misreading and Mythmaking: Moscow’s “Cotton 
Affair”, 1986-1991 
Introduction 
In 1989 two sets of confidential documents landed on the Politburo’s table. Both 
revealed that many of the claims surrounding the cotton scandal were erroneous. A large 
number of imprisoned or disgraced Uzbek officials had been innocent and evidence 
against them had been fabricated. Not limited to this, the investigators in Uzbekistan had 
purposefully misused media in discrediting Uzbek officials. The unprecedented media 
freedom during glasnost allowed journalists to widely disseminate accusations whose 
accuracy mattered less than the imperative of regularly serving stunning revelations.  
Such mythmaking ensued when central media in 1988 began speaking about “clans” in 
Uzbekistan. Shortly thereafter, in 1989, scholars embraced this concept as an accurate 
portrayal of Uzbek realities without questioning who launched it and the circumstances 
under which it arose.  
Further, just as Gorbachev misread the strength of nationalism in the Soviet 





an act of desperation, the central government began transferring Uzbek officials across 
the republic in a dizzying pace while leaving a handful of powerful figures in place. The 
one’s who were left en poste took advantage of their deep-seated networks in their native 
Tashkent and Samarkand to amass regionally defined power bases unmatched among the 
Uzbek elite. Islam Karimov inherited these power brokers after independence in 1991 
and it took more than a decade of maneuvering to eliminate them. In parallel to this 
struggle, Karimov has effectively barred former governors (hokimlar) from national 
offices to prevent them from bringing in regionally rooted clients into national 
government.  Striking at the core of Soviet place-based networks, Karimov aimed to 
suffocate the centrifugal forces of regionalism through a reversal of the Soviet era career 
pattern. The fight against patronage networks has nonetheless proven to be a prolonged 
struggle, as Gorbachev too was made aware of in the midst of perestroika.  
Gorbachev’s Misreading of the Situation 
The purge of Uzbek officials in the early and mid-1980s proved ineffective. A 
document dated August 1987 of the CPSU Politburo reveals that corruption and 
favoritism were present even when the Uzbek political system was under tight controls. 
Apart from pointing out insufficiencies in cotton cultivation in practically all oblasts of 
the republic, the Central Committee averred that plenty in these harvests had been 
embezzled and that several officials had “been drawn into friendship ties with a number 





and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Kadyrov, to “strengthen work with cadres”, to 
listen to the opinion of agricultural specialists, and to take other measures to resolve 
problems in the cotton sector.1 
 It might be argued that this description of the Politburo came too soon after the 
purge to judge its effectiveness. Still, instead of predicating the policy on reversing the 
primary source of region-based power and nepotism – the promotion of former First 
Secretaries upwards in the system, from a rayon to the oblast containing the rayon, and 
from oblast to the containing republic  – it was continued. For example, 
Usmankhodzhaev, the First Secretary 1983-88, had a long history in the provinces of the 
Ferghana Valley as had the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Soviet 1989-1990, 
Mirzaolim Ibragimov.2 True to form, old colleagues and figures from Namangan and 
Andijan made notable career leaps under Usmankhodzhaev.3 Clearly, Moscow could 
                                                 
 
1 RGANI, f.89, op.36, doc. 13 “O Ser’eznykh nedostatkakh v razvitii khlopkovostva v Uzbekskoj SSR” 
Vypiska iz protokola No.78 zasedaniya Politburo TsK KPSS, August 3, 1987.  
2 Usmankhodzhaev had served as First Secretary of the Andijan obkom, Chairman of the Namangan 
oblispolkom, and head of the Ferghana gorsoviet; Ibragimov was previously First Secretary of the Ferghana 
obkom. Other examples of leading figures whose paths came via provincial service are Gairat Kadyrov, the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers 1984-1989, who had risen through the Chirchik gorkom and his 
successor, Mirakhat Mirkasymov, who had served as First Secretary of the Tashkent obkom, prior to which 
he had been First Secretary of the Khorezm obkom. Makhmud Aripdzhanov, First Secretary of the Andijan 
obkom 1985-1990, rose through the Almalyk gorkom.    
3 For example, Usmankhodzhaev’s deputy chairman of the Namangan oblispolkom in 1974, Shavkat 





have targeted the problem of region-based promotions had it closed off the republic-level 
offices from figures rooted in the oblasts, but it did not. Instead, Moscow’s pursued the 
alternative strategy of transferring officials “laterally” across the republic from oblast to 
oblast.4 The intention was to root out the “wide-spread corruption”, “exploitation”, create 
stability in the republic, to instill a sense of “collegiality and criticism”, and return to 
“Leninist norms of party life”.5 Whatever the success on each of these parameters, the 
uprooting had unintended consequences. Patronage networks expanded as the transferred 
                                                 
 
Ferghana obkom in 1988. Another Namangan native, Makhmud Salakhitdinov, was designated Minister of 
Higher and Special Education in 1985. See “M. Salakhuddinov,” in Uzbek Sovet Entsiklopediyasi, Vol. 9 
(Tashkent: Uzbekistan SSR Fanlar Akademiyasi, 1977), p. 455.    
4 For example, Abdukhalyk Aidarkulov, a native of Tashkent oblast, serving there as First Secretary of a 
Tashkent gorkom, was during Gorbachev appointed First Secretary of the Navoi obkom and then First 
Secretary of Syr Darya oblast.  Anvar Ikramov, in turn, served as First Secretary of a Tashkent oblast 
raikom during Rashidov (1971-1980), only to be reappointed in 1988 as First Secretary of the Samarkand 
obkom; Salidzhan Mamarasulov, hailing from Andijan, served as First Secretary of the Andijan obkom 
during Rashidov (1978-1985), but was dispatched to Surkhandarya (1985-1989) in the Gorbachev period; 
And Tashkent-born Mirakhat Mirkasymov was transferred to Khorezm Oblast where he served as First 
Secretary from 1986 to 1988, at the time of which he was chosen First Secretary of Tashkent Oblast. See 
”Anvar Ikramov,” in Uzbek Sovet Entsiklopediyasi, Vol. 4, (Tashkent: Uzbekistan SSR Fanlar 
Akademiyasi, 1973), p. 578-579; “Salidzhan Mamarasulov,” in Sovetskij Entsiklopedicheskij Slovar’ Vol. 2 
(Moskva: Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1983); ad “M. Mirkasymov,” at centrasia.ru 
<http://www.centrasia.ru/person2.php?&st=1013880589> (2012-12-16).   
5 TsK Uzbekistana, Letter from I. Usmankhodzhaev, April 30, 1986. In Dmitrii Antonovich Volkogonov 
Papers, Container No. 16, "Uzbek Affair", Materials of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 





personnel built loyalties in new areas. In principle, this was not much different than the 
“rotation policy” pursued by Rashidov. Yet Rashidov was hesitant in leaving obkom First 
Secretaries and other officials on their home turfs (see Table 1, Appendix A).  
Gorbachev was less cautious in his crusading spirit. Thus, the few power brokers 
who were not subject to the “inter-oblast” transfers emerged emboldened and 
unchallenged, which concentrated powers in increasingly few hands.  Three pair of hands 
to be more precise, belonging to Timur Alimov, Ismail Jurabekov, and Shukrullah 
Mirzaidov. Only two weeks after Mikhail Gorbachev’s appointment on March 11, 1985, 
as General Secretary of the Communist Party, Timur Alimov was made a full member of 
Uzbekistan’s Central Committee, serving in parallel to his position as First Secretary of 
the Tashkent obkom.6 On August 29 the same year Gorbachev and the Politburo 
appointed Jurabekov deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.7 The Tashkent native 
Alimov served for a decade in Tashkent structures untouched, first as Chairman of the 
Tashkent oblispolkom from 1978 to 1985 and then First Secretary of the Tashkent 
obkom, 1985 to 1988. Next to his position in the Council of Ministers, Jurabekov was in 
1985 named Chairman of Gosagroprom and could through this position control much of 
the republic’s cotton production and rural countryside, including in his native Samarkand. 
                                                 
 
6 ”Personnel Changes at Party Plenum of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
April 24, 1985.  





Another powerful figure whose network was left intact, Shukrulla Mirzaidov, was to be 
swiftly neutralized by Karimov after independence but played a profound role in shaping 
the events of the Gorbachev era. Having served uninterrupted as Chairman or deputy 
Chairman in Tashkent-based institutions since 1963 – in the oblplan, oblispolkom, 
gorplan, and gorlispolkom – Mirzaidov had amassed a regional power base unmatched 
amongst the Uzbek elite. Even so, Gorbachev named him Chairman of Tashkent’s 
oblispolkom in 1985 and in 1989 Chairman of Gosplan.8 These three – Alimov, 
Jurabekov, and Mirzaidov – were also to become the principal power brokers behind 
Karimov’s rise to power in 1989. While Gorbachev’s unfaltering glasnost and 
perestroika aimed to spread powers in society and state, the unintended effect in 
Uzbekistan was a concentration of power.  These kingmakers were products not of 
Brezhnev and the Rashidov era but Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev.  
If the “inter-oblast” transfers had met with only partial success and even proved 
harmful for future democratization, Andropov’s and Gorbachev’s reluctance to affect a 
generation change was another missed opportunity. Instead, the officials promoted 
                                                 
 
8 This is not to say that these figures did not have allies beyond their home turfs. For example, Mirzaidov 
maintained close ties with Abdurauf Gafurov, a member of the Namangan obkom Bureau in 1985 and one 
of Ferghana Valley’s “underground millionaires”. See Martha Olcott, In the Whirlwind of Jihad 






typically belonged to the older generation of stale politicians.9 Beyond high age, what 
they also shared was that they were part of that segment of the elite which had sunk into 
oblivion during Rashidov. Nishanov, for example, had been in the deep-freeze for 25 
years biding his time in the Soviet Embassies in Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Jordan before 
being appointed Foreign Minister in Uzbekistan in 1985 and then Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet a year later. Former First Secretary Nurutdin Mukhitdinov, who after his 
fall from power in 1961 had been posted to diplomatic work in Syria, was reinstalled and 
ended his career as deputy Chairman of the Trade and Industry Chamber in 1987 at the 
age of 70.10 Rasul Gulyamov, who initially supported Rashidov but then turned into his 
critic when he was removed from the Bureau in the 1960s, resurfaced under Gorbachev 
as head of the so-called “Namangan clan”. Uzbekistan was ripe for a generation change 
but Moscow did not take advantage of it; Gorbachev’s “new thinking” suffered from the 
lack of “new thinkers”.  
                                                 
 
9 Usmankhodzhaev was born in 1930 and his successor Rafik Nishanov in 1926. Akil Salimov (chairman of 
Supreme Soviet 1983-1986) was born in 1928 and the First Secretary of the Bukhara obkom during 
Gorbachev, Ismail Dzhabbarov, in 1932.  For Salimov’s biography see, “A. U. Salimov,” in Uzbek Sovet 
Entsiklopediyasi Vol. 9 (Tashkent: Uzbekistan SSR Fanlar Akademiyasi, 1977), p. 452.  
10 Donald Carlisle, “Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan”, William Fierman (Ed.) Soviet Central Asia: 
The Failed Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 115-116; “N. Mukhitdinov,” in Uzbek 





What has been said above may be interpreted as a one-sided failure on 
Moscow’s part. But this is not the whole story since the Uzbek elite had proven 
stubbornly resistant to change. Much more than elsewhere in Central Asia they had 
become masters of keeping Russia out of its hair even when tightly manacled. This 
resilience took several expressions. First, many of Moscow’s dismissals in Uzbekistan 
were often rapidly reinstated locally in other positions. This “revolving door” subverted 
Moscow’s cadre policy at every step, and was especially pronounced at the oblast and 
rayon level. For example, the head of Surkhandarya’s Administrative Department, having 
been fired for forging documents for his daughter, resurfaced not shortly thereafter as the 
Department Head of the Oblast Trade Union organization.11 Moscow recognized its 
failure of eliciting obedience at the 1986 Party Congress and issued a decree in 1987 
warning party organs not to reinstate figures who had been expelled from the party on 
“bribery, embezzlement, and padding of reports”.12 Yet Moscow was utterly lacking the 
resources demanded to control adherence to this decree. It also faced a dwindling reserve 
of qualified personnel after the purge, forcing Moscow’s cadre bureau to turn a blind eye 
towards some reinstatements. Second, the Uzbek elite turned increasingly vocal in its 
                                                 
 
11 James Critchlow, “Prelude to Independence: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke Moscow’s Grip on 
Elite Recruitment,” in William Fierman (Ed.) Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1991), pp. 147-152.  





criticism of Moscow’s new “unstable” cadre policy. One obkom First Secretary at the 
Uzbek Party Congress of March 28, 1987, lambasted the purge, saying that work with 
cadres was “impossible” without “stability.” Like elsewhere in the Soviet Union, 
patronage networks were amorphous hydras. As one head was cut off, two new grew 
back in its place.  
Usmankhodzhaev’s Credibility Questioned 
Next to this resourceful meddling in cadre policy, new corruption allegations 
soon spurted out. In 1988 Rashidov’s successor, Usmankhodzhaev, was arrested along 
with dozens of other officials accused of accepting “large sums of money from their 
subordinates and other officials for patronage”. According to the Procurator General, 
Usmankhodzhaev at two instances embezzled 65000 rubles,13 and in a subsequent 
telegram it is established that he bribed Central Committee member Roshanov with 
25000 rubles.14  A campaign in mass media further alleged that Usmankhodzhaev had 
bribed Ligachev with 30000 rubles.15 Corruption – whether true or untrue – had persisted 
to Gorbachev’s dismay.   
                                                 
 
13 Prokurata Soyuza SSR, “Tovaritsu Gorbachevu M.S.”, No. 1-6-116-89, October 16, 1989, p. 4.  
14 Prokurata Soyuza SSR, “Tovaritsu Gorbachevu M.S.”, No. 1-5-101-89, November 12, 1989.  





Usmankhodzhaev’s successor was Rafik Nishanov whose Janus-face 
undoubtedly pointed more towards Gorbachev than his own republic.16 Heeding 
Gorbachev’s brisk instructions, Nishanov effected a further unpopular shake up in the 
Uzbek state apparatus. On July 28, 1988, 13 ministries were abolished by decree and 
several oblasts and rayons were declared subject to immediate amalgamation. The office 
holders in the defunct ministries were to be “transferred to production”, in effect losing 
the privileges they had held in the party nomenklatura.17 This far-reaching measure 
affected thousands of Uzbek officials in prominent positions. For example, on August 18, 
1988, 20000 specialists were “released to production” following the elimination of 
rayons.18 In early September, 1988, the Navoi and Samarkand oblasts were merged into 
one “Samarkand oblast” and Syr Darya oblast usurped Jizak oblast.19  This reorganization 
followed complaints in Moscow a year earlier that “hundreds of thousands” were 
employed in Uzbekistan’s 55 ministries and that several oblasts were too small for 
justifying their existence. Jizak, for example, with a population of 800.000 was singled 
                                                 
 
16 As Gorbachev reminisced in his memoirs, “I liked Rafik Nishanovich. His unchanging posture, humour 
and a certain philosophical distance from the petty vagaries of life – in other words everything that was 
usually associated with the ‘wisdom of the east’ – appealed to me.” Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New 
York: Doubleday, 1996), p. 304.  
17 ”Uzbek Ministries Abolished,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 6, 1988.  
18 ”Rural Rayons to be Abolished in Uzbekistan,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 8, 1988.  





out as particularly unwarranted.20 While the abolishment of Jizak has been viewed as a 
posthumous attack on Rashidov, it is important to recognize that this formed part of 
Moscow’s campaign to combine oblasts in the entire union.21 Jizak was an obvious 
victim due to its size but one cannot rule out that other motives guided this decision.  
The dismissal of Usmankhodzhaev in 1988 was a catalyst to yet another affair 
which raised questions not only of Usmankhodzhaev’s credibility but also Gdlyan and 
Ivanov’s corruption investigation in Uzbekistan during the 1980s.  In May 1989, Gdlyan 
and Ivanov began attacking the Politburo members Ligachev, Romanov, Solomentsev, 
and others for ties to the “Uzbek mafia”.22 Gdlyan was in the Yeltsin camp and a fierce 
opponent of Ligachev and other conservative members of the Politburo. Some of the 
testimony for the accusations levied against Ligachev and others were gathered from 
Usmankhodzhaev. “Gdlyan,” Ligachev lamented “convinced Usmankhodzhaev to 
fabricate testimony against me”.23 After his arrest on October 19, 1988, Usmankhodzhaev 
petitioned the Prosecutor General asking that his case be handled “only by Gdlyan, 
Ivanov, and their direct superior Karakozov”, whom he “trusted absolutely.”24   
                                                 
 
20 The Diaries of A. Chernaev, “1987” in Sovetskaya Politika 1992-1991, p. 54.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), p. 204-205.  
23 Ibid., p. 242.  





A personal letter from Usmankhodzhaev to Ligachev, dated January 23, 1990, 
and republished in Ligachev’s memoirs, furnishes additional evidence to that 
Usmankhodzhaev was firmly under Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s thumbs. “I was a victim of the 
political intriguers Gdlyan and Ivanov,” Usmankhodzhaev regretted, “who tried to 
fabricate accusations that a number of Party and soviet figures committed crimes…While 
I was under pressure from the investigators and started down the path of deception, I 
implicated innocent people, including you, Yegor Kuzmich.”25 Similar recantations were 
recorded by the Prosecutor on April 8, 1989. Prepared to cut off his nose to spite his face, 
Usmankhodzhaev stated during interrogations that he had implicated honest people at the 
demand of Gdlyan and Ivanov.26 “The innocent people they investigated,” Ligachev 
attested, “had been subjected to mental and physical harassment, the terms of detention 
were violated, and threats of reprisals against relatives were used to elicit the testimony 
they needed.”27   
The astute observer may question Ligachev’s testimony. After all, he was as 
implicated in the palace intrigues of the Kremlin as any other. While such objections are 
not unfounded, other independently collected archival evidence vindicates his case: The 
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in Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), p. 248-249.  
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Prosecutor’s office, Gorbachev, and a commission of legislators unearthed equally 
appalling violations in the work of the anti-corruption investigators. A not insignificant 
number of Uzbek officials had been indicted on trumped up charges, the material of 
which Gdlyan and Ivanov made it a matter of principle to feed to the Soviet news media. 
Uzbekistan was publicly condemned but eventually silently rehabilitated in the Politburo.   
Uzbekistan’s Silent Rehabilitation  
Having humbled Uzbekistan to the status of a mafia republic, the spotlight on 
Soviet corruption unexpectedly turned on Gdlyan and Ivanov themselves. That their 
corruption investigations had overstepped the bounds of its original purpose and begun to 
target the top Soviet leadership, including Yegor Ligachev, was likely a trigger for this 
seemingly preemptive action. Whatever the reason, beginning in May 1989 their 
rummaging in Uzbekistan was sharply criticized in confidential deliberations. This 
eventful month climaxed with a plenary session of the Supreme Soviet’s Presidium held 
on May 13. In a terse summary it was reported that Gdlyan and Ivanov had “used 
provocative methods”, “violated law” in their investigations of some “of the leading 
officials of the USSR”, and a commission was to be established to appraise Gdlyan’s and 
Ivanov’s work.28    
                                                 
 





One Politburo document authored by Gorbachev summarizes the many letters on 
violations by judicial organs (procurators, judges, courts etc.) in Uzbekistan, especially 
following the onset of Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s investigatory work.29 The majority had 
been sent by either convicted prisoners or their relatives, practically all of whom testified 
to unfair trials, false accusations, forced confessions, and/or the stereotyped picture 
portrayed in media.30  Although some of these letters were streaming in from other parts 
of the USSR, the main source was Uzbekistan. It was also declared that the USSR 
Prosecutor General underwrote several of the complaints contained in them. From 
Moscow’s perspective, the problem was not confined to the unlawful pursuit of several 
innocent communist and high level officials, which “had no parallels” in the rest of the 
USSR, but it had affected public opinion negatively, smeared judges, and created a 
perception that these methods were a facet of perestroika.31     
For example, two letter writers included in Gorbachev’s appraisal, V.Z. 
Zhevagin and U.S. Sizov of the USSR Supreme Court, referred to the former Uzbek 
deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Davydov, and another senior official in Yangiyul 
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raykom (Tashkent), Khadkhimuradov, who both had committed suicide while under 
investigation. According to these letters, the judge handling their case had groundlessly 
been accused by Gdlyan and Ivanov for ties to the mafia, and Davydov as well as 
Khadkhimuradov were claimed to be innocent. This letter, received on February 20, 
1989, was only one in a pile of similar letters.32      
Another letter cited by Gorbachev authored by one S.K. Ishanov, received on 
March 3, 1989, blamed Gdlyan and Ivanov for “unlawfulness”, that they had lapsed into 
“uncontrollable behavior”, and “terrorized the people of Uzbekistan”. This “moral 
trauma” was declared to have affected thousands of members of the Communist Party, 
their families, and relatives. Referring to one out of many equivalent instances of 
misconduct, he noted how T.Kh. Kakhramanov, another deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Uzbekistan, had been terrorized by the investigators on trumped up charges 
and falsified documentation. Other letters of forced confessions were received from the 
First Secretary of Karshi gorkom, A. Iliadi, an accountant at a Kolkhoz (M.M. Khvan), 
and the wife of the former First Secretary of Kyzyl-tep raykom, N.Khikmotov. The latter 
had been sentenced in 1986 for grand scale peculation but after a complaint and appeal 
                                                 
 





the Navoi oblast judge dismissed the case due to an insufficient preliminary 
investigation.33 
Uzbekistan’s former Second Secretary T.N. Osetrov submitted an equally long 
complaint about Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s investigation, categorically denying the charges 
against him and the unlawful arrest of his wife and daughter. To make matters worse, his 
reputation had been sullied in media whereby Selskaya Molodezh had charged him with 
“being bought all the time when serving in the Central Committee; Literaturnaya Gazeta 
(March 9, 1988) had accused him of belonging to Uzbekistan’s “mafia”; Pravda Vostoka 
(May 1988) profiled him as “directing a criminal cadre”; and Gdlyan’s book Detektiva i 
Politika (APN, 1989), co-authored with journalist E. Dodoyev, portrayed him as a 
“criminal” and “bribe-taker”. A response from the Ideology and Judicial Section of the 
all-Union Central Committee dated January 16, 1989, vindicated Osetrov’s claims. 
Having raked through the evidence, the USSR General Prosecutor A. Sakharov 
concluded that he “did not agree with the [Uzbek] prosecutor [in Osetrov’s case], “that 
the prosecutor’s office had made no attempt to acquire accurate information”, and that 
“the handling of Osetrov violated the presumption of innocence”.34   
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Osetrov was not alone of having been desecrated in the media. Another letter 
authored in defense of A.G. Statenin, a member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, 
remarked how as soon as the second day after Statenin’s arrest the media portrayed him 
as a criminal and plunderer. Statenin was sentenced to 8 years but was later acquitted due 
to insufficient evidence.35  Usmankhodzhaev, who had been feeding Gdlyan and Ivanov 
with false indictments throughout the 1980s, was subjected to an equally vicious media 
campaign after his arrest.36 Ligachev perhaps put Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s public relations 
campaign most succinctly: “…in addition to the group’s purely professional efforts, a 
new ‘quality’ of perestroika soon appeared in the investigators. They had a real knack for 
working with the press and TV, publicizing sensational materials before trials, sometimes 
signing their own names to articles….Gdlyan and Ivanov, who actively sought out 
contact with the press emerged as winners”.37   
Investigative journalist Olga Chaikovskaya’s article “the Myth”, published in  
Literaturnaya Gazeta, lent further support to Gorbachev’s case.38 In her account, Gdlyan 
and Ivanov among other violations had attempted to extract a false confession from a 
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director of a state farm that he had bribed the Secretary of the Karakalpak obkom.39 
Others had been subjected to torture or died in detention. Secretary Gaipov was found 
dead with 17 knife wounds in a room adjacent to Gdlyan’s office; the deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Davydov, referred to above, shot himself; and Col. Khadzhimurat left a 
suicide note saying that he could no longer endure the ordeal.40 Although comparable 
revelations were contained in then confidential documents, Chaikovskaya had evidently 
crossed a red-line since her sequel to this article was published in Vestnik Akademii Nauk 
SSSR (Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR), a publication of much more 
limited circulation.41 Apparently, the Soviet public was “ready” to learn about the 
spurious claims against Politburo members but the wrong-doings in Uzbekistan were a 
more bitter pill to swallow.  
A second confidential document, authored by 11 non-Central Asian all-Union 
Supreme Soviet deputies and addressed to members of the Politburo, raised further 
questions on the investigations.42 Evaluating the work of the commission composed of 
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the USSR Prosecutor, KGB, and the Supreme Court, the assessment deduced that 
Gdlyan, Ivanov, and their “circle” had severely violated Soviet law, used “provocative 
methods”, and been corrupted by wide-spread bribe taking. Not only letters streaming 
into the Central Committee testified to this but also the General Prosecutor O.M. Litvok 
and co-workers of Gdlyan.43 Particularly “illegal” was the treatment of the former 
chairman of Bukhara oblpotrebsoyuza, G. Mirzaev, who had been living under ”terrible 
conditions” for the past five years. The “investigation” of his behavior had been 
completed already in mid-1986 but he had by 1989 still not been directed to a court. 
Other forms of mistreatment included the arbitrary arrests of relatives, which had been 
“painful psychologically” for all involved. For example, sixteen of the relatives of the 
former First Secretary of Bukhara obkom, Karimov, had been incarcerated and put in 
confinement for terms ranging from 5-8 months. Thus, the Ministry of Justice and the 
Supreme Court reported that the investigators Gdlyan and Ivanov “had violated 
constitutional norms on judicial independence” and unacceptably interfered in the trials 
of the accused. Many had reportedly bribed Gdlyan and his group to be excluded from 
punishment or have their sentences reduced. “This material testifies to,” it is noted “that 
                                                 
 
sledovatelem po osobo vazhnym delam pri general’nom prokurore SSSR Gdlyanom T.Kh.” To members 
and candidates of the Politburo TsK KPSS, Secretaries of the TsK KPSS, and comrades Kryuchkov and 
Pugo. May 19, 1989.  





persons under investigation, to avoid extraordinary measures of punishment and a 
minimal sentence, confessed to the charges and then used connections ‘higher up’, 
namely to the leading officials of the republic and country”, to be cleared of accusations.  
Several others condemned in the course of the cotton affair had been indicted on thin or 
inexistent evidence, including but not limited to G. Mirzabaev, T.M. Umarov, R. Baltaev, 
T.N. Osetrov, G.M. Orlov, K. Kamalov and others.44  For these reasons, the evaluation 
called on the USSR Prosecutor to reassess the cotton affair, reopen the cases on 
corruption, crime and bribery in the republic, and conduct a “careful” investigation of the 
“criminal groups” working under Gdlyan in central, party, and state organs. Beyond this, 
it ordered the falsely accused Uzbeks Kakhmatov, the former Interior Minister 
Yakhyayev, and an Estonian scientist, Khinta, to be promptly rehabilitated.45 The 
systematic abuse of official position, toadyism, amoral way of living, among other 
violations, that Izvestija and Usmankhodzhaev had charged Yakhyayev with, were all of 
a sudden said to be fabricated.  
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The Politics of Rehabilitation 
The attacks on Gdlyan and Ivanov may have bloodied their noses but they only 
reinforced their popularity with the Russian public. In May 1989 they were elected to the 
Supreme Soviet, using attacks on the top party leadership in part, it seems, as a strategy 
to gain votes. Remarkably, in April 1990, a parliamentary resolution adopted with 275 
votes in favor and 84 against, effectively dropped the investigation of Gdlyan and Ivanov 
and their parliamentary immunity from prosecution was also retained. The resolution 
warned, however, that if “they continue activity leading to the destabilization of the 
situation in the country, the Supreme Soviet will move to lift parliamentary immunity 
from them”. Subsequently, Gdlyan and Ivanov were fired from the prosecutor’s office 
and reprimanded for having brought false accusations against Politburo member Yegor 
Ligachev. That Gorbachev had “turned a blind eye towards the mafia” was also by a 
legislative committee considered groundless.46    
While acknowledging that transgressions had been made by Gdlyan and Ivanov 
in Uzbekistan and elsewhere, the contents of these classified documents were not 
publicized. Uzbekistan and the large number of innocent Uzbeks were never rehabilitated 
in Soviet and Western media. A general silence on the matter prevailed, no thorough 
                                                 
 





independent investigation on what was true and not true in Uzbekistan was made, and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 rendered any such investigation impossible. The 
sentencing of Rashidov’s head of government, N. Khudaiberdyev, to nine years in labor 
camp in September 1989 only added fuel to the general sentiment that whatever the flaws 
of Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s investigation the “Uzbeks were still guilty”.47    
Media attention in the West and the USSR for the remainder of 1989 and 1990 
focused almost uniformly on the Churbanov and Ligachev cases, the Estonian scientist, 
and the internal power struggles in the Kremlin, which Gdlyan and Ivanov had become a 
part of.48 Indicatively, at the Central Committee Plenum of September 1989, Prosecutor 
General Alexander Sukharev provided a long official report with several substantive 
examples and facts about Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s abuses, including those against 
Ligachev and Smirnov (the head of the CC party organization department).49 But except 
for Usmankhodzhaev’s false testimony against Ligachev not a single word uttered in this 
two-page rant of 6500 words from the plenum concerned the rehabilitation of the Uzbeks 
who were the primary targets of this campaign, and on whom also internal Politburo 
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discussions focused overwhelmingly.  Indeed, the misdeeds in Uzbekistan were at the 
center of Politburo and Supreme Soviet concerns, if only because these cases were of 
excellent help when discrediting the allegations levied at Politburo members in the 
center.    
Even Ligachev noted this paradox: “The matter concerned only me,” he 
altruistically remarked, “[and] meanwhile the smear campaign against honest people -- 
was going on throughout the city and countryside.”50 “The creation of the “myth of [the 
heroic investigators] drowned out the reports and complaints about the investigators’ 
unlawful methods, which only a few newspapers picked up,“ Ligachev continued, 
“Cheers drowned out the moans of the tortured in the investigators’ offices of 
Uzbekistan. The press even attacked the special commission created by the presidium of 
the USSR Supreme Soviet to investigate complaints from Uzbekistan”.51 No attempt was 
made in central media to enlighten the public on the mistreatment of Uzbeks, which in 
Ligachev’s words impeded an objective “calm” evaluation.52 That society as a whole had 
become completely subservient and dependent upon the state over seven centuries of 
Soviet rule did not help. Whatever populistic ideas that were propounded in state media 
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after the new freedoms of glasnost were, some have argued, uncritically believed. 53 Once 
these errors were detected it was difficult to reverse public opinion and Uzbekistan, in 
many ways, thus became the first major casualty of this liberalism.54 
Although the center shirked on publicizing alternative findings of the cotton 
scandal, then-First Secretary Islam Karimov sought restitution. “Having ensured the 
country’s cotton independence,” Karimov stated at the 28th CPSU Congress in 1990, “the 
republic became a laboratory of ‘cotton scandals’, repression, and mass lawlessness 
degrading to people’s national dignity”.55  In February 1991, Uzbekistan’s Supreme 
Court examined 241 cases related to the “cotton affair” and acquitted all of them; 1600 of 
the 2600 implicated in the scandal were subsequently rehabilitated and cleared of all 
accusations while 1.5 million rubles were dispensed in compensations.56 After 
independence the Uzbek leadership assigned the blame for the “cotton scandal” not on 
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Rashidov but the communist party which had given incentives for massive corruption.57 
Aside from this redress, Rashidov was portrayed as a hero who had outsmarted the 
Russians, defended the interests of Uzbekistan, and stood up to the welter of pressures 
emanating from the center. His rehabilitation in post-Soviet Uzbekistan should be seen in 
light of this. The restoration of Rashidov’s name was cautiously expressed already at the 
22nd Uzbek Communist Party Congress in 1990 which discussed Rashidov’s 
accomplishments and urged that his legacy should be judged from “from the period in 
which he lived and worked”.58 After independence, President Karimov took this 
rehabilitation a step further, calling Rashidov in one of his works from 1993 “a true son 
of the land and people (rodiny i naroda)”.59   
Karimov’s rehabilitation of Rashidov and the victims of the cotton scandal has 
been widely portrayed as merely an instrument to consolidate his own rule. That Karimov 
employed this segment of history for his own purposes is probable, which is why he 
labelled the transgressions of the cotton affair as degrading to people’s national dignity 
(see citation above). It was a means to generate a degree of centripetal force and 
nationalism at the time of independence and a response to the denunciations of the entire 
Uzbek people as “parasites”. Even so, the rehabilitations themselves were practically 
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ignored by scholars and journalists. Karimov’s intentions were the sole focus, not 
whether the rehabilitations were warranted as a readjustment of past errors. With the 
exception of an obscure book published in Tashkent, few probed the substance behind the 
accusations that had been hurled at Uzbekistan.60   
 “Clans” and Mythmaking  
The mythmaking of “clans” that ensued was a function of this neglect.  In early 
1988, Pravda’s Uzbekistan correspondent, G. Ovcharenko wrote a damning article on 
“bandits”, “mafia”, “criminals”, “organized crime”, and “modern day Emirs” in 
Uzbekistan.61 Later the same year such denunciations took on a new dimension when a 
series of articles appeared in Soviet and Western media on the theme of “clans” in 
Uzbekistan. Prior to this the “clan” concept had rarely, if ever, been employed for 
Uzbekistan’s elite politics. Thus, Ovcharenko did not mention anything of the sort in the 
article cited above even if most other conceivable negative epithets were used. That this 
concept emerged in 1988 is evident when doing a simultaneous search in the FBIS, 
Pravda, EastView, and Proquest databases. In each of these, which contains practically 
all major Soviet and U.S. newspapers and issues in the 20th century and are independent 
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from each other, the same search of “Clan” and “Uzbekistan” returns results only from 
1988 and on. From March to August articles on this topic appeared in Trud, 
Literaturnaya Gazeta, and Komsomolskaya Pravda.62  Later, within the scope of a few 
months in the fall of 1988, this concept was introduced in a New York Times article 
describing the existence of “criminal clans” in Uzbekistan.63 On August 30, Pravda’s G. 
Ovcharenko, the author of the “Cobra” article, portrayed Yuri Churbanov and Sharaf 
Rashidov as heading a “crime clan” (prestupleniya klan).64 Likewise, Steve Goldstein 
wrote in the Philadelphia Inquirer three months thereafter how: “Clans…relatives and 
friends all help one another to succeed”.65 These reports precipitated a flood of news 
articles thereafter describing the same phenomena in Uzbekistan.66  
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Demian Vaisman was correct in his observation in 1995 that publications on 
“clans have only recently become more frequent”.67 It was not until 1989 that Western 
scholars began referring to “clans”. Thus, Boris Rumer wrote in a book published in May 
1989 that the Soviet Union had reinforced the “clan” and made it stronger.68 Likewise it 
was argued in 1991 that “clan and tribal allegiances” were still strong in Uzbekistan.69 In 
1994, Olivier Roy introduced a related term, describing Uzbek political factions as 
groupe de solidarité (solidarity groups) which functioned as a “new ‘clan’”.70  The 
concept gained increasing currency thereafter, in media as well as scholarship. While 
some were cautious, others took the claims contained in Pravda’s reports at face value.71 
In other words, it was scholars who responded to this public/journalistic engagement 
about “clans” with the liveliest enthusiasm and not vice versa.   
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Critics will almost certainly object that I could impossibly safeguard against the 
use of these concepts in the thousands of local newspapers and obscure journals across 
the world. Such a reasoning would reveal more about the fears of the critic in question 
than the validity of this hypothesis. If earlier scholarship that pre-dates the articles of 
Soviet journalists hypothetically exists it would, presumably, have been cited in the 
literature. Yet the literature does not contain any references to works observing 
“regionalism” in Uzbekistan prior to Carlisle’s 1986 article and “clans” before Rumer’s 
1989 book.  
Some of these early analysts, including Critchlow, readily acknowledged that the 
data on “clans” and sub-national networks derived from Soviet central media and often 
added caveats on the use of this material. Thus, in an early influential article on Uzbek 
“clans” and subnational networks, James Critchlow noted: “Soviet media tend to be 
reticent about the specifics of vestigial and tribal or clan consciousness.”72 This was 
understandable since the clans pioneered by journalists were often not “real” clans but 
metaphors. For example, one Uzbek “clan member” identified by Pravda, Yuri 
Churbanov, was born and raised in Russia, i.e., half a continent away from the kinship 
network of which he ostensibly was a part. Another odd klan constellation consisted of 
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Brezhnev, Medunov, Rashidov, and Kunaev – the first two born in Russia and the two 
latter in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.73  In the same vein, Chernenko’s biographer in 1989 
noted that Brezhnev’s Moldavian and Dnepropretovsk “mafias” were animated by 
“principles of mafia psychology and tribal solidarity.”74 In many ways, klan functioned as 
a negative word for all sorts of phenomena Moscow did not like and was used as 
propaganda against its perceived enemies.75 The notion of klan was a synonym to the 
Soviet concept of “family group” only expressed in stronger terms. Perhaps sensing this 
connection, many scholars used the concept of “clans” in inverted commas at first but 
during the 1990s these gradually disappeared and what was once fictive groups, turned 
into real political factions.  
When following the labyrinthine citations of “secondary” sources in this field 
one almost inevitably hits a dead end, when no source is quoted, and where the original 
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claim often has been distorted along the way. For example, the source cited for Luong’s 
contention of overt regional favoritism occurring under Rashidov’s auspices is an early 
article by James Critchlow from 1991.76 Yet Critchlow made no such specific claim 
about Rashidov in the article and pages referred to (p. 137, 140) but he did suggest that 
“localism” and “subnational networks” were present in Uzbekistan.77 Critchlow, in turn, 
did not provide any source for his claim but referred to “denunciations by Moscow 
spokesmen”.78 In other words, Luong’s proposition about Rashidov traces to Soviet 
central media even if she, presumably, was unaware of this connection.  
Misinterpretations of the already biased claims of Usmankhodzhaev and the 
post-Rashidov leadership can also be detected. One example is an oft-quoted Uzbek 
Communist Party Plenum report in Pravda Vostoka from June 26, 1984. The report 
accuses the First Secretary of Bukhara obkom A. Karimov for having “promoted 
cadres…on the grounds of friendship or local favoritism”.79 When the same source in 
quoted in the scholarly literature, it is reported that Karimov was criticized for “deciding 
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personnel questions on the principle of common place of origin, kinship, and personal 
loyalty”.80 Mark well the difference since it strikes at the core of the distinction between 
“normal” Soviet patronage policy, in which friendship and local favoritism were 
common, and “clan” politics in which common place of origin and kinship are the 
defining factors.  
With time the regionalism hypothesis also came to encompass the citizenry at 
large and not only the elite.81 The argument was that a national identity had not yet 
consolidated in Uzbekistan and that region of origin was the primary identity among the 
populace. One may question whether this was more an assumption than a finding. 
Michael Kennedy’s extensive survey research on the strength of regional versus national 
identities in Ukraine, Estonia, and Uzbekistan conducted in 1997 produced the direct 
opposite result. He found that regional identities were critical variables in Ukraine and 
Estonia but less so in Uzbekistan. With the partial exception of the Karakalpaks, who are 
distinct since they have formed a nominally autonomous oblast since the early Soviet 
period, “Uzbeks and Tajiks…were quite unlikely to highlight regional issues”. Whereas 
citizens of Ukraine’s Lviv, Donetsk, and Kiev held grievances against other regions and 
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each other,  Kennedy’s research team was “frankly surprised…that regional identity was 
not particularly important” among the citizenry of Uzbekistan.82 This survey suggests that 
direct contact with the Uzbek people may generate alternative findings.   
That the clan/region hypothesis emerged in conjunction with the cotton scandal 
and Moscow’s drive to portray Uzbekistan as ruled by “mafias” and “clans” is evident 
though rarely, if ever, acknowledged by advocates of this hypothesis.  There has been 
little, if any, reflection on the circumstances under which this theory arose, nor has there 
been much problematization of the absence of primary sources in existing scholarship. In 
the course of the post-independence period, the clan/region hypothesis was gradually 
amplified; each successive publication made more far-reaching claims about the 
relevance of this theory than the preceding one yet without basing them on new evidence. 
But if the initial premises are wrong, then the conclusions are bound to be wrong. And if 
the premises derive from Soviet propaganda, it is worthwhile to remain open to 
alternative hypotheses.  
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Facing the Reality: Islam Karimov Attacks the Problem at Its Core  
Gorbachev’s legacy defined Karimov’s challenges after independence. It is true 
that Karimov after 1991 was constrained by powerbrokers and that these in part had 
regional bases. Rising under Gorbachev’s patronage, Timur Alimov, Shukrullo 
Mirzaidov, and Ismail Jurabekov exerted considerable influence long after Gorbachev 
threw in the towel. While Mirzaidov was neutralized shortly after independence, Alimov 
and Jurabekov tied President Karimov’s hands in many areas up to the mid-2000s, not 
least in democratic and economic reform. The powers of these figures were not subtle: 
Alimov and Mirzaidov controlled vast networks of clients in the Tashkent region where 
they had served uninterrupted for 20 years, and governors from oblasts down to the 
village level in agricultural areas were firmly under Jurabekov’s thumb.83  
For nearly 20 years Ismail Jurabekov presided over this sphere, serving as 
Chairman of Gosagroprom from 1985-1990, first deputy chairman of the Council of 
Ministers during the same period, first deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture 
1994-1998, and then State Advisor to the President on Agriculture from 2000 to March 
2004. That Uzbekistan’s state apparatus was dominated by figures from Tashkent and 
                                                 
 





Samarkand up to the early 2000s traces to this perestroika era legacy.  Not unlike the 
“compromise solution” in the Politburo that brought Brezhnev to power and then 
curtailed his room for maneuver, Karimov’s powers were circumscribed by those that had 
placed him in power.84  
These power-brokers and others looked with wariness toward reform and 
privatization because this would cut directly into their profits. Thus, ADB concludes: “As 
Uzbekistan has a centralized distribution system of resources, some government officials 
have their prestige and power base directly linked to their control of the resource 
distribution system. These officials and their corresponding institutions do not support 
reform because then there would be private suppliers and competition, while at present 
they enjoy a virtual monopoly.”85  
Karimov subtly hinted to the powers wielded by these individuals in his book 
On the Threshold of Independence, in which he speaks about the power of “clans”. This 
book was influential since the “second wave” of scholarly writing on clans around the 
turn of the millennium emerged shortly after its publication in 1997. But if Karimov 
speaks about “clans” is not this evidence of “clans”? Clearly, few voices in this debate 
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should be regarded as more authoritative than Karimov’s -- he has been at the center of 
Uzbekistan’s politicking longer than Rashidov himself. At the same time, it is worth 
asking whether Karimov’s reference to “clans” was his own terminology or if he was 
trying to speak in terms intelligible to Westerners.  Karimov’s point was conceivably to 
highlight the constraints he was facing, that authoritarian rule was a precondition for 
surmounting them, and that Western diplomats should recognize this.  
If Karimov’s policies are a guide, his approach was to attack the region-based 
power-brokers and regionalism inherited from the Gorbachev era by striking the problem 
at its core. No longer a prisoner of Soviet politics, Karimov silently mounted a campaign 
to suffocate regionalism through a reversal of the Soviet era career pattern. Though no 
purely organizational measure could fragment the Soviet system alone, he nonetheless 
sought to demolish regionally defined patronage networks by barring former governors of 
provinces from the national stage. Among the hokimlar (governors) serving from 1991 
down to today, only one has ever played a major role in national affairs after serving as 
hokim and that is the current Prime Minister, Shavkat Mirziyaev, hokim of Samarkand 
from 2001-2003 (see Table 9, Appendix C). The reverse direction is more frequent: a few 
hokimlar previously served as ministers prior to their appointments as heads of provinces. 
There is a degree of interaction between cabinet and provincial structures but this mostly 





level.86 The national political structures are designed to prevent regionalism and the 
politicking associated with it from infiltrating national structures.   
If indigenous “clans”, not the Soviet era vertical career pattern and its associated 
patronage, was the source of regionalism then why would Karimov attack the problem 
from this end? This disassociation between the republic- and the regional level would 
presumably be an ineffective measure against identity-bound clans since these “exist” 
regardless of paths to power and their associated patronage. And still one of the first 
measures Karimov took was to attack this source of Soviet regionalism, which existed in 
the entire Soviet Union.   
A precondition for this policy was to rein in the powers of regional governors 
and assure that Tashkent had a hand in everything. Thus, in January 1992 a State Control 
Committee was established under the Presidential apparatus, placing the supervision over 
the implication of laws and decrees under central rather than regional control. Satellite 
offices were subsequently established in each viloyat, the autonomous republic of 
Karakalpakstan, and the capital city Tashkent to evaluate and assess the performance of 
regional administrations. Among other new means of control, the President and central 
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authorities made it a matter of priority to build links with the local level and thereby 
circumvent the regional hokimyats.  For example, a resolution adopted in 1997 urged the 
shifting of “industrial control” to the cities and rayons rather than the provinces.87 
Likewise, in 1999 the Cabinet Resolution “On measures to strengthen control over 
budgetary discipline” curtailed spending in the regions and imposed a stricter control 
over regional and local budgets.88 The most important precondition, however, was to 
have regional governors appointed rather than elected and constantly keep them on their 
heels. This was a long step back from democratization of the political system but the 
policy was understandable. Karimov feared that the election of governors would not only 
empower them but stir up something approximating “states within a state”, analogous to 
what happened in Yeltsin’s Russia.89  
The risk of this happening in Uzbekistan was particularly pronounced due to the 
prevailing poverty. It is to governors and mayors that local businesses, families, and 
individual inhabitants turn for preferential treatment and support. Conversely, governors 
and mayors pressure local state-owned firms to partially finance the low salaries of their 
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civil servants. The result is a web of mutual dependence, patronage, and de facto control 
by governors over segments of the economy.90 Empowering the provincial governors 
would not only have revealed Karimov’s feebleness to this politicking but governors 
would have aspired for key national offices, including the presidency. Regionalism would 
have been reinforced and threatened not only Karimov’s powers but also state stability as 
happened in Kyrgyzstan. It should not come as a surprise that Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who 
deposed ruling President Askar Akayev in the 2005 Tulip Revolution, came from long 
service in the Jalalabad oblast since independence, as head of it from 1995 and on, and 
then filling the equivalent position in Chui oblast prior to becoming Prime Minister in 
2000.   
Though Karimov inherited a dominance of figures from Tashkent and 
Samarkand, owing to the sway of Alimov and Jurabekov, such “regionalism” withered 
with their demise in the early 2000s and final removal in 2004. Between 2002 and 2006, 
the predominance of these two regions in government became increasingly diluted.91 
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Thus the cabinet of February 2005 was composed of ministers whose origins were all 
over the country: Syr Darya, Tashkent, Surkhandarya, Jizak, Namangan, Ferghana, 
Samarkand, and elsewhere. Only one, significantly, was born in Karimov’s native 
Samarkand. This was a vital first step in consolidating the Uzbek nation-state and 
preventing its capture by regional interests.  
The removal of Alimov and Jurabekov had not only a salutary effect in placating 
regionalism but also, to a lesser extent, sped up reforms.  For example, the Welfare 
Improvement Strategy Paper of the GOU adopted in 2005 acknowledges that reforms in 
the agricultural sector were slow prior to 2003.92 From that point on, however, reforms 
took off which is why the ADB concludes that: “there has been genuine, if uneven, 
progress in the past 3-4 years [up to 2008] in formulating and implementing agricultural 
policy reforms and institutional change”.93  
Though still utterly incomplete in the sphere of political and economic reform, 
Karimov’s pre-emptive action against regionalism has been successful. This policy 
prevented, though never insured, that new strong regionally rooted power brokers would 
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emerge after Alimov and Jurabekov. It is true that Jurabekov was succeeded by a new 
group of younger men, among the most prominent of whom were Gafur Rakhimov and 
Abduarif Sodyq. But they differed from Jurabekov in one critical respect. “Neither is 
perceived,” Frederick Starr states, “as having a strong regional base within the country 
and both for the time being have been content to distance themselves from matters of 
government.”94 Had Karimov preserved the Soviet tradition, a new set of regional power 
brokers would merely have replaced Alimov and Jurabekov, exercising equal control 
over territory as well as regional sectors of the economy.  
The Soviet legacy Karimov inherited goes some way towards explaining his 
gradualism, caution, and centralization of powers. But this is not the whole story since 
Karimov looked to the past for working models of governance. Rashidov’s footprint in 
post-independence Uzbekistan is larger than Karimov’s rehabilitation of the disgraced 
First Secretary.  
First, Karimov’s centralization of powers from the oblasts to Tashkent and the 
routing of governors “downstream” from the capital to the oblasts have perhaps been 
inspired by Rashidov’s center-region equation. Rashidov could never be as bold as to bar 
obkom First Secretaries completely from national offices, but the end of Soviet rule 
opened such opportunities for Karimov. No different from the Rashidov era, Karimov 
                                                 
 





reined in the powers of governors, curtailed most intermediary powers between the 
national and local levels, and centralized power to effect it.  
Second, Karimov has worked to absorb all corners of the republic into 
government. The Prosecutor General is from Ferghana, the intelligence head is a native 
of Surkhandarya, the Minister of Foreign Affairs hails from Tashkent, and the Chairman 
of the Senate comes from Khorezm. This is a conscious effort of nation-building and 
exhibits a similar spirit as Rashidov’s policy in this realm.  
Third, the two longest serving First Secretaries during the Soviet era, Rashidov 
and Yusupov, paired concentration of powers with the promotion of national symbols and 
Uzbek national identity. Amir Timur’s place in Uzbek society today owes to Yusupov’s 
and Rashidov’s advancement of the same. Karimov’s predecessors had to pursue this 
gradually within the parameters of the permissible but such constraints did not act upon 
Karimov. Absent democratic processes, Karimov reached out to the population directly 
and employed national symbols and nationalism for these purposes. If Rashidov and 
Yusupov were “worshipped by the entire people” as has been claimed, is it any wonder 
that Karimov after independence followed in their footsteps? Karimov turned to the 
model of government that had worked best historically and adapted it to the new 
circumstances after independence.  
Fourth, the deft Soviet politician concentrated powers in his hands to the extent 
that he could and exercised them in the first instance since this was a sine qua non to 





and Yusupov to stay in power and pursue Uzbek interests, whether Yusupov’s Great 
Ferghana canal or Rashidov’s push for investments into industry. Then as now, Karimov 
has viewed concentration of powers as a precondition for nation-building, even if his 
gradualism at times has appeared extremely unhurried.  
Conclusion 
The corruption that was unearthed in Uzbekistan in course of the cotton affair 
was in all likelihood, as portrayed by Moscow, the top of an iceberg of a much deeper 
problem encompassing the whole of Uzbek and Soviet society at large.  Likewise, 
Davydov, Khadkimuradov, Khikmotov, Osetrov, Gaipov, Mirzaev, Kamalov, and all the 
others falsely accused in course of the investigation were presumably the top of the 
iceberg of the 2600 officials who were excluded from the party, removed, or arrested on 
fabricated evidence. Uzbekistan’s “cotton affair” and Moscow’s “cotton affair” were 
manifestations of two of the darker sides of the Soviet polity. Corruption was endemic 
throughout the Soviet Union, as detailed in each of the chapters of this dissertation, and 
the “food chain” of Soviet politics entailed that enemies or the friends of one’s enemies 
were ruthlessly destroyed. Frictions and contradictions of the Soviet system snowballed 
over a century were unleashed with the “cotton affair”. Had this brewing central-regional 
conflict erupted on someone else’s watch but Andropov’s, who together with the 





corruption allegations facing Uzbekistan might well have been hurled at some other non-
Muslim republic.  
It was in this soil that the theory of “clans” and “regionalism” emerged in the 
1980s.  The scholarly literature on “clans” and regionalism is so entangled with the 
turmoil of the 1980s and its mass of falsified information and propaganda that it is 
difficult to separate myths from reality in it.  Perhaps the greatest paradox is that this 
theory of “clans” gained traction among Western analysts in the specific year of 1989. 
This was at the exact same moment that Gorbachev and parliamentary deputies began 
questioning much of the evidence that was the embryo of the hypothesis. It was also at a 
time when glasnost and the opening of the regime seemed to allow more rigorous 
research by outside scholars than ever before.  
Gorbachev’s anti-corruption policy was in part a blind reaction to an intractable 
problem and it was to be expected that corruption and the selection of personnel on the 
basis of friendship persisted. The flaw was that it worked at cross purposes with 
Gorbachev’s democratization drive. While he may have crushed the power bases of 
several provincial secretaries by transferring them across the republic, he left a few en 
poste, enabling them to maintain their networks intact and thereby concentrating powers 
in the hands of these individuals.  The Soviet Union was disintegrating, the Central Asian 
republics were nationalizing, but instead of acknowledging how Soviet policies 
inadvertently had produced this potentially explosive situation, Gorbachev blamed 





mythmaking. Soviet authorities were in part responsible for this but Soviet media, using 
the newfound freedoms of Perestroika, did more than any other in spreading the myth 
that the Central Asian republics were ruled by “clans” and “mafias”. Moscow’s 
misreading and mythmaking were eventually adopted uncritically by Western scholars 
who, while addressing Moscow’s misreading of nationality conflicts, further sustained 
the myth that indigenous “clans” defined politics in Central Asia. Inadvertently, these 
analysts have to varying degrees become spokesmen of the political agenda propounded 
by the anti-corruption investigation and its falsified evidence. 
Karimov’s policies in the post-Soviet period, however, have been guided less by 
myths than finding solutions to practical problems. Among these were how to defeat the 
powerbrokers rooted in Tashkent and Samarkand whose interests lay with preserving the 
essentials of the Soviet system. Only by 2003-2004 had the most influential of these been 
defeated. Their demise precipitated a new government of much more mixed origins than 
Alimov’s and Jurabekov’s protégés from Tashkent and Samarkand. This only proved 
what Karimov silently had been engaged in since the early 1990s, which was to prevent 
officials rooted in the provinces (especially governors) from entering the national stage 





8. Myth and Reality: A Conclusion  
Several conclusions can be drawn from this survey of politics and patronage in 
Soviet Uzbekistan. To start with, it is clear that contemporary scholarly assessments and 
archival evidence are discordant. This suggests either that scholars are wrong or that 
Soviet perceptions of localism and “clans” in Uzbekistan were erroneous and that the 
former have uncovered a reality that eluded Soviet control organs. On the basis of 
available evidence, the conclusion points to the first. There are good reasons to believe 
that the notion of regional elite “clans” and particularly strong regional elite identities is a 
myth. Like most myths, this finding is not based on primary sources but the accumulation 
and gradual amplification of initially unsupported claims. Most roads in this literature 
lead back to Carlisle’s pioneering article or the early writings on “clans” around 1991-
1992 through a maze of citations of other secondary sources. A research field in which 
primary sources remain unexplored could progress in few other ways.  
The arguments of Carlisle, Critchlow, and other path-breaking authors were to 
be expected. They wrote at a time when the Soviet archives had not yet opened and when 
scholars were confined to the sources of Soviet central media, other publicly available 
publications, testimony of émigrés, and limited field research in the era of glasnost. That 





“Regionalism” and subsequently “clans” flew from the Soviet portrayal of events in 
Soviet Uzbekistan. That is why earlier scholars of Soviet Uzbekistan did not recognize 
this ex post facto assessment, but it struck a responsive chord among post-Soviet 
scholars. When archives opened after the collapse of the USSR, scholars on “clans” or 
regionalism in Soviet Uzbekistan did not take advantage of them but instead tended to 
rely on the earlier post-1985/pre-1992 writings. Along the way, the initial claims of the 
pioneering writers have been distorted and their caveats have vanished.   
That few, if any, of the major works on clans and regions have related 
regionalism in Uzbekistan to the trend of regionalism and territorialized factions 
elsewhere in the Soviet Union is noteworthy. If the thesis of indigenous “clans” and 
strong regional identities rooted in Central Asia’s past hypothetically is correct, then this 
must somehow be separated from the regional factions elsewhere in the USSR. A link 
must be established between region and individuals and that several identifiable 
characteristics were unique to Central Asia, e.g., the existence of a core “kin group” in 
clans, marriage as a method of strengthening clan power, and that region of origin was an 
important criterion in appointments. Such data cannot be obtained from circumstantial 
evidence of “rooted” First Secretaries or biographical source material but need written 
correspondence, assessments of party violations, or testimony of participants. This 
problem has not been attacked because there are few ways of resolving it absent the 





scholars, Central Asia analysts have instead claimed a unique Central Asian 
“regionalism” derived from its culture.  
The ultimate source of this myth of strong regionalism and clans traces to the 
“cotton affair”. A retrospective reading of the literature confirms that it evolved with it. 
The concept of regionalism was adopted shortly after the Uzbek Party Congress in 1984 
and the notion of “clans” was incorporated from 1989 and on after similar observations 
had been made among Soviet journalists starting in mid-1988. That the stimulus of this 
field was Soviet propaganda would have been a problem in any event. Yet that it traces to 
the “cotton affair” further compounds it since many of the claims were fabricated as the 
Politburo’s self-introspection revealed in 1989. Usmankhodzhaev had implicated “honest 
people”, engaged in defamation of the Rashidov leadership on the orders of the anti-
corruption investigators, and exploited media for these purposes. True to form, much of 
what surfaced in the media during these years came from these false accusations. 
“Moscow’s denunciations” cited by scholars as evidence of “clans” around 1991 came 
straight from this campaign. Eventually, this blossomed into the field of Uzbek “clans” 
and regionalism.  
If there is a silver thread that runs through the archival material, media, and 
party plenum reports down to the “cotton affair” it is the near absence of zemlyachestvo 
or mestnichestvo as sources of concern in Uzbekistan. The Bolsheviks did not formulate a 
“tribal policy” or anything similar based on region for early Soviet Uzbekistan and 





between Uzbeks and Russians. In the Khrushchev period the Party Control Commission 
identified a number of other problems but neither in Soviet central media nor in 
confidential correspondence were the Uzbek elite exposed to similar criticism of 
zemlyachestvo as their Tajik counterparts.  
A rare exception to this rule is the campaign mounted against Rashidov at the 
1964 Tashkent obkom Party Congress when he stood accused of favoritism. However, 
none of the figures involved were “relatives” of Rashidov as has been claimed in the 
literature. Rashidov was only superficially acquainted with Azimov and Khudaiberdyev 
and his brother Sahib had been chosen deputy Prosecutor General before Rashidov had 
been nominated to the Central Committee empowered, formally at least, to shape this 
process. The 1982 “scoresheet” of the Party Control Commission did not pinpoint 
localism as a problem in Rashidov’s Uzbekistan even if it was observed elsewhere in the 
USSR. Nor did the Party Control Commission’s specific file on mestnichestvo in the 
Soviet Union mention Uzbekistan even if such practices were exposed in Chelyabinsk, 
Moscow, Krasnodarsk, Azerbaijan and other places.  
Another method to reach this conclusion is simply to read the literature on 
“clans” and regions. If “localism” was a constant concern in Uzbekistan throughout the 





Critchlow among others,1 then why are they not citing any media or plenum reports that 
would vindicate these claims? Or have scholars making this observation refrained from 
citing such material even if it would strengthen their hypotheses? The reality is that it was 
not a major concern, neither publicly nor confidentially.  
If the thesis of “clans” and strong regionalism in Uzbekistan is a myth what, 
then, was the reality in summarized form? Taken as a whole, the forms of party violations 
canvassed by the Party Control Commission in Uzbekistan over this long stretch of time 
were scarcely unique: Foot-dragging on policy implementation, nepotism at lower levels, 
embezzlement, theft, concentration of powers, misuse of state funds, low number of 
figures with worker backgrounds in governing positions, failure of plan fulfilment, 
wrecking and sabotage under Stalin, a permissive approach to national/religious 
sentiment, failure to include local nationalities, “groupism”, corruption, violation of plan 
discipline, speculation, flamboyant lifestyles, and embezzlement. All of these were to 
varying extents observable in the Western parts of the empire as well, as Fainsod’s study 
of the Smolensk archive elaborates in greater detail. Tendencies of “groupism” in the 
Khrushchev era also entered at a point in time when “interest groups” were pinpointed 
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throughout the USSR. The only “special concerns” in Central Asia appear to have been a 
“feudal attitude towards women” and perhaps the “high turnover of cadres”.   Stated 
succinctly, party violations and patronage did not deviate much from that observed in the 
other corners of the empire.  
Moscow imposed a common mold across the USSR, but what made Uzbekistan 
distinct was the high elite mobility laterally and vertically which eroded the 
terrorialization of patronage networks seen elsewhere. Though my data were limited to 
the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, obkom First Secretaries had generally served in 
three or more oblasts during their careers, only a small minority were natives of the 
oblasts in question, the vast majority came from another oblast immediately prior to 
appointment, and only a few percent remained in the oblast after their stint. That a 
majority served across Uzbekistan’s “historical divide” of Samarkand/Bukhara and 
Tashkent/Ferghana Valley cemented relations between these two territories which, 
perhaps, was a conscious policy. Noteworthy is that this was particularly pronounced 
under Rashidov who also was empowered to shape this policy. A similarly high elite 
mobility was seen among those inhabiting leading republic-level offices. This is intuitive 
since practically all but Rashidov had previously served as obkom First Secretaries. With 
the exception of Nurutdinov whose career was confined to Tashkent, practically all other 
prominent officials had served in several oblasts and often outside of their home 





zemlyachestvo was a lesser concern in Uzbekistan than in many other Soviet republics, at 
least on higher levels in the state and party hierarchy.  
Inevitably, this mobile elite formed new loyalties in diverse places. That 
“protection pacts” tended to be composed of individuals of diverse origins suggest the 
relevance of career-based ties. Ranging from the pacts of the 1930s, the Yusupov-
Mavlyanov-Mirza Akhmedov pact in the 1940s, to the Rashidov pact in the 1970s, the 
common denominator among them was the disparate origins of their members. Baltabaev 
and Tyuerabekov, hailing from Ferghana Valley and Khodjent (Tajikistan), were figures 
that Ikramov had encountered in Tashkent. Yusupov’s main allies were natives of 
southern Kazakhstan but they had all served together in the Tashkent obkom or gorkom. 
Likewise, because Rashidov was not “rooted” in a particular oblast and had not served as 
obkom First Secretary, his closest allies came from all over the republic. That the 
Ferghana Party Control Commission in early Soviet Uzbekistan identified a mutual 
protection pact composed of three individuals from Tashkent, Ferghana, and Samarkand 
further attests to the marginal relevance of place of origin.  
What could have bound all these officials to one another but loyalties and 
common perspectives and interests formed in the course of their careers? The individuals 
that came to Rashidov’s defense in 1964 came from Namangan, Kashkadarya, and 
several from Tashkent and all referred to career-based encounters with the First 
Secretary. Similar reflections among the Bureau members who elected Rashidov in 1959 





Other factors beyond high elite mobility accounted for the heterogenous 
protection pacts. First, the size of the republic and the comparatively large number of 
oblasts entailed that officials seldom served only in one region, in contrast to Tajikistan. 
This is conceivably why regionalism tended to be most visible in the smaller republics 
e.g. Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The principle behind loyalties may not 
necessarily have been different than in Uzbekistan only that the concentration of power to 
a single region generated hegemonies which were more palpable. That Karimov moved 
quickly upon independence to close the lid between oblasts and the republican-level 
attests to a felt need that regionalism was a function of the Soviet career pattern rather 
than indigenous “clans”.     
Second, the settled lifestyle of Uzbekistan’s territories favored elite ties which 
were not place-based. Catapulted into leadership positions after the delimitation, the new 
national elite had vested interests in the preservation of the new republic and were not 
bound by similar tribal solidarities as defined their Turkmen counterparts. Their loyalties 
were not primarily in their home regions but with the Communist Party and Stalin’s 
national idea, if not for any other reason than for the privileges bestowed upon them. On 
repeated occasions Stalin sided with the indigenes, empowered them at the expense of the 
Second Secretaries, and shrewdly exploited the tactic of de-Russification. Roger Kangas 
thorough-going account on this formative period shows that the Uzbek elite rallied 
around the new concept of the Uzbek nation. The centrifugal forces of particularistic 





Uzbekistan because the social structures of the settled and nomadic areas were very 
different and because the Bolsheviks’ shared preconceptions about this important 
distinction. Evidence that zemlyachestvo was a “dominant principle in recruitment”, as 
has been argued, is equally sparse.   
Third, national solidarities among Uzbekistan’s elite were triggered by the 
center’s omnipresence. Uzbeks in the Central Committee Bureau cooperated and 
colluded against their Russian/Ukrainian counterparts with Stalin’s tacit approval; the 
center’s tightening of cadre policy and control over Uzbekistan’s nomenklatura was 
sometimes subverted, as evident in the Gorbachev era; and Rashidov deftly killed 
Khrushchev’s proposal to eliminate the Tashkent gorkom. What defined Rashidov’s rule 
was a national orientation and an attempt to break Soviet regionalism to the extent that 
circumstances allowed: he assured an interchange of personnel between the republic-level 
and the oblasts, uprooted obkom First Secretaries, concentrated power to the capital from 
the oblasts to achieve this, incorporated the marginalized areas of Uzbekistan into 
government, and promoted Uzbek national culture. It should not come as a surprise that 
contemporaneous scholars in the late 1970s considered Uzbekistan the most consolidated 
and nationalistic of the Central Asian republics.  Importantly, however, this rarely 
aroused hatred towards Russians as in the Baltics. In spite of the degrading treatment 
during the cotton scandal, 95% of Uzbeks in March 1991 still voted in favor of 





Luong’s “regionalism” hypothesis is correct in that Soviet rule empowered 
certain oblasts. This fettered Uzbekistan’s politics and confined it to two or three 
predominant regions. This held particularly true in the Stalin period when regions were 
judged according to their perceived loyalties. The Kokand elite was destroyed early on 
and the Bukharans were bought off, which initially ensured the latter a prominent role in 
the new republic next to Tashkent. The domination of Tashkent and Ferghana in the post-
purge period owed in part to that the Bukharans were undermined, the status of Ferghana 
was raised with the expanding cotton production centered on Ferghana Valley, and 
Yusupov enjoyed Stalin’s trust. The robustness of this cadre hierarchy was clearly 
evident when Stalin executed the first generation of leaders from Tashkent and Ferghana 
and a new set of leaders from the same origins were installed in their place. This 
Tashkent-Ferghana linkup lasted until the late 1950s when Samarkand was upgraded to 
“second in importance” among Uzbekistan’s eight oblasts. True to form, Samarkand 
crept back with Rashidov’s rise to power. Noteworthy is that when cadre policy was most 
decentralized under Brezhnev, the hegemony of figures from Tashkent and Ferghana in 
Uzbekistan’s Central Committee Bureau fragmented. Members and candidates admitted 
to Rashidov’s Bureau at the zenith of his powers in 1976 had the most disparate origins in 
Soviet Uzbekistan’s history. The “regionalism” that did exist in Uzbekistan had external 
origins, was not indigenous to Uzbek society, and this was most persuasively 





On the other hand, this imposed regionalism never translated into “strong 
regional elite identities” for the sole reason that this, as Luong correctly argues, 
necessitates “rooted” Uzbek officials. Yet the Uzbek obkom First Secretaries were rarely 
rooted. Luong’s use of the category “previous position in the same oblast” obscures this 
fact since Uzbek obkom First Secretaries were transferred back to oblasts in which they 
had previously served. It was the “unrootedness” of Uzbek obkom First Secretaries which 
led many to have held a “previous position in the same oblast”. That this misleading 
category has been used and not the one ordinarily used by scholars of Soviet regionalism, 
i.e., “position in oblast immediately prior to appointment”, is perhaps an indicator to the 
troubles scholars have had in pinning down evidence for Uzbek “regionalism”.   
Olivier Roy’s thesis of “solidarity networks” may be relevant if conceived on a 
non-regional basis but this is not what he argued. He argued that these “always were 
regional”, a function not of Soviet policy but Central Asian culture and that this gave 
solidarity groups a “territorial basis” that their Russian counterparts were lacking. Like 
other analysts he appears to have neglected the development towards regionalism 
elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Territorial factions bound by bonds of solidarity defined 
the entire Soviet polity from the Politburo and down under Khrushchev and Brezhnev 
and to a lesser extent before and after. What Roy and others derived from Central Asian 
culture had Soviet origins.  If they had recognized the identical phenomenon of 
regionalism elsewhere they would presumably have explained how the Central Asian 





In the final analysis, evidence is thin that Uzbekistan’s factionalism added up to 
“clans” or strong regionalism. The limited evidence that can be mustered in favor of the 
“clan” hypothesis is the bombast and bluster of Usmankhodzhaev and central media. Yet 
such data should be approached with skepticism for the same reasons that the alleged 
presence of “harems” among the Tajik elite should be. The discrediting of predecessors 
often involved a battery of accusations and it is the task of the analyst to single out which 
ones that have a basis in reality. Yet analysts took most, if not all, of the Soviet 
denunciations of Rashidov at face value. With the passage of time, the original Soviet 
sources of such information were “cleansed” in the scholarly literature and myths became 
reality.  
Having said that, the conclusions reached in this dissertation must still be treated 
as provisional. If or when the still classified archives of the Brezhnev era are made 
available, evidence may surface that challenges the hypotheses advanced herein just as 
those about the other Soviet republics may need to be revised. It cannot be ruled out 
completely that kinship was of particular importance in the politics of Soviet Uzbekistan, 
even if most indicators and existing evidence do not point in this direction. To confirm 
this hypothesis analysts must find clear-cut evidence that kinship-related bonds were a 
particular concern in Soviet Uzbekistan. The Party Control Commission’s records among 
other resources were examined by this author but other agencies may have documented it.  
This dissertation has established that the reigning theory is questionable and that 





patronage. Archival evidence, journalistic material, and plenum reports attest to that 
patronage in Soviet Uzbekistan approximated that conducted in the non-Muslim areas of 
the USSR, deviated only in marginal respects from it, and that existing assumptions are 
based more on myths than reality. I see few reasons why the heterogenous groups that 
formed among the Uzbek elite at the obkom- and republic-level in Soviet Uzbekistan 
should be considered distinct from the Soviet “family groups” elsewhere. The “cotton 
affair” was a product of the Soviet system and the “family groups” and conflicting 
interests which composed it. Determined to assert Central Asia’s uniqueness, many post-
Soviet Central Asia analysts instead took Moscow’s claims at face value, ignored the 
contradictory evidence that Moscow itself provided later on, and built a theory that with 
few exceptions are based on citations of each other.  
The Implications  
Extant scholarship in political science has treated the Soviet legacy of 
regionalism as essentially similar across the Central Asian republics. Several hypotheses 
have been derived from this observation: Kathleen Collins, for instance, argues that the 
absence or presence of pacts between regional “clans” determined the different 
trajectories of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan after independence. In this 
interpretation, the absence of a pact in Tajikistan accounted for the civil war which ripped 





stability.2 Luong, in turn, makes a similar argument about the similarities of regionalism 
in Soviet Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan and how different perceptions of the 
shifting relative power between “the center” and “regional leaders” after independence 
accounted for the absence or presence of pluralism.3 Key to both of these accounts is that 
a Soviet legacy of strong regionalism and regional identities defined the republics in 
question. 
The findings of this dissertation challenge this core assumption, at least as 
regards Uzbekistan. The differences in the extent of localism and regionalism between 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were profound. Whether speaking of the extent of elite 
mobility, zemlyachestvo, and cohesiveness of regional elite groups, which all are related, 
they differ widely on each of these parameters. In Uzbekistan lateral and vertical elite 
mobility was very high, zemlyachestvo was of marginal concern, and mutual protection 
pacts tended to be composed of figures from diverse origins. In Tajikistan, in contrast, the 
Leninabad elite rarely went beyond their home province, zemlyachestvo was a concern 
throughout the Soviet period, and the clique that formed in this province was hegemonic 
for 50 years up until 1991.  
                                                 
 
2 Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006).  
3 Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, 





While several factors and circumstances inevitably were at work in causing 
Tajikistan’s civil war, this concentration of power to one region certainly did not help as 
the subdued non-Leninabad elite reasserted themselves with a vengeance after 
independence.4 While the Leninabad and Kulyab elite groups initially stood on the same 
side in fighting the opposition, they splintered from 1993 and on as the subdued Kulyab 
elite outmaneuvered the Leninabadis. That a similar region-based conflict did not evolve 
in Uzbekistan was to some degree to be expected since the elite had intermingled for 
almost 70 years and often traversed half of the republic’s oblasts in the course of their 
careers. The factions in Uzbekistan were not territorialized and the individuals 
comprising them were tied to each other in webs of relationships. 
 A civil war erupting on that basis is less likely since the factors of identity or 
territory were not in play. The primary interest of the power brokers Uzbekistan inherited 
from the Soviet era was to retain the privileges of the Soviet period. President Karimov 
heeded these concerns. There existed no omnipotent regional elite defined by identity and 
territory that had completely sidelined other regional elites as in Tajikistan. Karimov also 
proved himself adept in suppressing dissent, which was not all surprising since the 
heterogenous opposition in Tajikistan was a trigger of the civil war as they sought to 
                                                 
 
4 For a brief account of the Tajik civil war and its multiple causes, see Muriel Atkin, “Tajikistan’s Civil 





displace the old Soviet elite. What was at stake for the non-Leninabadi elite in Tajikistan 
was whether they were to continue to be excluded from the privileges of office and power 
as the Soviet empire crumbled. The ruling Uzbek elite were content with the status quo as 
long as Karimov did not embark on economic or political reform.  
In other words, the degree of territorialization of elite factions explains, in part, 
the different trajectories of these republics. It helped maintain stability in Uzbekistan and 
a bloodless transition but at the cost of a perpetuation of the Soviet system. In Tajikistan 
it sustained and partially caused the civil war and, later, would lead to a preservation of 
some of the essentials of the Soviet system here as well as the neo-Soviet Kulyab elite 







Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI)  
Fund 17 Central Committee of the KPSS, 1903-1991 
Fund 76 Feliks Dzerzhinskij, 1877-1926 
Fund 82 Vyacheslav Molotov, 1890-1986 
Fund 327 n.a.  
Fund 558 Josef Stalin, 1878-1953 
Fund 589 Party Control Commission Under the Central Committee of the 
KPSS, 1952-1991 
 
Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) 
Fund 5 The Central Committee of the KPSS, 1935-1991 
Fund 6 Party Control Commission Under the Central Committee of the 
KPSS, 1935-1991  







Other archival sources used:  
Alexander Yakovlev Archives; 
Library of Congress Archival Section; 
 The State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF); 
The Central Archive of FSB, Russia (TsA FSB Rossii);  
Cabinet of Britain Papers – Political Intelligence Department.  
 
The following books published by the Party Control Committee of the KPSS have also 
informed this dissertation.  
Partijnyj Kontrol’ Deyatelnosti Administratsii (Moskva, 1983); 
Spravochnik Partijnogo Rabotnika (Moskva, 1983); 
V.M. Lyukov et. al., Partijnyj Kontrol’: Printsipy, Praktika, Zadachi (Moskva: Polizdat, 
1983); 
Organizatsionnaya Rabota v Organakh Narodnogo Kontrolya SSSR (Moskva: 
Ekonomika, 1982).  
Memoirs and Biographies 
Leon Aron, Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 
The Diaries of A. Chernaev, Sovetskaya Politika 1992-1991, Unpublished.   





Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993).  
B. Reskov and G. Sedob, Usman Yusupov (Toshkent: BAE, 1976).  
Encyclopedias  
Great Soviet Encyclopedia Tadzhikskaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya 
Kazak Sovet Entsiklopediyasy Uzbek Sovet Entsiklopediyasi 
Kyrgyz Sovet Entsiklopediyasy Handbook of Central Asia 
O’zbekistan Milliy Entsiklopediyasi Bol’shaya Rossijskaya Entsiklopediya 
Sovetskij Enstiklopedicheskij Slovar’ Handbook of Central Asia 
Newspapers  
Pravda Pravda Ukrainy 
Izvestija Current Digest of the Soviet Press 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda Pravda Ukrainy 
Literaturnaya Gazeta Posev 
Pravda Vostoka Partiynaya Zhizn 
Seattle Times Edmonton Journal 
New York Times Christian Science Monitor 





Sovetskaya Rossii The Baltimore Sun 
Vancouver Sun Chicago Tribune 
Washington Post Wall Street Journal 
Books and Articles  
Abashin, S.N. Natsionalizmy v Srednej Azii: v Poiskakh Identichnosti (St. Petersburg, 
2007). 
Abashin, S.N et. al. “Soviet Rule and the Delineation of Borders in the Ferghana Valley,” 
in S.F. Starr (Ed.), Ferghana Valley: The Heart of Central Asia (New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2011).  
Abdurazakov, S. K. Administrativno-Territorial’noe Ustroistvo Uzbekskoj SSR 
(Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1987). 
Abdullaev, Ravshan. et al. “Colonial Rule and Indigenous Response, 1860-1917,” in S.F. 
Starr (Ed.), Ferghana Valley: The  Heart of Central Asia (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2011).  
Abdullaev, K. and Nazarov, R. “The Ferghana Valley Under Stalin, 1929-1953,” in S.F. 
Starr (Ed.) Ferghana Valley: The  Heart of Central Asia (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2011).  
Abduprakhimova, N. “Uzbekistan v Sostave Rossijskoj Imperii” in Ocherki po Istorii 
Gosudarstvennosti Uzbekistana (Tashkent, 2001).  
Abramzon, S.M. “O Sushchnosti Patriarkhal’no – Feodal’nykh Otnosheniju Kochevukh 
Narodov Srednej Azii i Kazakhstana,” in Materialy Ob’edinennoj Nauchnoj 
Sessii Posvjashchennoj Istorii Srednej Azii i Kazakhstana v do-Oktojabrskij 
Period (Tashkent: Academy of Sciences, 1955). 
Abramson, David. From Soviet to Mahalla: Community and Transition in Post-Soviet 





ADB, Uzbekistan: Implementation and Monitoring of Policy Reforms in the Agriculture 
Sector (December 2008). 
Akerman, Ella. "Democratisation in Central Asia: Communism to Clanism." Conflict, 
Security, and Development, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2002), pp. 133-144. 
Aloev, I. Anglo-Uzbek-Uzbekskij Slovar’ (Tashkent: Qomuslar Bosh Taririiati, 1993).  
Atkin, Muriel. “Tajikistan’s Civil War,” Current History (October, 1997).  
Bennigsen, Alexandre. ”The Nature of Ethnic Consciousness in Soviet Central Asia,” 
Paper delivered at the Conference on Soviet Central Asia: Trends and Changes, 
International Communications Agency, Washington D.C., 1978.  
-- “Several Nations or One People? Ethnic Consciousness among Soviet Central 
Asian Muslims,” Survey, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1979).  
-- “La Famille Musulmane en Union Soviétique,” Cahiers du Monde Russe et 
Soviétique Vol. 1, No.1 (May, 1959).  
Bennigsen, A. and Carrere D’Encausse, H.  “Russians and Muslims in Central Asia,” 
Civilisations, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1955).   
Beshimov, B. et al. “A New Phase in the History of the Ferghana Valley, 1992-2008,” in 
S.F. Starr (Ed.), Ferghana Valley: The  Heart of Central Asia (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2011).  
Bichel, A. "Identity/Difference in Central Asia: Tribes, Clans, and Mahalla," in Daniel 
Kempton and Terry Clark (Eds.) Unity Or Separation: Center-Periphery 
Relations in the Former Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 2001).  
Breslauer, B. “Provincial Party Leader’s Demand Articulation and the Nature of Center-
Periphery Relations in the USSR,” Slavic Review, Vol. 45 (1985), pp. 650-672.  
Brown, A. The Gorbachev Factor  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).  
Buturlin, A. "Without Regard to Any Local Organs," Sotsialisticheskaia Zakonnost, 
August 1986, no. 8, pp. 6-7, from FBIS-USSR Political and Sociological 





Bailey Carlisle, Kathleen. Clan and Politics in Uzbekistan, PhD Dissertation, Boston 
College, September 2001.  
Carlisle, Donald S. “Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to 
Gorbachev,” in William Fierman (Ed.) Soviet Central Asia: The Failed 
Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).  
-- “The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938–83)”, Central Asian 
Survey Vol. 5, No. 3-4, (1986).  
Carmel, J. “Power Elites in Uzbekistan: Clans or Political Alliances?” Orient, Vol. 46, 
No. 4 (2005), pp. 581-608.  
Carrère d'Encausse, Hélène. L'Empire éclaté  (Paris: Flammarion, 1978).  
-- The End of the Soviet Empire : The Triumph of the Republics (New York: Basic 
Books, 1992).   
-- “Les Survivances pré-Islamiques chez les Musulmans de l'U.R.S.S.” Cahiers du 
Monde Russe et Soviétique, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April - June, 1961), pp. 212-227.  
Ceccarelli, A. "Clans, Politics and Organized Crime in Central Asia," Trends in 
Organized Crime, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2007). 
Clark, William A. “Toward the Construction of a Political Mobility Ranking of Oblast 
Communist Party Committees,” Soviet Union, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1987).  
Collins, Kathleen. "Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia," Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2002), pp. 137-152. 
-- Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).  
--Clans, Pacts, and Politics: Understanding Regime Transition in Central Asia, 
PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, 1999 
-- “The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian 





Colton, Timothy and Gustafson, T. Soldiers and the Soviet State (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1990).  
Critchlow, James. Nationalism in Uzbekistan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991). 
-- “Prelude to Independence: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke Moscow’s 
Grip on Elite Recruitment,” in William Fierman (Ed.) Soviet Central Asia: The 
Failed Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).  
-- “Russia and the Uzbeks”, Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des 
Slavistes, Vol. 17, No. 2/3 (Summer and Fall, 1975), pp. 366-373.  
DeWeese, Devin. “The Politics of Sacred Lineages in 19th-Century Central Asia: 
Descent Groups Linked to Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi in Shrine Documents and 
Genealogical Charters,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 31, 
No. 4 (November, 1999), pp. 507-530. 
Dobrosmyslov, A. I. Tashkent v Proshlom’ i Nastoyashchemi (Tashkent : O.A. Portseva, 
1912).  
Dudoignon, Stéphane A. “Les "Tribulations" du juge Żiyā: Histoire et Mémoire du 
Clientélisme Politique à Boukhara,” Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, Vol. 
59, No. 5/6 (September - December, 2004), pp. 1095-1135.   
Duffy Toft, Monica. The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the 
Indivisibility of Territory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
Edgar, Adrienne L.”Genealogy, Class, and Tribal Policy in Soviet Turkmenistan, 1924-
34,” Slavic Review, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Summer 2001).  
-- The Creation of Soviet Turkmenistan, 1924-1938, PhD Dissertation, University 
of California at Berkeley, 1999.  
--Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2001).  
Ebon, Martin. The Andropov File: The Life and Ideas of Yuri V. Andropov, General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: McGraw 





Fainsod, Merle. Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1958).  
Fedorov, Yury. "Uzbekistan: Clans, Succession, and Stability,” Security Index: A Russian 
Journal on International Security, Vol.18, No. 2 (2012), pp. 39-54.  
Fedtke, G. “How Bukharans Turned into Uzbeks and Tajiks: Soviet Nationalities Policy 
in the Light of a Personal Rivalry,” in P. Sartori, and T. Trevisani (Eds.), 
Patterns of Transformation in and Around Uzbekistan (Reggio Emilia: Diabasis, 
2007).    
J. Paul Goode, “The Puzzle of Putin's Gubernatorial Appointments,” Europe-Asia 
Studies, Vol. 59, No. 3 (May, 2007).  
Heinemann-Gruder, Andreas and Haberstock, Holger. “Sultan, Clan and Patronage: The 
Dilemmas Facing Central Asia's Regimes”, Osteuropa, Vol.  57, No. 8-9 
(August 2007).  
Grey Hodnett, “Technology and Social Change in Soviet Central Asia: The Politics of 
Cotton Growing,” in Henry W Morton and T.K. Rudolf (Eds.) Soviet Politics 
and Society in the 1970's (New York: The Free Press, 1974).  
Hosking, Geoffrey. “Patronage and the Russian State,” The Slavonic and East European 
Review, Vol. 78, No. 2 (April, 2000).  
Hough, Jerry. The Soviet Prefects (Cambridge: Harvard, 1969).  
Gadzieva, S. “K Voprosu o Tuhume i Bolshoj Sem'e u Kajakentskih Kumykov” K.S.I.E., 
Vol. 14, (1952).  
de Gagemeister, Jules. Essai sur les Ressources Territoriales et Commerciales de l'Asie 
Occidentale (Paris : De L'impr. de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1839).  
Gleason, Gregory. “Fealty and Loyalty: Informal Authority Structures in Soviet Asia,” 
Soviet Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4 (1991).  
--Between Moscow and Tashkent: The Politics of the Uzbek Cotton Production 





-- “Sharaf Rashidov and the Dilemmas of National Leadership,” Central Asian 
Survey, Vol. 5, No. 3-4, (1986), pp. 133-160.   
Yoram Gorlizki, “Too Much Trust: Regional Party Leaders and Local Political Networks 
under Brezhnev,” Slavic Review, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Fall, 2010).  
Gullette, David. “Theories on Central Asian Factionalism: The Debate in Political 
Science and Its Wider Implications,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 3 
(2007), pp.  373-387.  
Harasymiw, Bohdan. ” The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System,” 
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique, 
Vol. 2, No. 4 (December, 1969).  
Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1968). 
Iliuskhin, V. Oborotni: Kak Bylo Nadumano "Uzbekskoe" Delo (Tashkent: Uzbekiston, 
1993). 
Ilkhamov, Alisher. “The Limits of Centralization: Regional Challenges in Uzbekistan,” in 
Pauline Jones Luong (Ed.), The Transformation of Central Asia: States and 
Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2004), pp. 159-181.  
-- “Stalled at the Doorstep of Modern Statehood: The Neopatrimonial Regime in 
Uzbekistan,” in Emilian Kavalski (Ed.), Stable Outside, Fragile Inside? 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2010).  
Kaiser, Robert. The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1994).  
Kangas, Roger. Faizulla Khodzhaev: National Communism in Bukhara and Soviet 
Uzbekistan, 1896-1938, PhD Dissertation, Indiana University, 1991.  





Karskii, E. F. Etnograficheskaia Karta Bielorusskago Plemeni: Trudy Komissii po 
Izucheniiu Plemennogo Sostava Naseleniia Rossii, Vol. 2 (Petrograd: 
Rossiiskaia Akademiia nauk, 1917).  
Katsuk, M. and Onipko, N. “Bor’ba s Mestnichestva,” Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost, No. 
11, (November, 1961).  
Khlebnyuk, Oleg. “Sistematsentr-Regiony v 1930-1950-e gody: Prepochylkipolitizatsii 
Nomenklatury,” Cahiers du Monde Russe, Vol. 44, No. 2/3 (April-September, 
2003).  
Khodzhaev, Faizullah. Izbrannye Trudy (Tashkent: Akademiia Nauk Uzbekskoj SSR, 
1970). 
Keddie, Nikkie R. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of the Revolution (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003).  
Keller, Shoshana. “The Central Asian Bureau: An Essential Tool in Governing Soviet 
Turkestan,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 2/3 (June-September, 2003).  
Kennedy, Michael D. “Post-Soviet Identity and Environmental Problems in Transition: 
Estonia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan through Focus Groups,” Paper prepared for 
project workshop on "Identity Formation and Social Problems in Estonia, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan", Kyiv, Ukraine, August 4-8, 1997. 
Khan Marwat, Fazal-ur-Rahim. The Basmachi Movement in Soviet Central Asia: A Study 
in Political Development (New Delhi: Emjay, 1985).  
Khodorov, I. "Natsional'noe Razmezhevanie Srednei Azii," Novyi Vostok, Vol. 8-9 
(1926).  
Kun, VI. "Izuchenie Etnicheskogo Sostava Turkestana," Novyi Vostok, Vol. 6 (1924).  
Kunhenn, Paul. Die Nomaden und Oasenbewohner Westturkestans (Langendreer : 
Heinrich Poppinghaus, 1926).  





Laitin, David. “Ethnic Unmixing and Civil War,” Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2004), 
pp. 350-65.  
Ledeneva, Alena. Russia’s Economy of Favors: Blat, Networking, and Informal 
Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).   
Lewis, David. “Understanding the Authoritarian State: Neopatrimonialism in Central 
Asia,” The Brown Journal of World, Vol. 19, No.1 (Fall 2012).  
Linden, Carl A. Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957-1964 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1966).  
Lindholm, Charles. “Kinship Structure and Political Authority: The Middle East and 
Central Asia,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 28, No. 2. 
(April, 1986), pp. 334-355.  
Lodge, Milton. “Groupism in the Post-Stalin Period,” Midwest Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 12, No. 3 (August, 1968), pp. 330-351.  
Lubin, Nancy. Labor and Nationality in Central Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1984).  
-- “Uzbekistan: Challenges Ahead,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Autumn 
1989).  
Luong, Pauline Jones. Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Central Asia 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
--”Sources of Institutional Continuity: The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia,” Paper 
prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Washington, D.C., August 31-September 2, 2000. 
Jowitt, Ken. “Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime,” 
Soviet Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3 (July, 1983), pp. 275-297.  
Madamidzhanova, Zukhra and Mukhtarov, Ildar. “Cultural Life in the Ferghana Valley 
Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev,” in S. Frederick Starr (Ed.) Ferghana Valley: 





Malashenko, Alexey. The Fight for Influence: Russia in Central Asia (Moscow: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2013).  
Materialy Ob'edinennoj Nauchnoj Sessii Posvjalcennoj Istorii Srednej Azii i Kazahstana 
v do-Oktjabrskij Period (Tashkent: Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, 1955).  
Markowitz, Lawrence P. State Erosion: Unlootable Resources and Unruly Elites in 
Central Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).  
Martin, Terry D.  The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet 
Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
Matley, Ian M. “Ethnic Groups of the Bukharan State ca. 1920 and the Question of 
Nationality,” in Edward Allworth (Ed.) The Nationality Question in Soviet 
Central Asia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).  
McAuley, Alastair. “Economic Development and Political Nationalism in Uzbekistan” 
Central Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No. 3-4, (1986), pp. 161-182. 
Mieczkowski, Z.  ”The Economic Regionalization of the Soviet Union in the Lenin and 
Stalin Period,” Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. 8 (1966).  
Miller, John. “Cadres Policy in the Nationality Areas: Recruitment of the CPSU First and 
Secretaries in the non-Russian Republics of the USSR,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 29 
(January, 1977).  
Monday, Chris. “Family Rule as the Highest Stage of Communism,” Asian Survey, Vol. 
51, No. 5 (September-October, 2011). 
Moses, Joel. “Regionalism in Soviet Politics: Continuity as a Source of Change, 1953-
1982” Soviet Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (April, 1985).  
-- Regional Party Leadership and Policy Making in the USSR (New York: Praeger, 
1974).  
--"The Impact of Nomenklatura in Soviet Regional Elite Recruitment," Soviet 





--"Functional Career Specialization in Soviet Regional Elite Recruitment," in T. H. 
Rigby and Bohdan Harasymniw (Eds.), Leadership Selection and Patron-Client 
Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), 
pp. 15-61. 
Mukulskii, D.V. ”Klany i Politika v Tadzhikistane,” Rossiia i Musulmanskii, No. 12 
(1995).  
Naumkin, Vitaly. “Uzbekistan’s State-Building Fatigue,” The Washington Quarterly, 
Vol. 29, No.3 (Summer, 2006), pp. 127-140.  
Niazi, A. Sh. “Tadzhikistan: Konflikt Regionov,” Vostok, No. 2 (1997).  
Olcott, Martha. In the Whirlwind of Jihad (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2012).  
Oliver, James H. “Turnover and Family Circles in Soviet Administration,” Slavic Review, 
Vol. 32 (September, 1973). 
Orlovsky, Daniel T. “Political Clientelism in Russia: The Historical Perspective” in T. H. 
Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw (Eds.), Leadership Selection and Patron-Client 
Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia (London, 1983), pp. 174-99. 
Park, Alexander G. Bolshevism in Turkestan 1917-1927  (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1957).  
Pipes, Richard. “Muslims of Soviet Central Asia: Trends and Prospects,” Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring, 1955), pp. 147-162.  
Ploss, Sidney. Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of 
Agricultural Policy, 1953-1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). 
Programma KPSS 1961 (Moscow, 1961).  
Rashid, Ahmed. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New York: Penguine 
Books, 2003).  
Rashidov, Sharaf. Leninizm: Znamia Osvobozhdeniia i Progressa Narodov (Tashkent: 





-- Ideologicheskaia Rabota: Moshchnyi Faktor Bor'by za Kommunizm (Moscow: 
Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1974). 
--Pobediteli (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1951).   
Razzakov, Fedor. Korruptsiya v Politburo: Delo Krasnogo Uzbeka (Moscow: Eksmo, 
2009).  
Reskov, B and Sedob, G. Usman Yusupov (Toshkent: BAE, 1976).  
Rigby, T. H. “Early Provincial Cliques and the Rise of Stalin,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 33, 
No. 1 (January, 1981).  
-- “Staffing USSR Incorporated: The Origins of the Nomenklatura System,” Soviet 
Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 (October, 1988).  
--”The Soviet Politburo: A Comparative Profile 1951-71,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 24, 
No. 1 (July, 1972). 
Ro’i, Yaacov. “The Islamic Influence on Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia,” Problems 
of Communism, Vol. 39, No. 4 (July, 1990). 
Roy, Olivier. The New Central Asia (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007). 
--Det Nya Centralasien (Stockholm: Alhambra, 2002).  
--“L’Asie Centrale et le National-Soviétisme ,” Cahiers Internationaux de 
Sociologie, Vol. 96 (Janvier-Juin, 1994).  
Rumer, Boris. Soviet Central Asia: A Tragic Experiment (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
Ruscha-Uzbekcha Lughat (Moscow: Uzbekiston SSR Fanlar Akademiyasi, 1954).  
Rywkin, Michael. “Religion, Modern Nationalism and Political Power in Soviet Central 
Asia,” Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, Vol. 17, 





-- “Cadre Competition in Uzbekistan: The Ethnic Aspect,” Central Asian Survey, 
Vol. 5, No. 3-4 (1986), pp. 183-194. 
Safarov, G. Kolonial’naia Revoliutsiia Opyt Turkestana (Moscow, 1921). 
Sahadeo, Jeff. “Soviet ‘Blacks’ and Place Making in Leningrad and Moscow,” Slavic 
Review, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Summer, 2012), pp. 331-358. 
Sansanwal, M.S. Political Leadership in Soviet Central Asia, 1946-1964 (New Delhi: 
Commonwealth, 1968). 
Sarty: Etnograficheskoe Materialy (Tashkent, 1895).  
Selnick, Irwin Steven. The Ethnic and Political Determinants of Elite Recruitment in the 
Soviet National Republics: The Uzbek Soviet Elite, 1952-1981, PhD 
Dissertation, Columbia University, 1984.  
Shkapskim’, O.A. Turkestan: Srednyaya Aziya (St. Petersburg: Svet’, 1909).  
Slezkine, Yuri. “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State 
Promoted Ethnic Particularism,” Slavic Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Summer 1994). 
Smith, Gordon. “Gorbachev and the Council of Ministers: Leadership Consolidation and 
Its Policy Implications,” Soviet Union, Vol. 14, No. 3 (1987). 
Starr, S. Frederick. “Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia,” 
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2006.  
-- “Political Power in Uzbekistan,” Unpublished paper, 2008.  
Steibel, Gerald L. “Another New Class in the Classless Society,” Slavic and East-
European Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1957-1958).  
Stewart, Philip D. et. al. “Soviet Regions and Economic Priorities: A Study in Politburo 
Perceptions,” Soviet Union, Vol. 10, No. 2-3 (1983).  





Taksanov, Alisher. Uzbekistan: Regional’nye Elity, Korruptsiya, i Nelegal’nyj Biznez 
(Tashkent: Elgg, 2012).  
Tolz, Vera. Russia: Inventing the Nation (Bloomsbury, 2001).  
Trofimov, D.A. “Klanovost kak Element Politicheskoj Kultury Tsentralnoj Azii (na 
Primere Kazakhstana, Uzbekistana i Kyrgyzstana),” in Politicheskaia Kultura 
Stran Azii i Afriki (Moscow, 1996).  
Tromly, Benjamin. ”The Leningrad Affair and Soviet Patronage Politics, 1949-1950,” 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 5 (July 2004), pp. 707-729. 
Tucker, Robert C. “Field Observations in Soviet Local Government,” American Slavic 
and East European Review, Volume 18, No. 4 (December, 1959).  
Tucker, Robert. Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 1990).  
Tunçer-Kılavuz, Idil. "Political and Social Networks in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: 
‘Clan’, Region and Beyond," Central Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2009), pp. 
323-334. 
Ulam, Adam. Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1967 (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).  
USDA Foreign Agriculture Service, U.S. Team Reports on Soviet Cotton Production and 
Trade (June, 1977).     
Ubaidullaeva, R.A. Regionalynye Problemy Razmeshcheniiai Effektivnosti Ispol'zovaniiat 
Rudovykhresursov v Uzbekskoi SSR, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, (Tashkent: 
1974).  
Urban, Michael E.; Reed, Russell B. “Regionalism in a Systems Perspective: Explaining 
Elite Circulation in a Soviet Republic,” Slavic Review, Vol. 48, No.3, (Fall, 
1989).  
Vakhabova, M. G. (Ed.), Torzhestvo Leninskogo Kooperativnogo Plana v Uzbekistane 





Vaisman, Demian. “Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan”, in 
Yaacov Ro’i (Ed.) Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies (Portland: Frank Cass, 
1995).  
Wheeler, Geoffrey. The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1964).  
Whetten, Lawrence. Current Research in Comparative Communism: An Analysis and 
Bibliographic Guide to the Soviet System (New York: Praeger, 1976).  
Willerton Jr., John P. “Patronage Networks and Coalition Building in the Brezhnev Era,” 
Soviet Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2 (April, 1987).  
--Patronage and Politics in the USSR (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992).  
Winner, Irene. “Some Problems of Nomadism and Social Organization of the Recently 
Settled Kazakhs,” Central Asian Review, Vol. 11 (1963).  
Xiaowei Zang, “Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China,” Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 6 (June, 
1991), p. 524. 
Zarubin, I. I. Spisok Narodnostei Turkestanskogo Kraia: Trudy Komissii po Izucheniiu 
Plemennogo Sostava Naseleniia Rossii, Vol. 9 (Leningrad: Rossiiskaia 
Akademiia Nauk, 1925).  
-- Naselenie Samarkandskoi oblasti: Trudy Komissii po Izucheniiu Plemennogo 
Sostava Naseleniia Rossii, Vol. 10 (Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1926).  
Ziyaeva, Diora. “Changing Identities Among Uzbek Youth: Transition from Regional to 
Socio-Economic Identities,” Paper Prepared for NBR Conference on 
“Generational Change and Leadership Succession in Uzbekistan,” Washington 
D.C., March 2, 2006.  
Zdanko, A. “Karakalpaki Khorezmskogo Oazisa”, in Arkheologicheskie i 
Etnograficheskie Raboty Khorezmskoj Ekspeditsii I945-1948 (Moskva, 1952).  







A) Obkom First Secretaries  
Table 1: Uzbekistan: Oblast Committee First Secretaries, 1950-1980 
 
Oblast Name Years 
Served 
Prior Position Next Position Region of 
Origin 





1951-56 Secr. CC on Cadre 1st Dep. Chm Pres. 
CM 
Tashkent No (Tashkent, Andijan) 
 R.K. Kurbanov 1956-61 1st Secr. 
Kashkadarya 
obkom 




Andijan, Tashkent)  




Ferghana No (Andijan, Tashkent) 




n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 









 Ashur Khaidarov 1964-68 Secr. CC Uz n.a. n.a. No (Andijan, Tashkent) 











1974-78 Chm. Namangan 
oblispolkom 
Chm. Pres. SS Ferghana Yes (Ferghana, Syr 
Darya, Namangan, 
Andijan, Tashkent)  
 S.M. 
Mamarasulov 
1978- Dep. Chm. CM Uz Present as of 
2/5/81 








n.a. Yes (Tashkent, Bukhara, 
Namangan, 
Surkhandarya)  








Surkhandarya, Bukhara)  
 Akhmadali Rizaev 1956-62 Chm. Andijan 
ispolkom 
1st Secr. Kokand 
gorkom 
Ferghana Yes (Ferghana, 
Karakalpak, Samarkand, 
Andijan, Bukhara)  
 N.M. Matchanov 1962-65 Dep. Min. of 
Agriculture 
Sec CC CPUz 
(Agr) 
Khiva No (Bukhara, Tashkent) 
 Kaium Murtazaev 1965-77 1st Secr, Tashkent 
obkom 
Chm. SC for 
Labor CM Uz 
Kash-
kadarya 













Jizak S.M. Tairov 1974-78 n.a. Minister of 
Forestry 
n.a. n.a. 





Ferghana F.K. Kokanbaev 1952-54 n.a. Dep. Min. 
Consumer Goods 
n.a. n.a. 
 T.K. Kambarov 1954-62 n.a. 1st Secr. Ferghana 
gorkom 
n.a. n.a. 




n.a. Dep. Chm. Pres. 
CM Uz 
n.a. n.a. 
 S.R. Rasulov  1963-64 
(Ind.) 
n.a. 1st Secr. Tashkent 
gorkom 
n.a. n.a. 
 F. Sh. 
Shamsutdinov 
1965-78 1st Secr. 
Surkhandarya 
obkom 
Retired Ferghana Yes (Tashkent, Andijan, 
Ferghana, Khorezm, 
Surkhandarya) 





Kashkadarya R.K. Kurbanov 1952-55 1st Secr. raikom, 
Andijan 







 M.G. Guliamov 1955-59 n.a. Chm. Surkh-
andarya oblispolk. 
n.a. n.a. 












Khorezm M. Rakhmanov 1951-
1960 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 F.Sh. 
Shamsutdinov 




Ferghana Yes (Tashkent, Andijan, 
Ferghana, Khorezm, 
Surkhandarya)   
 B.R. Rakhimov 1962-68 1st Secr. raikom in 
Samarkand obl. 











1968- n.a. Present as of 
2/5/81 
n.a. n.a. 
Namangan Khasan Dzhuraev 1951-54 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 S.N. Nurutdinov 1954-55 Head of Dept. CC 
Uz 
1st Secr. Tashkent 
gorkom 
Tashkent No (Tashkent, 
Namangan) 
 Abdulkhai Tairov 1955-59 Chm. Namangan 
ispolkom 
1st deputy Hd MA 
“Virgin Lands” 





1968-73 1st Secr. 
Samarkand oblast 
1st Secr. Tashkent 
gorkom 
Tashkent Yes (Tashkent, 
Samarkand, Namangan) 




Ferghana Yes (Ferghana, 
Namangan, Tashkent) 









Samarkand T.K. Kambarov 1951-54 n.a. 1st Secr. Ferghana 
obkom 
n.a. n.a. 
 Nor Yakubov 1954-57 n.a. Public Prosecutor n.a. n.a. 
























Chm Oblispolkom Tashkent Yes (Tashkent, 
Samarkand, Namangan) 





Shimkent Yes (Surkhandarya, 
Tashkent, Samarkand) 
 V.N. Kadyrov 1973-74 n.a. Died 10/5/74 n.a. n.a. 
 B.R. Rakhimov 1974- 1st Secr. Andijan 
obkom 






Andijan)   
 
Surkhandarya Arif Khakimov 1952-61 Secr. Karakalpak 
obkom 
Dep. Min. Agr. 
Prod. and Proc. 





1961-63 Dep. Chm CM Uz Sec CC CPUz 
(Agr.) 
Jizak Yes (Tashkent, Bukhara, 
Surkhandarya, Syr 







1963-65 1st Secr. Khorezm 
obkom 
1st Secr. Ferghana 
obkom 
Ferghana Yes (Tashkent, Andijan, 
Ferghana, Khorezm, 
Surkhandarya)  






Surkhandarya)   
 Abduvakhid 
Karimov 





1977- Secr. Samarkand 
obkom 
Present as of 
8/5/1981 














Syr Darya No (Syr Darya, 
Tashkent) 







Chm Pres. CM 
UzSSR 
Jizak Yes (Tashkent, Bukhara, 
Surkhandarya, Syr 
Darya) 







Arif Alimov 1952-56 1st Secr. Bukhara 
obkom 
Sec CC CPUz 
(Agr) 
Tashkent Yes (Andijan, Tashkent, 
Ferghana, Karakalpak, 
Namangan, Samarkand, 





 S.N. Nurutdinov 1956-59 1st Secr. Tashkent 
gorkom 
Chm Uzbek TUC Tashkent No (Tashkent, 
Namangan) 
 R.G. Gulamov 1959-61 Member of 
Bureau, CC Uz 






Secr. CC Uz Minister of 
Procure- 
Ment 
Tashkent Yes (Namangan, 
Tashkent, Kashkadarya) 
 P.V. Kaimakov 1963-64 
(ind.) 





1970- 1st Dep. Chm CM 
Uz 
Present as of 
2/5/81 







1952-55 1st Secr. 
Komsomol 
Sec CC CPUz 
(Ind.) 
Tashkent Yes (Namangan, 
Tashkent, Kashkadarya) 
 S.N. Nurutdinov 1955-56 1st Secr. 
Namangan obkom 
1st Secr. Tashkent 
obkom 
Tashkent No (Tashkent, 
Namangan) 
 R.G. Gulamov 1956-57 Chm. Tashkent 
ispolkom 
Dep. Chm. Pres. 
CM Uz 
n.a. No (Tashkent) 
 F. Kh. Khodzhaev 1957-60 n.a. Minister of Cotton 
Ginning 
n.a. n.a. 




Yes (Ferghana, Bukhara, 
Tashkent) 
 S.R. Rasulov 1965-73 n.a. Hd Dpt CC CPUz 
(Transport) 
n.a. n.a. 
 A.A. Khodzhaev 1973-78 1st Secr. 
Namangan oblast 
Sec CC CPUz 
(Constr.) 
Tashkent Yes (Tashkent, 
Samarkand, Namangan) 







Sources: Uzbekskaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya Vol. 1-13, (Tashkent: Uzbekiston SSR Fanlar Akademiyasi, 1972-1980); and Irwin 
Steven Selnick, The Ethnic and Political Determinants of Elite Recruitment in the Soviet National Republics: The Uzbek Soviet Elite, 





B) Central Committee (b) Members and Candidates, 1937-1976 
Table 2: Composition of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee (b), June 1937 
 
Name Place of Birth 
Yu. Akhunbabaev Ferghana 
S. Baltabaev Ferghana 
N. S. Zagvozdin Non-native (Tobol guberniya, Russia) 
A. Ikramov Tashkent 
G. Iskhakov Non-native 
A. Karimov Ferghana 
D. I. Manzhara Non-native (Kherson oblast, Ukraine) 
D.Tyuryabekov Khodjent (Tajikistan) 
A. A.Tsekher Non-native  
K. Sharipov Non-native 
M. Shirmukhamedov Tashkent 
 
 
Table 3: Composition of Uzbekistan’s Central Committtee (b), March 1940 
 
 
Name Place of Birth 
U. Yusupov  Ferghana 
A. V. Kudriavtchev Non-native 
N. P. Mun'ko Non-native 
Ya. Artykbaev n.a. 
S. Azimov n.a. 
A. Abdurakhmanov Tashkent 
Yu. Akhunbabaev Ferghana 
Kh.Turdyev n.a. 
A. N. Sadzhaya Non-native (Georgia) 
I. R. Apanasenko Non-native 
P. A. Kabanov Non-native (St. Petersburg) 
A. T. Aleksandrovskii (c)  Non-native 





I. K. Kulagin (c) Non-native 
S. Kamalov (c) Tashkent 




Table 4: Composition of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee (b), 1949 
 
 
Name Place of Birth 
A. Abdurakhmanov Tashkent 
V.A. Bylbas  Non-native 
M. G.Vakhabov n.a. 
P. A. Kabanov n.a. 
N. A. Lomakin Non-native 
A.I. Niyazov Ferghana 
S. Nurutdinov Tashkent 
I.E. Petrov Non-native  
U. Yusupov Ferghana 
Yu. Babadzhanov (c) Khorezm 
M.I. Baskakov (c) Non-native (Moscow) 
K. R. Rakhimov (c)  Ferghana 
 
 
Table 5: Composition of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee (b), 1954 
 
 
Name Place of Birth 
V.A. Bylbas Non-native 
S.K. Kamalov Tashkent 
A.A. Luchinskii Non-native 
R. E. Melnikov Non-native (Moscow) 
N. Mukhitdinov Tashkent  
Kh. Mukhitdinova n/a 
Sh. Rashidov Samarkand 
U. Yusupov  Ferghana 
A. Alimov (c)  Tashkent 
A.P. Byzov (c) Non-native  







Table 6: Composition of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee (b), 1956 
 
 
Name Place of Birth 
A. Abdurazakov Tashkent 
A. Alimov Tashkent 
A.P. Byzov Non-native  
S.K. Kamalov Tashkent 
A. A. Luchinskii Non-native 
R.E. Melnikov Non-native (Moscow) 
M. Mirza-Akhmedov Kazakhstan (Turkistan Sh.) 
K. Murtazaev Kashkadarya 
N. Mukhitdinov Tashkent 
Z. Rakhimbabaeva Andijan 
Sh. Rashidov Samarkand/Jizak 
 
 
Table 7: Composition of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee (b), 1959 
 
Name Place of Birth  
Sh. R. Rashidov Samarkand/Jizak 
F. E. Titov Non-native  
M. A. Abdurazakov Namangan 
G. A. Gabril'yants Non-native  
Z.R. Rakhimbabayeva Andijan 
Ya.S. Nasriddinova Ferghana 
A. A. Alimov Tashkent 
R. G. Gulamov n.a. 
G. F. Naimushin Non-native  
1.1. Fedyuninskii Non-native (Sverdlovsk) 
A. N. Rudin Non-native 
K.M. Murtazaev (c) Kashkadarya 







Table 8: Composition of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee (b), 1976   
 
Name Place of Birth 
I.G. Anisimkin Non-native  
S.E. Belonozhko Non-native (Chernigod oblast) 
V.G. Lomonosov Non-native (Khabarovsk) 
T.N. Osetrov Non-native (Belgorod oblast) 
E.B. Nordman Non-native (Tomel oblast) 
G.M. Orlov Osh, Ferghana (Kyrgyz Republic)  
N.M. Matchanov Khorezm 
M.M. Musakhanov Ferghana 
S. Rashidov  Samarkand/Jizak 
A.U. Salimov Tashkent 
A.A. Khodzhaev Tashkent 
N.D. Khudaiberdiev  Samarkand/Jizak 
K. Kamalov Karakalpakstan 
S.U. Sultanova Tashkent 
N. Makhmudov Ferghana 
Yu. Kurbanov Karakalpakstan 
 
Source on Composition 
Donald Carlisle. “The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938–83)”, Central 
Asian Survey Vol. 5, No. 3-4, (1986), pp. 130-132.  
Sources on Birth Place  
(GSE – Great Soviet Encyclopedia; HCA – Handbook of Central Asia; KaSE – Kazak 
Sovet Entsiklopediyasy; KySE – Kyrgyz Sovet Entsiklopediyasy; OME – O’zbekistan 
Milliy Entsiklopediyasi; SES – Sovetskij Enstiklopedicheskij Slovar’; TSE – 
Tadzhikskaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya; USE – Uzbek Sovet Entsiklopediyasi; SIKPSS 
-- Spravochnik po Istorii Kommunisticheskoj Partii i Sovetskogo Soyuza 1898-1991) 
A. Abdurakhmanov – HCA, Vol. 3, 1956, p. 883; A. Alimov –HCA, Vol. 3, 1956, p. 885; 
A.A. Khodzhaev – USE, Vol. 12, 1979, p. 413; A.U. Salimov – USE, Vol. 9, 1977, p. 
452; Abdurazzakov – OME, Vol. “A-B”, p. 40; Akhunbabaev – KSE, Vol. 1, p. 618; 
Babazhanov – HCA, Vol. 3, 1956, p. 886; Baskakov – SIKPSS at 
<http://www.knowbysight.info/BBB/01269.asp>;  Belonozhko -- Vol. 2, 1972, p. 143; 
Bylbas -- SIKPSS at <http://www.knowbysight.info/BBB/11672.asp>; Byzov HCA, Vol. 
3, 1956, p. 887;  Fedyuninskij – USE, Vol. 12, 1979, p. 50; G.M. Orlov – USE, Vol. 8, 
1976, p. 284; K. Kamalov – USE, Vol. 5, 1974, p. 284; Khudaiberdyev – USE, Vol. 
1979, p. 400; Kurbanov (n.a.); Lomonosov USE, Vol. 6, 1975, p. 430; Luchinskii – HCA, 





<http://www.knowbysight.info/MMM/07996.asp>; Matchanov – USE, Vol. 7, 1976, p. 
55; Melnikov, – HCA, Vol. 3, 1956, p. 893; Mirza-Akhmedov – USE, Vol. 7, 1976, p. 
262; Mukhitdinov – USE, Vol. 7, p. 482-483; Mukhitdinova –  HCA, Vol. 3, 1956, p. 
889; Murtazaev, centrasia.ru; Musakhanov – USE, Vol. 7, 1976, p. 441.;  N. Makhmudov 
– USE, Vol. 7, 1976, p. 95; Niyazov – HCA, Vol. 3, 1956, p. 896-97; Nordman – USE, 
Vol. 8, 1976, p. 62; Nurutdinov – HCA, Vol. 3, 1956, p. 897-98; Osetrov -- USE, Vol. 8, 
1976, p. 293; Rakhimbabayeva -- OSE, Volume “R”, 2010, p. 93; Rakhimbabayeva -- 
OSE, Volume “R”, 2010, p. 93;  Rakhimov – HCA, Vol. 3, 1956, p. 898-89; Rashidov – 
USE, Vol. 9, 1977 , p. 198; Rashidov – USE, Vol. 9, 1977 , p. 198; S. Kamalov -- USE, 
Vol. 5, p. 283-284; S.U. Sultanova – USE, Vol. 10, 1979, page number missing (after 
Olya Sultanova and before Toshkhon Sultonova); Sadzhaya -- SIKPSS at < 
http://www.knowbysight.info/SSS/05405.asp>; Shirmukhamedov – at centrasia.ru 
<http://www.centrasia.ru/person2.php?&st=1097758042>; Yusupov -- HCA, Vol. 3, 
1956, p. 889;  Zagvozdin – in N.V. Petrov and K.V. Skorkin, Kto Rukovodil NKVD 1934-






C) Governors (Hokimlar)  
Table 9: Governors in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan, 1991-2012 
 
Oblast Name Years served 
 







































































































Tashkent (City) Rustam  Shaabdurakhmanov 2001-2005 
Syr Darya Batyr M. Makhmudov 1993-  
 
Source: Pauline Jones Luong, Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political 
Continuity in post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts (New York: 
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